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Abstract
The regulation of interactions in open multi-agent systems is an increasingly
relevant research topic. The field of normative multi-agent systems looks at such
interactions as norm-governed: agent behaviors are guided by norms, dictating
what they should do or do not in particular situations. Electronic institutions,
inspired on real-world institutions that regulate interactions between members of
a society, have been studied and developed as a means of delivering regulated
(artificial) multi-agent environments.
Running business-to-business relationships over the Internet is quickly becom-
ing the standard way of doing business. While technological advances are mainly
concerned with matchmaking and business integration from an implementation
point of view, electronic contracting, seen as the set of activities that allow com-
panies to electronically establish and enact contractual relations, has still a long
way to go. Nevertheless, the automation of electronic contracting is acknowledged
by some researchers as highly beneficial to companies.
In this thesis we investigate on the role electronic institutions can play in
the domain of agent-based electronic contracting. An Electronic Institution (EI)
is here seen as a computational infrastructure that assists software agents in the
process of creating and running contractual relationships. For that purpose, in our
view the EI includes a set of services focusing on the automation of activities such
as contract negotiation, monitoring and enforcement. The main subject of this
thesis concerns the specification, development and exploitation of an institutional
normative environment for electronic contracting.
We propose a new formalization of contractual obligations, based on temporal
logic. Contractual obligations are seen as directed obligations with flexible time
windows. Our contribution allows agents to reason explicitly about temporal
violation states, and enables counterparties of obligations to participate in the
monitoring process.
Electronic contracts, obtained through a process of negotiation, are added to
the normative environment for monitoring and enforcement purposes. This envi-
ronment includes a hierarchical normative framework intended to assist contract
establishment, whose specification is a major contribution of this thesis. By ex-
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hibiting a norm defeasibility model, the normative framework is adaptable and
extensible to different contracting situations. We present a rule-based implemen-
tation of a contract monitoring service, and validate its correctness by defining
several contracting scenarios. The monitoring process is then applied to a number
of possible contract enactments showing different outcomes. This implemented
prototype, embedded in a more comprehensive Electronic Institution Platform,
is another contribution of this thesis.
A final contribution is an initial prospect towards norm enforcement within
the institutional environment, based on an adaptive deterrence sanctioning model
that tries to enforce norm compliance without excessively compromising agents’
willingness to establish contracts. We propose a novel abstract contract repre-
sentation, based on the notion of commitment trees. In an agent population, we
characterize agents using two main parameters: risk tolerance and social aware-
ness. Using a social simulation approach, we show that, according to our pro-
posed adaptive deterrence model, deterrence sanctions tend to be less needed
when agents are more socially concerned, which is in accordance with real-life
experience.
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Resumo
A regulac¸a˜o das interacc¸o˜es em sistemas multi-agentes abertos e´ um tema de in-
vestigac¸a˜o de relevaˆncia crescente. A a´rea dos sistemas multi-agentes normativos
considera tais interacc¸o˜es como sendo governadas por normas: os comportamen-
tos dos agentes sa˜o guiados por normas, indicando o que eles devem ou na˜o fazer
em situac¸o˜es concretas. As instituic¸o˜es electro´nicas, inspiradas em instituic¸o˜es
do mundo real que regulam interacc¸o˜es entre os membros de uma sociedade, teˆm
sido estudadas e desenvolvidas como uma forma de obter ambientes (artificiais)
multi-agentes regulados.
A conduc¸a˜o de relac¸o˜es do tipo business-to-business na Internet esta´ rapi-
damente a tornar-se na forma standard de efectuar nego´cios. Enquanto que os
avanc¸os tecnolo´gicos se debruc¸am principalmente sobre a pesquisa de parceiros
potenciais e sobre a integrac¸a˜o do nego´cio de um ponto de vista implementacional,
a contratac¸a˜o electro´nica, vista como o conjunto de actividades que permitem a`s
empresas estabelecer e conduzir relac¸o˜es contratuais de forma electro´nica, tem
ainda um longo caminho a percorrer. No entanto, a automac¸a˜o da contratac¸a˜o
electro´nica e´ reconhecida por alguns investigadores como sendo altamente bene´fica
para as empresas.
Nesta tese investigamos o papel que as instituic¸o˜es electro´nicas podem de-
sempenhar no domı´nio da contratac¸a˜o electro´nica baseada em agentes computa-
cionais. Uma Instituic¸a˜o Electro´nica (EI) e´ aqui vista como uma infra-estrutura
computacional que assiste agentes de software no processo de criac¸a˜o e execuc¸a˜o
de relac¸o˜es contratuais. Para tal, na nossa perspectiva a EI inclui um conjunto
de servic¸os virados para a automac¸a˜o de actividades tais como a negociac¸a˜o de
contratos, sua monitorizac¸a˜o e coerc¸a˜o. O assunto principal desta tese diz re-
speito a` especificac¸a˜o, desenvolvimento e explorac¸a˜o de um ambiente normativo
institucional para contratac¸a˜o electro´nica.
Propomos uma nova formalizac¸a˜o de obrigac¸o˜es contratuais, baseada em lo´gica
temporal. As obrigac¸o˜es contratuais sa˜o vistas como obrigac¸o˜es direccionadas
com janelas temporais flex´ıveis. A nossa contribuic¸a˜o faz com que os agentes
possam raciocinar explicitamente sobre estados de violac¸a˜o temporal, e permite
a` contraparte de uma obrigac¸a˜o participar no processo de monitorizac¸a˜o.
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Os contratos electro´nicos, obtidos por um processo de negociac¸a˜o, sa˜o adi-
cionados ao ambiente normativo com a finalidade da sua monitorizac¸a˜o e coerc¸a˜o.
Este ambiente inclui um enquadramento normativo hiera´rquico cujo objectivo e´
assistir a criac¸a˜o de contratos, e cuja especificac¸a˜o e´ uma contribuic¸a˜o princi-
pal desta tese. Ao exibir um modelo de revogac¸a˜o de normas, o enquadramento
normativo e´ adapta´vel e extens´ıvel a diferentes situac¸o˜es contratuais. Apresenta-
mos uma implementac¸a˜o baseada em regras de um servic¸o de monitorizac¸a˜o de
contratos, e validamos a sua correcc¸a˜o definindo diversos cena´rios contratuais. O
processo de monitorizac¸a˜o e´ depois aplicado a um conjunto de poss´ıveis execuc¸o˜es
de contrato com diferentes resultados. Este proto´tipo, implementado e integrado
numa Plataforma Instituic¸a˜o Electro´nica mais abrangente, e´ outra contribuic¸a˜o
desta tese.
Uma contribuic¸a˜o final e´ uma abordagem inicial a` problema´tica da coerc¸a˜o de
normas no seio de um ambiente institucional, baseada num modelo adaptativo de
sanc¸o˜es dissuasoras que tenta impor o cumprimento de normas sem comprometer
excessivamente a predisposic¸a˜o dos agentes em estabelecer contratos. Propomos
uma nova representac¸a˜o abstracta de contrato, baseada na noc¸a˜o de a´rvore de
compromissos. Numa populac¸a˜o de agentes, caracterizamos os agentes com base
em dois paraˆmetros principais: toleraˆncia ao risco e conscieˆncia social. Recor-
rendo a uma abordagem de simulac¸a˜o social, mostramos que, de acordo com o
nosso modelo adaptativo de dissuasa˜o, as sanc¸o˜es tendem a ser menos necessa´rias
quando os agentes exibem um comportamento socialmente mais aceita´vel, o que
vai de encontro a` experieˆncia do mundo real.
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Re´sume´
La re´gulation des interactions dans les syste`mes multi-agents ouvert est un sujet
de recherche de plus en plus pertinent. Le domaine des syste`mes multi-agents
normatifs regarde telles interactions comme gouverne´es par normes: les com-
portements des agents sont guide´s par des normes, qui indique ce qu’ils doivent
ou doivent pas faire en situations particulie`res. Les institutions e´lectroniques,
inspire´s sur les institutions du monde re´el qui re´gissent les interactions entre les
membres dune socie´te´, ont e´te´ e´tudie´s et de´veloppe´s comme un moyen de fournir
des environnements (artificielles) multi-agents re´gule´es.
La mise en marche des relations business-to-business sur l’Internet est rapi-
dement devenu le moyen standard de conduire des affaires. Bien que les avance´es
technologiques sont principalement concerne´es par la cherche´ de potentiel parte-
naires et l’inte´gration des entreprises d’un point de vue de l’imple´mentation, la
contractualisation e´lectronique, conside´re´ comme l’ensemble des activite´s qui per-
mettent aux entreprises d’e´tablir et d’exe´cuter, par voie e´lectronique, des relations
contractuelles, a encore un long chemin a` parcourir. Ne´anmoins, l’automatisation
de la contractualisation e´lectronique est reconnu par certains chercheurs comme
tre`s avantageux pour les entreprises.
Dans cette the`se, nous e´tudions le roˆle que les institutions e´lectroniques peu-
vent jouer dans le domaine de la contractualisation e´lectronique a` base d’agents.
Une Institution E´lectronique (EI) est ici conside´re´ comme une infrastructure com-
putationnelle qui aide les agents logiciels dans le processus de cre´ation et exe´cution
des relations contractuelles. A` cet effet, a` notre avis la EI comprend un ensemble
de services axe´s sur l’automatisation des activite´s telles que la ne´gociation des
contrats, le suivi de son exe´cution et application. Le sujet principal de cette the`se
concerne la spe´cification, le de´veloppement et l’exploitation d’un environnement
normatif institutionnel pour la contractualisation e´lectronique.
Nous proposons une nouvelle formalisation des obligations contractuelles, base´
sur la logique temporelle. Les obligations contractuelles sont conside´re´es comme
des obligations directionnels avec feneˆtres de temps flexibles. Notre contribution
permet aux agents de raisonner explicitement sur des violations temporelles, et
permet aux contreparties de l’obligation de participer au processus de suivi.
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Des contrats e´lectroniques, obtenu par un processus de ne´gociation, sont
ajoute´s a` l’environnement normatif a` fin de surveillance et application. Cet
environnement comprend un cadre normatif hie´rarchique qui vise a` aider a` la
cre´ation de contrats, dont la spe´cification est une contribution majeure de cette
the`se. En pre´sentant une mode`le de re´vocation des normes, le cadre normatif
est adaptable et extensible a` diffe´rents situations contractuelles. Nous pre´sentons
une imple´mentation base´ a` re`gles d’un service de surveillance du contrat, et nous
validons sa conformite´ avec la de´finition des diffe´rents sce´narios contractuelles.
Le processus de suivi est ensuite applique´ dans un certain nombre de possible
exe´cutions de contrats avec diffe´rents re´sultats. Ce prototype, imple´mente´ et
inte´gre´ dans une plus large Plateforme Institution E´lectronique, constitue une
autre contribution de cette the`se.
Une dernie`re contribution est un approche initiale vers l’application des normes
au sein de l’environnement institutionnel, fonde´ sur un mode`le adaptative de sanc-
tions de dissuasion qui essaie de faire respecter les normes sans trop compromet-
tre la volonte´ des agents a` e´tablir des contrats. Nous proposons une nouvelle
repre´sentation abstraite du contrat, fonde´e sur la notion de arbre d’engagements.
Dans une population d’agents, nous caracte´risons les agents au moyen de deux
parame`tres principaux: tole´rance au risque et conscience sociale. En utilisant une
approche de simulation sociale, nous montrons que, selon notre mode`le adaptatif
de dissuasion, les sanctions tendent a` eˆtre moins ne´cessaire lorsque les agents sont
socialement plus concerne´s, ce qui est conforme a` l’expe´rience de la vie re´elle.
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Chapter1
Introduction
Multi-agent systems (MAS) research provides an increasingly relevant perspec-
tive to artificial intelligence and to computing in general: that of modeling sys-
tems where the interaction among computing elements (software agents) is of
paramount importance [152]. Researchers in this field are therefore no longer
solely interested in building intelligent individual software agents, but also in de-
signing suitable interactions among these agents and modeling organizations that
they may be a part of.
This thesis is centered around the role of electronic institutions, understood
as computational infrastructures, in assisting software agents in the process of
creating and running contractual relationships. The development of autonomous
software agents that are able to use these infrastructures is a daunting task of
which we will only scratch the surface. In fact, the target domain that we address
– business-to-business contracting – may pose too many obstacles to such an
endeavor (both in terms of technological limitations and real-world acceptance).
Throughout this thesis we will be more interested in the supporting features that
can be developed to assist partially autonomous software agents in tasks related
with the establishment and enactment of contracts regulating joint work. Partial
autonomy is here used in the sense that, despite significant automation, human
interaction is likely to be needed in several steps of the process.
In this chapter we provide motivation for this work, present the rationale be-
hind the research done and summarize the main contributions that were achieved.
We also outline the structure of the rest of this document.
1.1 The Evolution of Business
The shift, in the last decades, from an industrial economy (based on mass produc-
tion models) to an information-based economy associated with the globalization
of markets, has brought an enormous increase in competitiveness, leading to the
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need for new organizational models (see e.g. [73] for some insights on this is-
sue). In order to prosper in such an environment, enterprises need to establish
synergies through collaborative links, sometimes even with competitors: differ-
ent enterprises coordinate the necessary means to accomplish shared activities or
reach common goals. This association of strengths enables enterprises to build
privileged relationships, based on an increase of advantages through resource and
competence sharing, leading to risk minimization.
Cooperation arrangements are particularly relevant for small and medium en-
terprises (SME) [2], due to their reduced size, high specialization and flexibility.
These kinds of enterprises have been adopting new strategies that enable them
to adapt to a constantly changing market, by organizing themselves in strategic
partnerships. While maintaining their business independence, partners are able
to reach otherwise unreachable (physical and customer) markets and take advan-
tage of economies of scale. Furthermore, many large companies are isolating parts
of their businesses, making them autonomous and more agile, in order to increase
the overall flexibility and achieve greater performances. Outsourcing models are
also becoming dominant, enabling enterprises to concentrate on their core com-
petencies. Thus, there is an increasing emphasis in temporary cooperation and
coordination of small business units.
The concept of a Virtual Enterprise (VE) has also arisen from the trend to-
wards coordination of several business entities, providing a more decentralized
approach. As noted by Petersen [176], several definitions have been proposed
for the VE concept, from within different research communities. One possible
definition has been advanced by Camarinha-Matos [28]: “a temporary alliance of
enterprises that come together to share skills or core competences and resources
in order to better respond to business opportunities, and whose cooperation is
supported by computer networks.”. However, the establishment of cooperation
agreements between enterprises is not a new phenomenon, rather belonging to
the very nature of the business world; the use of communication and information
technologies to support agile cooperation brings a new level of effectiveness and
a substantial increase of cooperation on a global scale, as distance is no longer
a major limiting issue. Other definitions highlight the fact that enterprises par-
ticipating in a VE are independent and autonomous entities [76], or emphasize
the temporary nature of a VE and the dynamism of the business environment in
which they are to be created [55].
As a consequence of this evolution, there is a major trend on developing
advanced software tools that support the establishment and management of co-
operation agreements among companies.
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1.2 Conducting Electronic Business
From a technological perspective, the advent of the Internet has brought to the
business realm new ways of exchanging data between companies, assisted by
computer communication networks. The first technological impact has thus been
on changing the way companies exchange documents (e.g. through e-mails), which
are turned into an electronic form. A pioneering standard that was created at
this stage was EDI1, which enabled companies to exchange structured messages
that could be automatically interpreted by their information systems.
After information and communication technologies have matured, electronic
commerce (e-commerce for short) has become a common term, as more and
more companies join the “on-line” and electronic paradigm of doing business.
While this is true for business-to-consumer relationships, e-commerce has a much
stronger importance and is becoming everyday more widespread in the business-
to-business (B2B) world. Companies have started to automate some of their busi-
ness activities, namely the process of finding potential business partners. This
means that besides holding a world-wide-web presence through websites, compa-
nies have created business portals that more powerfully allow them to manage
their B2B relationships. Furthermore, third-party on-line business marketplaces
(e.g. MFG.com2) have been created that allow SMEs to pursue business oppor-
tunities in the world-wide-web.
Also, a number of standards has grown in the e-commerce domain, defined by
standardization bodies such as UN/CEFACT3 or OASIS4.
The ebXML5 suite of specifications intends to enable enterprises of any size
and geographical location to enter into business over the Internet, by specifying
standard methods to exchange business messages, conduct trading relationships,
communicate data in common terms and define and register business processes.
Enterprises are seen as trading partners that register their business profiles in an
easily accessible ebXML registry. After an initial discovery phase, trading part-
ners define a business arrangement that outlines a mutually agreed upon business
scenario (a collaboration protocol agreement), including messaging requirements
for transactions to take place.
Another suite of specifications has been created by the Web Services Activity
of the W3C6, targeted more broadly at application-to-application communica-
tion. Web-service standards include specifications for the exchange of messages
1Electronic Data Interchange
2http://www.mfg.com
3United Nations Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business – http://www.
unece.org/cefact/
4Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards – http://www.
oasis-open.org
5Electronic Business using eXtensible Markup Language – http://www.ebxml.org
6World Wide Web Consortium – http://www.w3.org
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(SOAP7), for the description of services that are provided by applications and
that can be invoked through SOAP messages (WSDL8), and for infrastructures
required to publish and discover services at runtime (UDDI9).
A related standard has been promoted to foster the use of web-service tech-
nology in business applications: WS-BPEL10 is an orchestration language for
specifying business process behavior based on web-services. While the interac-
tion model supported by WSDL is a stateless request-response model, WS-BPEL
provides a means to define sequences of peer-to-peer web-service invocations that
implement a business interaction protocol.
Several other standardization efforts have been pursuit, some of which are
precursors of the above mentioned ones.
Time has now come for a more integrating approach on automated handling of
(parts of) the contracting activity, ranging from partner matchmaking to contract
establishment and to business enactment. This gives rise to electronic contract-
ing (e-contracting for short), seen as a further step on using information and
communication technologies in the core of a business relationship – the contract,
which is to be handled in an electronic form (e-contract). However, as noted by
Angelov [6] the development of automated tools for handling e-contracts presents
many technological, business and legal challenges.
Standardization efforts on e-contracting have also been attempted. For in-
stance, the LegalXML11 initiative aims at creating standards for the electronic
exchange of legal data. In particular, it has delivered the LegalXML eCon-
tracts specification, which aims at handling contract documents and terms. The
LegalXML Technical Committee has considered the scenario of having machine
readable contracts useful for performance monitoring and dispute resolution [157].
However, the specification has left out a deontic contract language approach, ac-
knowledging that this is a specialized area that requires considerable further re-
search before commercial adoption. Deontic issues are, nevertheless, of paramount
importance in contractual relationships, and their explicit representation in some
form is crucial to enable automatic contract monitoring.
A number of rule-based engines exist that allow for the specification of business
rules, which can in turn be used to specify the deontic aspects of contracts, making
them available for machine processing (e.g. for run-time compliance checking).
A standardization effort in this domain is the Rule Markup Initiative12, which
attempts to define RuleML13 as a common language representation for all kinds
of rules (not only for business or e-contract purposes).
7Simple Object Access Protocol
8Web Services Description Language
9Universal Description, Discovery and Integration
10Web Services Business Process Execution Language
11http://www.legalxml.org
12http://www.ruleml.org
13Rule Markup Language
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1.3 Research Rationale and Outputs
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate and make contributions regarding the
development of infrastructures that support e-contracting. We employ a MAS
research perspective to this problem.
There has been substantial research on the application of MAS to B2B (see
e.g. the surveys [19] and [109]). A vast amount of approaches to B2B automation
has concentrated on the design of market mechanisms (e.g. auctions) and negoti-
ation protocols [121][91], which together with research on bidding and negotiation
strategies comprise what might be called approaches to agent-based automated ne-
gotiation. Negotiation protocols and tools that allow for partner selection in VE
scenarios have also been proposed (namely by Rocha [185] and Petersen [176]).
Comparatively less approaches focus on e-contract establishment, that is,
on how software agents might be able to negotiate the normative content of
e-contracts. By normative content we mean the business commitments or obli-
gations that contractual partners commit to when establishing a contract. There
are, however, several research initiatives concerned with capturing the normative
aspects of e-contracts (many of which are covered in the next chapters).
The research we have done and report in this thesis concerns employing the
concept of electronic institutions to the domain of agent-based B2B e-contracting.
Real-world institutions are used to regulate the interactions between members of a
society. An Electronic Institution (EI) is the electronic counterpart of one of such
institutions, specifying and enforcing regulations on electronic members (software
agents) that adhere to the underlying electronic society on behalf of real enter-
prises. There have been other researchers exploring and developing the notion of
electronic institutions within the MAS research field (namely Noriega [166], F.
Dignum [60], Rodr´ıguez-Aguilar [188], Esteva [68], Va´zquez-Salceda [226]). Our
approach tries to provide a practical and open account to the EI concept, thinking
of it as a coordination framework that assists agents on establishing contractual
relationships that will be a part of the regulations guiding future interactions
between such agents.
A subfield of MAS research that has grown in importance in the last years
is the field of normative multi-agent systems (NMAS) [23]. A normative system
has been defined as a “set of interacting agents whose behaviour can usefully be
regarded as governed by norms. Norms prescribe how agents ought to behave,
and specify how they are permitted to behave and what their rights are” [116].
Agents therefore interact in some kind of normative environment that shapes,
or at least influences, their behavior options. We believe that this normative
perspective on MAS is perfectly suited for the e-contracting domain, and we have
used NMAS as the underlying scene for applying MAS in this domain.
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1.3.1 Research questions
As mentioned above, the guiding line of this research is the application of elec-
tronic institutions and normative multi-agent systems to the domain of B2B e-
contracting. Therefore, a major effort has been put on analyzing the EI concept
from the point of view of its potential importance in enabling the use of software
agents for automating e-contracting processes. In particular, we have tried to
pursue the following research questions:
1. How can the concept of Electronic Institution be adapted to address the
domain of agent-based e-contracting?
Although there have been some approaches to design and develop the con-
cept of Electronic Institution, they somehow lack the flexibility of address-
ing the creation of normative relationships (contracts) at run-time. We
therefore need to rethink the concept in terms of its applicability to the
e-contracting domain.
2. What kind of e-contracting support should we embed in a normative envi-
ronment?
Having NMAS as our underlying scene, and considering that e-contracts are
created at run-time, we have a setting where interacting agents are willing
to establish normative relationships. We need to investigate on the kinds
of infrastructures that can be provided to assist these agents on their effort
to establish contracts and to enact those contracts.
3. How should e-contracts be specified in order to enable their automatic pro-
cessing?
An important phase of e-contracting is the enactment of contracts. If
an Electronic Institution is to be able to monitor contract enactment, e-
contracts should be specified in a way that enables them to be interpreted
in an automatic way. Taking a NMAS perspective, we need to study how
norms can be used to model the normative content of e-contracts.
4. Which mechanisms may an Electronic Institution, and more specifically a
normative environment, put in practice to enforce e-contracts?
Taking agents as autonomous entities from the Electronic Institution’s per-
spective, they are able to decide whether to fulfill or not their contractual
duties. Therefore, it is important to consider extra-contractual enforcement
mechanisms that can be put into place in order to influence agent behavior.
These questions are obviously interrelated. The specification of e-contracts
influences and is dependent on the e-contracting infrastructures that are to be
available. The “institutional” flavor of the Electronic Institution concept is closely
related with its ability to monitor and enforce norms, which should be identified
as an important ingredient of the infrastructures to develop.
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1.3.2 Main contributions
This research has focused on building infrastructures for agent-based B2B e-
contracting. The main scientific contributions are centered on the specification,
development and exploitation of an institutional normative environment. We
therefore highlight the following contributions:
• A specification of an institutional normative environment
Software agents, representing different business entities, negotiate and es-
tablish contractual relationships. Such relationships are expressed by a set
of contractual norms that will guide further interactions among contractual
partners. The normative environment that we propose has the responsi-
bility to monitor norm abidance, by maintaining a normative state and
applying monitoring rules and contractual norms. Our approach is inspired
by Searle’s work on institutional reality [203], in order to bring facts into
the normative environment. Also, the environment is institutional in the
sense that it is empowered to enforce norms should they be violated.
• A hierarchical normative framework model with norm defeasibility
In order to facilitate the establishment of e-contracts, the normative envi-
ronment includes a supportive and extensible normative framework model.
This model is inspired by notions coming from contract law theory, namely
the use of “default rules” – background norms to be applied in the absence
of any explicit agreement to the contrary. This normative structure is com-
posed of a hierarchy of contexts, within which norms are created that may
apply to sub-contexts. The context hierarchy tries to mimic the fact that
in business it is often the case that a B2B contractual agreement forms the
business context for more specific contracts that may be created. Each con-
tract establishes a new context for norm applicability. A norm defeasibility
approach is proposed in order to determine whether a norm should be in-
herited, for a specific situation, from an upper context. This feature allows
the normative framework to be adapted (to better fit a particular contract
case) and extended (allowing new contract types to be defined).
• A formalization of contractual obligations using temporal logic
Our approach, taking inspiration from real-world legislations on trade con-
tracts, sees contract enactment as a cooperative activity. The successful
performance of business is supposed to benefit all involved parties, and
therefore contractual partners may be cooperative enough to allow, up to a
certain extent, counterparty deviations. The semantics of contractual obli-
gations, as we model them, incorporate flexible livelines and deadlines, and
include the possibility for agents to participate in the monitoring process.
8 Chapter 1. Introduction
• An implemented prototype (proof-of-concept) integrating the scientific con-
tributions highlighted above
An institutional normative environment including the aforementioned fea-
tures has been implemented, based on a forward-chaining rule-based in-
ference engine – Jess14 [82]. Furthermore, this environment has been in-
tegrated into an Electronic Institution Platform also providing negotiation
and contracting facilities.
• A preliminary model of adaptive deterrence sanctions for norm enforcement
Adaptive enforcement mechanisms are important in open environments,
where the behavior of an agent population cannot be directly controlled.
When the normative specification of contracts has imperfections, namely
by not specifying normative consequences for every possible contract en-
actment outcome, self-interested agents may try to exploit their potential
advantage and intentionally violate contract clauses. We have designed and
experimentally evaluated a model for adaptive deterrence sanctions that
tries to enforce norm compliance without excessively compromising agents’
willingness to establish contracts. Raising deterrence sanctions has a side
effect of increasing the risk associated with contracting activities.
The research reported in this thesis is framed into a wider research project,
taking place at LIACC15 (in the NIAD&R16 group) and under supervision of
Prof. Euge´nio Oliveira, which concerns the development of an Electronic Institu-
tion Platform for B2B contracting. Several agent-based services have been iden-
tified and developed that assist the automation of e-contracting processes, such
as partner selection through automatic negotiation [172][185], ontology-mapping
[155][154], contract establishment, monitoring and enforcement (including the
work reported in this thesis), and computational trust and reputation [219].
These services have been integrated in a common software platform (based on
JADE17 [18] and using well-defined interaction protocols), and an effort has been
put on aligning the operation of the normative environment with the outcome of
the negotiation and contract establishment service. Contract drafting makes use
of a particular contract model we have developed. The normative environment
provides a contract monitoring and enforcement service, and has been integrated
with subscription mechanisms in place for the notification of contract-related
events to interested and authorized agents.
14http://www.jessrules.com
15Laborato´rio de Inteligeˆncia Artificial e Cieˆncia de Computadores
16Nu´cleo de Inteligeˆncia Artificial Distribu´ıda & Robo´tica
17Java Agent DEvelopment Framework – http://jade.tilab.com
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1.4 Structure of this Thesis
The rest of this thesis is divided into two parts.
Part I provides the reader a perspective on research that has been carried
out in two research communities devoted to distinct but somehow related research
areas. The work presented in this thesis can be seen as an effort to bring these
research areas closer to each other: electronic contracting and normative multi-
agent systems.
• Chapter 2 provides a background overview on the issue of electronic con-
tracting. We start by dissecting the stages that may be comprised in this
activity and describe the key issues in each of those stages. When doing so,
we refer to numerous approaches of other researches dealing with such is-
sues. The chapter also brings to light a number of relevant research projects
that are related to electronic contracting.
• Chapter 3 delves into the research realm of normative multi-agent systems.
We start by an introduction to norms and their use within the MAS research
community. We then provide an overview of some research perspectives
on providing regulated environments for MAS. The central concept of this
thesis – Electronic Institution – is then studied in detail as a means for
delivering a regulated multi-agent environment. The notion of institution
is first presented from a multidisciplinary perspective. The most relevant
approaches to conceptualize, design or develop institutions in MAS, from
different research groups, are discussed.
Part II includes the research contributions of this thesis, while trying to
answer the research questions raised in Section 1.3.1.
• Chapter 4 presents the Electronic Institution concept from the LIACC-
NIAD&R perspective, with an e-contracting application in mind. Some
of the services to be provided by an Electronic Institution Platform are
presented, even though they are outside the scope of this thesis. We also
shed some light on the kinds of contractual scenarios that we aim at with
the research developments contained in this thesis. Chapter 4 answers the
first research question.
• Chapter 5 provides a specification for an institutional normative envi-
ronment, including a norm representation formalism. The normative en-
vironment provides an e-contract monitoring and enforcement facility, by
applying monitoring rules and contractual norms. It also includes a context-
based hierarchical normative framework that agents can exploit when creat-
ing their own e-contracts. Chapter 5 answers the second research question,
and partially the third.
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• Chapter 6 proposes a formalization of contractual obligations using tem-
poral logic. This formalization tries to take into account the way contracts
are enacted in the real-world, taking inspiration from legislations on trade
contracts. The semantics of contractual obligations is modeled with a flexi-
ble approach to temporal violations, identifying the bearer and counterparty
roles in a directed obligation and enabling enacting agents to participate in
the monitoring process. Chapter 6 provides a reinforcement to answer the
third research question.
• Chapter 7 explains how the ideas presented in the preceding chapters have
been implemented using a rule-based inference engine. It also illustrates
the operation of the normative environment with different e-contracting
scenarios and enactments. Chapter 7 shows the feasibility of the answers
to the second and third research questions.
• Chapter 8 addresses the issue of norm enforcement by proposing an ab-
stract model to represent the normative content of contracts, based on which
an adaptive deterrence sanctioning model has been designed. Experiments
have been made with a social simulation approach: the adaptation model
was tested when facing different kinds of agent populations, where agents
are parameterized regarding their risk tolerance and their social awareness
when enacting the contracts they commit to. Chapter 8 provides a prelim-
inary response to the fourth research question.
• Finally, Chapter 9 looks back to the research contributions of this thesis,
giving them a critical appreciation. It also identifies some lines of future
research.
Part I
Background
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Chapter2
Electronic Contracting
Contracts are an essential element in business. A contract is a legally binding
agreement between two or more parties. Typically, the parties entering in a con-
tract commit to certain obligations in return for certain rights. In other words,
a set of value exchanges is assumed to be taking place in contract enactment;
in principle, every partner will benefit from such exchanges. According to con-
tract law, contracts may be obtained by oral agreement (most purchases that
we make every day are contracts of this form). We will, however, concentrate
on discussing issues related with contracts that are obtained by explicit written
agreements. These contracts may have an arbitrary complexity and give parties
material evidence that prove the actual terms agreed upon at contract establish-
ment.
Electronic contracting comprises all the activities related with running con-
tractual relationships by electronic means. These means help overcoming the
slowness and high costs of traditional paper-based contracts, and enable address-
ing emerging business paradigms based on dynamism and automation of trading
relations. Angelov [6] has developed a thorough research on the business, legal and
technological requirements for the development of highly automated e-contracting
systems.
Legal aspects of e-contracting are already addressed in regulations such as the
Directive on Electronic Commerce of the European Union [214] and its transpo-
sition to the Portuguese legislation [15]. In particular, such regulations admit
the establishment of contracts between computers, that is, in an entirely auto-
mated way. But besides legal issues, the realization of e-contracting poses many
technological and business challenges that have yet to be addressed.
Angelov identifies the benefits companies get from highly automated electronic
contracting, and distinguishes different adoption levels of e-contracting processes,
namely what he calls shallow and deep e-contracting [9]. The former exploits the
use of information and communication technologies for carrying out, by electronic
means, the same business processes that occur without these tools, and therefore
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maintaining the same level of involvement of people. On the contrary, deep e-
contracting presupposes a higher level of automation, and leads to changes in the
existing business processes. It also poses many research challenges concerning
the supporting technologies. The carrying out of contracting activities through
electronic means is still lacking supporting infrastructures that enable a higher
level of automation.
In this chapter we dissect e-contracting into the several activities that may
make part of this electronic approach to contracting. When doing so, we will
provide an overview of the main research approaches devoted to such activities.
2.1 E-contracting Stages
Electronic contracting involves a set of activities that are centered on an essential
concept: the electronic contract. Taking this into account, we identify three
major stages within any e-contracting effort:
• Pre-contractual : This stage covers those activities related with information
acquisition and identification of business opportunities. Electronic mar-
kets with matchmaking facilities are typical at this stage, before potential
partners in a business contract start making preparations regarding such
a relationship. The connection with the next stage might consist of an
invitation to treat.
• Contractual : This stage comprises the negotiation of business terms and
exchanged value provisions, which will be included in the contract. Market
mechanisms for resource allocation, such as auctions and negotiation pro-
tocols, can and have been used to automate the achievement of deals with
predefined contract templates. The negotiation of contractual terms is,
however, a much more demanding activity to consider automating through
electronic means. The output of this stage, in case of success, is a legally-
binding agreement – a contract – which is the object of the whole contractual
relationship. An electronic representation of the contract enables it to be
automatically interpreted by computers.
• Post-contractual : After a contract has been established, it is time to proceed
as agreed. Parties in the contract will enact the necessary activities to fulfill
contractual terms. Contract monitoring tools may help on checking partners
abidance to contractual terms, provided that the contract is represented
electronically and in a way amenable to automatic processing. In case
partners fail to comply with their obligations, the contract or the legislative
system on which it is based may provide corrective measures to be applied.
Several authors have based their research on similarly defined contracting
stages (e.g. [183][231]). In some cases the pre-contractual stage is further detailed
2.2. Finding Business Partners 15
into an information gathering and an intention phase [92][7]. In other cases the
contractual phase is divided into the negotiation itself and the formal capture of
negotiation outcomes in an e-contract amenable for automatic processing [178].
We will now provide a brief overview of some approaches addressing the main
issues related with each of the three e-contracting stages as identified above.
2.2 Finding Business Partners
The pre-contractual stage is perhaps the most widely addressed by existing tech-
nological infrastructures. Since the beginning of e-commerce many on-line mar-
ketplaces have been developed, devoted to both domains of business-to-consumer
and business-to-business. Business players have at their disposal the means to
find potential business partners worldwide. Furthermore, there is already a high
degree of automation at this stage. Matchmaking facilities already exist that
automatically inform business players, based on their registered profiles, of new
request-for-quotes (which comprise announced business opportunities).
Open marketplaces may be inadequate when the establishment of business
relationships requires trust among individual business players. While most of
these business platforms include some form of reputation mechanism that allow
participants to provide feedback on the performance of contractual partners, this
somehow does not seem to be enough in situations where partners really need
to be acquainted with each other. Moreover, when one intends to automate fur-
ther aspects of the e-contracting process, further supporting infrastructures are
needed. This is important when companies want to address a highly dynamic
market, seeking to react to business opportunities in a very prompt way, which
is a perfect match for the requirement of a fast set-up phase for Virtual Enter-
prises [179][29].
In order to provide a higher degree of preparedness to address business oppor-
tunities, environments where groups of companies have prior knowledge and/or
business experiences with each other have been proposed. These may consist of
industry clusters of companies in the same or in complementary business domains.
The concept of Virtual Enterprise Breeding Environment (VBE) [29][30] has been
advanced as an association or pool of enterprises that are willing to cooperate (a
keyword is preparedness) and that establish a long-term cooperation agreement.
When a business opportunity arrives, a subset of the members of this pool may
be selected, forming a VE. It is the role of the VBE to provide facilitating ele-
ments for boosting VE formation: a common infrastructure, common ontologies
and mutual trust.
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2.3 Negotiating E-contracts
Automated negotiation has been an active area of research for at least the last
two decades, mainly in the multi-agent systems research community. Follow-
ing the seminal works by Raiffa [181], and Rosenschein and Zlotkin [191], many
researchers have devoted their efforts to devising negotiation protocols and strate-
gies for automated negotiation among software agents.
Most research has, however, considered negotiation as a process of finding a
mutually acceptable agreement on a multi-attribute search space. Every nego-
tiable issue in a contract is therefore seen as an attribute in the space of possible
deals, and in many cases research is kept at a very abstract level (e.g. [124]).
Also, the automation of business negotiations using software agents has focused
on negotiation as a partner selection process (e.g. [185]), not making a connec-
tion to the contract that formalizes the business agreement. But in business two
negotiation stages are needed: the negotiation of exchanged values and the ne-
gotiation of their provisions, which is often called contract drafting [54]. Little
work has been done on e-contract negotiation that takes into account contractual
conditions such as deadlines, payment conditions, warranties, or sanctions. When
making the connection with contract drafting, predefined contract templates are
typically used.
The automation of negotiation using software agents is feasible only in rel-
atively well-structured areas [231]. In most business settings negotiation will
still need to be performed by humans in the foreseeable future. In these cases
negotiation support systems [120] may have an important role to play.
The need for a starting ground in e-contract negotiations is acknowledged by
several researchers (see, for instance, [183][196][231]). In fact, starting a negoti-
ation where nothing is fixed represents a too ill-structured problem to consider
automating. The importance of a contract template resides on its ability to pro-
vide a structure on which negotiation can be based. Certain kinds of business
relations are formally typified and documented by relevant professional or le-
gal bodies through model-form contracts. In this sense, instead of beginning
from scratch a new contractual relation, prospective business partners can use an
e-contract template, which can be seen as a contract outline containing domain-
independent interaction schemata (business protocols) and variable elements to
be filled-in with domain-specific data (such as exchanged values, prices, quanti-
ties, deadlines, and so on) resulting from a negotiation process (as in the approach
suggested in [129]). If the negotiation is successful, an actual contract is produced
that is an instantiation of the template. Templates thus provide a structure that
allows negotiation, as a process of cooperative construction of a business relation,
to be focused on those elements that are specific of the business at hand.
An interesting integration of both contract representation and negotiation is
presented in [183], where auctions are automatically generated from declarative
contract descriptions. The authors use a declarative language for representing
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both fully specified executable contracts and partially specified ones that are
to be completed through negotiation. A contract template is composed of a
fixed part – the so called proto-contract – and an identifiable set of issues to be
negotiated; the template can then evolve through partial agreements, as each issue
is successively fixed, until it becomes a fully-specified contract. The declarative
description of partial contracts includes rules that describe the components of the
contract left to be determined, expressing how they are to be negotiated. From
this declarative setting, negotiation mechanisms are generated, which consist of
AuctionBot auctions [237].
Other attempts to assist e-contract negotiation follow the negotiation support
systems approach [120]. This seems to be more feasible in the short-term, while
posing less demanding research challenges. In the collaborative networked orga-
nizations research community, supporting tools for virtual organization formation
are being attempted [171], not having automation as a main concern.
Looking at the legal aspects of what may be included in a contract, and there-
fore what might be negotiated between business peers, we observe that contract-
ing parties are free to create contracts with arbitrary content (this is expressed in
article 405 of the Portuguese Civil Code [14] as contractual freedom). Therefore,
although specific legislations may exist that regulate typical commercial relation-
ships, such legislations are provided in order to facilitate parties when contracting,
and usually not with the aim of constraining contractual content [118]. Parties
are therefore allowed to contract around these “default rules” [48].
2.4 Representing E-contracts
Information and communication technologies have been used for representing e-
contracts. However, current practice is largely devoted to giving natural language
written contracts an electronic existence, which is supposed to facilitate search-
ing and reading by human users. The possibility of having e-contracts that are
automatically interpretable by machines has not been fully addressed by recent
standardization efforts (e.g. LegalXML [157]).
The representation of law and regulations as computer programs has long been
addressed by researchers (see [206] for a somewhat outdated survey). The possi-
bility of reasoning about the application of legislations using artificial intelligence
techniques has been actively pursued by many researchers. In particular, deontic
logic [225] has played an important role in this research area [235][115]. The use
of similar techniques to represent e-contracts (as studied by Daskalopulu [50])
is a natural extension of this work, since a contract can be seen as a regulation
targeted at a specific group of individuals. One such attempt to represent deontic
aspects of e-contracts is DocLog [213], which provides a semi-formal specification
of contracts: an XML contract representation includes natural language clauses
complemented with a structured normative description of such clauses. The aim
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of DocLog is to help human decision-makers in understanding the normative im-
plications of certain business messages.
A number of research efforts have set higher standards in e-contract represen-
tation. More than having legal advice tools for legal practitioners, these efforts
aim at automating the interpretation and execution of contractual content, en-
abling a higher level of business integration.
As mentioned before, deontic logic is the most widely used approach to model
the normative content of contractual relations [197][194][212]. Deontic logic is a
branch of modal logic also known as the logic of normative concepts. This logic
embraces the notions of obligation, permission and prohibition, which are analo-
gous to the modal concepts of necessity, possibility and impossibility, respectively.
Although traditionally used to analyze normative reasoning in law, applications
of deontic logic in computer science exist [235], not limited to the domain of legal
knowledge representation and legal expert systems; other applications include,
e.g., authorization mechanisms and electronic contracting.
Extensions to the original work on deontic logic (and particularly to what is
known as Standard Deontic Logic [225]) have been made so as to allow its practical
use. These include approaches to handle norm violations, such as the application
of sanctions, also known as contrary-to-duties [32]: obligations that come into
force in sub-ideal situations (i.e., when other obligations are violated). Other
important extensions consider the use of conditional [222] and temporal [63][27]
aspects: obligations are often made conditional on the occurrence of another event
and have an associated deadline. Temporal logic [67] is often used to specify the
semantics of deontic operators. Namely, Xu [238] uses propositional temporal
logic for modeling monitorable contracts, and V. Dignum [66] proposes a Logic
for Contract Representation based on branching-time temporal logic.
Using deontic logic to model the normative content of contracts typically
consists of composing a set of normative statements including deontic operators
(obligations, permissions or prohibitions), which are made conditional and have
a temporal dimension (see e.g. the contract representation in the Electronic
Contract Framework by Salle´ [196], or the contract specification language used
by Kollingbaum [129]). Another important issue in business contract obligations
is directedness [194][212]: the identification of both the bearer (who is obliged)
and the counterparty (to whom the bearer is obliged). Directed obligations are
defined as commitments by Singh [230].
One possible representation for modeling obligations in contracts is based on
the following structure: σ → Ob,c(α ≺ δ). In this representation, when a state
of affairs σ is the case, agent b is obliged towards agent c to bring about α
before deadline δ. The characterization of the state of affairs may be such that
obligations are raised on the fulfillment or violation of other obligations, making
it possible to compose obligation chains that implement the desired contract
enactment protocol. It also enables the specification of responses to contract
violations (contrary-to-duties).
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Other contract representation formalisms that include the handling of deontic
operators have also been studied. Event Calculus [130][207] is a formalism for
representing and reasoning about actions or events and their effects, consisting of
a set of axioms in first-order predicate logic that defines the relationship between
events, time-points and fluents. Event calculus has been used by Knottenbelt
to define a contract language [126][125]. In his approach, events are defined
as initiating or terminating fluents regarding the normative positions of agents
within a contract. The evolution of obligations (their fulfillment or violation) are
captured by rules specifying these event-fluent relationships.
An event-based representation of contracts is suggested by Abrahams [1]. Con-
tracts (and business policies in general) are viewed as collections of occurrences
that are stored in an occurrence store. An occurrence is an event that occurs at a
particular point in time (or that occupies a period of time), and has participants
acting in various roles (for instance, a purchasing occurrence has a purchaser, a
purchased object and a seller). The occurrence store is an active database that
checks newly added occurrences with existing policies, triggering contractually
defined responses accordingly.
Processes and state machines have also been used to represent contracts. In
Daskalopulu’s approach [51], states represent the obligations that are in effect be-
tween the parties. Transitions correspond to the performance or non-performance
of actions by parties. A similar approach is taken by Molina-Jimenez [164].
Some researchers try to build on rule-based markup languages to represent
business rules. The SweetDeal system is introduced by Grosof [100] and de-
scribed as a rule-based approach to the representation of business contracts (or
more generally to represent e-commerce rules [98]). In this system, emerging
semantic web standards for knowledge representation of rules (namely RuleML)
are combined with ontology representation languages, taking into account busi-
ness process description knowledge drawn from the MIT Process Handbook (a
large repository widely used by industry business process designers). The system
makes use of courteous logic programs [99]: sets of rules with explicit priority
definitions among them, which are used for conflict handling.
2.5 Monitoring and Enforcing E-contracts
Once an e-contract is in place, parties are expected to follow their promises by
fulfilling their part of the agreement. Software tools that support this stage of
e-contracting have been proposed by several researchers. Such proposals range
from simply monitoring the fulfillment of contracts, to providing facilities that
allow agents to interact when enacting contracts, to developing mechanisms that
make it possible to enforce parties to fulfill contracts.
In the real-world, when contractual obligations are assumed by parties they
are typically not automatically enforced. For this reason, in non-electronic con-
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tracts contrary-to-duty definitions are not common. The violation of an obligation
entitles the offended party to invoke legal power on a court of law, which may
prescribe a secondary obligation to be imposed on the prevaricator [53]. Besides,
parties are not willing to stipulate handling procedures for all possible circum-
stances, deferring them to when and if situations arise.
Although there are several research projects devoted to assisting and verify-
ing e-business enactment, here we will only provide an overview of some of the
approaches that can be found in the literature on e-contract monitoring and en-
forcement. In the next section we will discuss some of such projects. Automated
monitoring of e-contracts requires a suitable representation of the contract. In the
previous section we have identified some approaches available in the literature,
and we here revisit some of them from a contract enactment perspective.
Xu [239] has developed an approach to monitoring multi-party contracts, fo-
cusing on formalizing a paper contract into representations suitable to monitoring
purposes. For that, a paper contract is represented as a formal e-contract using
temporal logic. The monitoring mechanism is designed to detect actual violations
and to pro-actively detect and alert imminent violations. More specifically, the
proposed contract model is composed of a trading process (including actions and
commitments), a logic relationship specifying contract constraints (precedences
among actions), and a commitment graph (a visual tool providing an overview
of the commitments between partners). Pro-active monitoring [238] consists of
checking and updating “guards of constraints”, which capture the progression
of constraint schemes and check what obligations remain to be realized. These
guards are based on the pre-conditions and post-conditions of actions.
In his approach based on event calculus, Knottenbelt [127] provides a meta-
interpreter that enables an agent to query what obligations are active with respect
to a contract. Also, rules are included that capture the fulfillment or violation of
obligations. Fluents pertaining to obligated facts are acknowledged in the system
through a model of authorizations: each fluent is explicitly associated with the
agents that are authorized to issue it. A non-authorized attempt will have no
effect in the contract (that is, will not initiate any other fluent).
The involvement of a trusted third party in e-contract enactment is gener-
ally claimed. For instance, Kollingbaum [129] proposes a supervised interaction
framework, where a trusted third party is included as part of any automated busi-
ness transaction. Agents are organized in three-party relationships between two
contracting individuals (a client and a supplier) and an authority that monitors
the execution of contracts, verifying that errant behavior is either prevented or
sanctioned. This authority enables the marketplace (where contract enactment
takes place) to evaluate participants, keeping reputation records on the basis of
past business transactions.
Salle´ [196] proposes a contract fulfillment protocol, a collaborative protocol
based on the lifecycle of normative statements. The idea is that, since contrac-
tual relationships are distributed, there is a need to synchronize the different views
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each agent has about the fulfillment of each contractual commitment. Each obli-
gation has a set of states it might go through. An obligation can be refused or
accepted by its bearer. After being accepted, the obligation may be canceled or
complied with. These states are part of an obligation lifecycle model, and agents
use this lifecycle to communicate their intentions on fulfilling contractual norms,
allowing their contractual partners to know what to expect from them. This
ability is referred to as dynamic forecasting of partners’ behavior, and it enables
a fluent and prompt execution of contracts, as agents do not have to wait for the
fulfillment of their partners’ obligations to start executing their own (hence the
collaborative nature).
The general problem of coordinating business activities is addressed in [161],
where Minsky proposes the utilization of a common law (a set of policies) to
govern the interaction between agents representing different enterprises. The
proposed law governed interaction is an interaction mode that guarantees the
observance of a specified set of rules of engagement by each member of a group
(such rules represent the law of the group, containing policies that reflect some
prior contract between the group members). The law-enforcement mechanism
is based on a set of trusted entities (controllers) that mediate the exchange of
messages between the members of the group.
The real-world application of agents in automated contract fulfillment is chal-
lenged by the presence of complex legal issues and subjective judgments of agent
compliance, as pointed out in a survey [109] exploring the use of agents in e-
commerce. Still, some research on these matters has been made, for instance, by
Daskalopulu [52], by proposing the presence of an e-market controller agent (a
third party) to resolve disputes arising from subjective views on contract compli-
ance, thereby playing the role of a judge. This agent holds a representation of the
contract, and when a conflict occurs it collects evidence from the involved parties
and obtains information from independent advisors, such as certification author-
ities, regulators, or controllers of other associated markets. Other authors have
proposed subjective logic for addressing e-contract enforcement. Milosevic [159]
highlights the distinction between discretionary and non-discretionary enforce-
ment. While in the latter violations are dealt with indistinctively, the former is
seen as a more realistic approach of reacting to a contract violation, whose extent
may be variable and therefore demand for different corrective measures. The as-
sessment of violations may be based on subjective logic as a means for combining
parties’ opinions.
2.6 E-contracting Endeavors
In this section we provide a brief overview of the most relevant undertakings on
e-contracting that have been developed in the most recent years.
The Elemental project grew up from the work on e-contracting [158][93][159]
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carried out at the Distributed Systems Technology Centre of the University of
Queensland. This work was one of the first addressing e-contracting with an
integrative perspective, identifying e-contracting stages and activities such as
negotiation, contract validation, monitoring and enforcement, together with a
set of contract-related roles for B2B applications (e.g. contract repository, no-
tary, contract monitor, notifier and enforcer). Focusing on automated contract
management, a Business Contract Architecture has been designed where
these components are implemented through Web Services. Although taking this
general approach of identifying relevant services for e-contracting activities, the
project seems to focus on bilateral relationships of the “extended enterprise” kind
[131][160], wherein a dominant enterprise extends its boarders through business
contracts that regulate the collaboration with secondary partners. This kind of
inter-organizational collaborations require tight electronic links between organi-
zations, which exchange messages that typically carry business documents. An
XML-based Business Contract Language [165][131] was proposed aiming at de-
scribing contract semantics for the purpose of automating contract management
activities. This language takes into account three categories of concepts: a com-
munity model defines the roles and their relationships, together with policies
applied to those roles, and is used to define collaborative arrangements; events
and states describe detailed behavior constraints and are the basis to support
real-time monitoring; general language constructs enable the use of programming
language constructs for more complex contract definitions.
SeCo (Secure Electronic Contracts) [193][92][96] started in 1998 at the Uni-
versity of St. Gallen and the University of Zurich, and was a project focused
on merging business requirements on e-contracting with information technology
security requirements and legal aspects. The project was initiated at the early
stages of the legal acceptance of electronically created contracts and digital signa-
tures, and as such puts an emphasis on developing a technical solution for secure
and legally valid e-contracts. The phases of contracting were analyzed from a le-
gal perspective, and a contracting framework for integrated business transactions
was conceptualized including a set of contracting services, such as negotiation,
monitoring and enforcement. The project had a strong emphasis on security as-
pects of e-contracting. Contracts are based on a so-called SeCo Container, used
both for contract negotiation and for finalized contracts. A container includes a
contract section (with the contract content and a digital signature block), a log
section registering the events that occur during contracting (and that support the
monitoring service) and a status section holding information about the current
state of the SeCo Container.
COSMOS (Common Open Service Market for SMEs) [97] was a research
project initiated in 1998 and lead by the University of Hamburg that aimed at
developing a supporting platform for Internet business transactions based on a
generic e-contracting system. Services to be facilitated to commercial partners
include offer catalogues, brokerage, contract negotiation, signing and execution.
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These services are meant to reduce transaction costs. A contract is defined in
terms of four parts: the involved parties (who), the subject of the contract in
terms of the transfer of items (what), the causal relationships defining when
are which items to be delivered and which clauses to activate in case of non-
compliance (how), and clauses addressing general terms and conditions as well
as references to applicable regulations (legal). A contract template is initially
defined including the “how” and “legal” clauses, together with roles, but without
contract parties nor the exact obligations that are to be carried-on. Negotiation
will fill-in the rest of the details and after the parties sign the contract it becomes
executable and is transferred to a workflow execution engine.
CrossFlow (Cross-Organizational Workflow Support for Virtual Organiza-
tions) [128][113][112] started in 1998 with the University of Twente as a main
partner, and aimed at cross-organizational workflow support in settings of service
provider/consumer relationships. Organizations may delegate tasks in their work-
flows to external organizations (seen as service providers). In specific business
sectors (vertical markets), standard types of services exist, opening the possibil-
ity for dynamic outsourcing based on a common understanding of those services.
Standard services are parameterized for enabling flexibility in service enactment.
In CrossFlow, contracts are used as a means for flexible service outsourcing.
A contract specifies the products or services to be exchanged and the rules of
engagement. Contract negotiation was not a main issue in this project. The
approach was based on standard form contracts in the context of specific markets.
Contract templates are initially advertised by service providers via a trader, and
searched by service consumers for contract matchmaking. Besides defining a
business relationship, contracts are also used operationally in the execution phase.
Process structures establish a mapping from service execution rules to workflow
management systems in both service consumer and provider sides. This issue is
representative of the emphasis of the CrossFlow project in contract enactment,
focusing on the integration of cross-organizational workflow management systems.
In this regard, it shares the same rationale as the Coyote project [49] developed at
IBM Research Division, which tries to address business deals that are materialized
into distributed long running applications spanning multiple autonomous business
organizations. Both projects are concerned with the different processes that the
companies perform during contract enactment. Coyote is also based on service-
oriented technologies.
The CrossFlow project has eventually given rise to a follow-up enterprise at
the Technical University of Eindhoven, where the work by Angelov [6] is most
relevant. Angelov examined different business paradigms for the adoption of e-
contracting [9], distinguishing between a shallower and a deeper approach, and
discussing several implications of each. The investigations carried out tried to
foster research on highly automated e-contracting systems, making a thorough
study on the benefits of their development and adoption. The business, legal
and technological requirements for this automation were also studied. A concep-
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tual framework for B2B e-contracting support – the 4W framework [8] – was
developed that identifies and explores the concepts that are important for the de-
sign of an e-contracting system. A contract includes a set of participants (Who)
exchanging obligations for rights (What) in a certain way (hoW ); furthermore,
it is established and enacted within a legal, geographical and business context
(Where).
MeMo (Mediating and Monitoring Electronic Commerce) [56][199][180][231]
started in 1999 with partners from The Netherlands, Spain and Germany. The
project aimed at constructing a safe and trusted environment for promoting in-
ternational e-commerce activities for SMEs. Tools for information discovery,
protocol-based negotiations, and contract enactment monitoring, based on a busi-
ness data repository, were included as parts of an electronic marketplace. The
main focus was on supporting electronic negotiations among human negotiators,
by analyzing the kinds of messages (e.g. offers, requests, quotations, counterof-
fers) that are exchanged in business scenarios, and the documents that these
message exchanges deal with. The MeMo negotiation module enables human
agents to structure their communication using a Formal Language for Business
Communication [122], which is based on speech-act theory [17][202] and formal
logic.
A few projects have concentrated on the legal aspects of e-contracting. The
eLegal project [33] started in 2000 and its goals were to specify user requirements,
implement legal support tools and promote enhanced business practices where
electronic information exchange is contractually stipulated. The project had a
strong focus in the construction industry. According to the project statement,
the use of ICT in project-based business is lacking contractual frameworks that
define legal conditions and contracts, and tools which provide such legal support.
A set of contract negotiation tools has been developed that assists parties in
establishing contracts that regulate data exchange rules and formats. ALIVE
(Advanced Legal Issues on Virtual Enterprises) started in 2001 and was a research
project aiming to identify and classify the legal issues arising from the emergence
of the VE paradigm. Among them is the possible lack of legal personality of a VE
and the implications this fact has on contract establishment with third parties.
Furthermore, the project’s final goal was to define a road-map for the resolution
of such legal issues. An important deliverable of the project was the development
of a Virtual Enterprise Legal Issue Taxonomy [200]. The close affinity between
eLegal and ALIVE has lead to the organization of joint workshops.
CONTRACT [40][174][132][173][162] is a recent project on e-contracting
that started in 2006. The aim of the project was to develop frameworks, compo-
nents and tools which make it possible to model, build, verify and monitor dis-
tributed electronic business systems on the basis of dynamically generated, cross-
organizational contracts. The project focused on specifying contracts for B2B
interactions, on formal verification techniques for contracts, and on monitoring
tools for contract-based systems. A theoretical framework for e-business appli-
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cations based on binding contractual relationships was developed. A contracting
language was proposed that tries to be less abstract than XML representations
of human contracts (which cannot be used directly by computational systems for
monitoring and control purposes, since they typically do not define how activities
are to be monitored), and more general than service-level agreements specifica-
tions (which only allow for limited monitoring of computer-observable parameters
or metrics). A Web Services framework has been designed implementing several
contracting-related administrative roles for monitoring contract execution, such
as observer, manager, contract storer or notary. Mechanisms for contract off-line
verification, on-line monitoring and analysis have been designed that integrate
with the developed frameworks.
Finally, an Europe-wide research initiative stemming from the multi-agent
systems research community – Agreement Technologies1 – has started in 2008
that aims at congregating efforts of researchers in the field to address issues related
to a new paradigm for next generation distributed systems, based on the concept
of agreement between computational agents. The issues tackled in this initiative
are closely related to those of e-contracting, namely semantic alignment, norms,
organizations, argumentation, negotiation, trust and reputation. All these issues
are important aspects to take into account when aiming at automating contractual
activities by employing software agents and multi-agent systems technology.
2.7 Conclusion
As shown in the previous section, the development of tools that support elec-
tronic contracting has gain much interest in the last decade. Looking back at the
research projects that have dealt with some aspects of e-contracting, we may dis-
tinguish those that have made a more focused contribution from those that have
tried to provide a more comprehensive perspective. Table 2.1 provides a summary
of the aforementioned projects in this respect. We may observe that only two of
the listed projects have a more comprehensive approach to e-contracting, namely
the Business Contract Architecture (which is part of the Elemental project) and
COSMOS. Even so, the former focuses on a particular collaboration setting (ex-
tended enterprise), and the latter reduces contract enactment to workflow ac-
tivities. Almost every project that deals with contract monitoring assumes this
simplification (CONTRACT, which is contemporary to the research reported in
this thesis, seems to be an exception).
The investigations of Angelov [6], regarding the benefits of developing highly
automated e-contracting systems, demand for further research on automating e-
contracting activities. Although human involvement in the several stages that
compose e-contracting is likely to be essential, there is still room for a number of
developments that aim at automating specific e-contracting activities.
1http://www.agreement-technologies.eu/
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Table 2.1: Focus of e-contracting projects
Project Main focus
Business Contract Architecture integrative perspective on e-contracting
stages and activities; extended enterprise
SeCo legal and security aspects of e-contracting
COSMOS generic e-contracting system; semi-
automated contract negotiation and
enactment through workflows
CrossFlow e-contract enactment in vertical markets
through workflows
MeMo e-negotiation support for human negotia-
tors
eLegal legal aspects for electronic information ex-
change; construction industry
ALIVE legal aspects of Virtual Enterprises
CONTRACT e-contract formal verification and moni-
toring tools
The efforts laid out by the MAS research community (namely through the
Agreement Technologies initiative) aim at fostering research on making it possible
to apply computational agents to several domains. Therefore, we see MAS as a
promising approach to deliver automated tools that can be applied to the field of
e-contracting. The research included in this thesis is a contribution towards that
direction.
In the next chapter we provide an overview of MAS research with a bias on
the use of norms and electronic institutions in agent systems. Our objective is to
present the most relevant aspects of MAS research that are the cornerstones of
the research reported in this thesis.
Chapter3
Agents, Norms and Electronic
Institutions
Since the conception of agents and multi-agent systems as a research field, re-
searchers have been trying to come out with a list of properties that should char-
acterize an agent as a intelligent entity. A widely accepted characterization [236]
defines agents as entities that are capable of flexible autonomous behavior that
exhibits reactivity (timely response to changes in the environment), proactiveness
(goal-directed behavior) and social ability (interaction with other agents).
A main aspect of agenthood, which might go unnoticed in the previous para-
graph, is autonomy : the ability of an agent to control its own behavior, i.e., to
decide what to do in each situation that it is facing. This has been advocated
as a distinguishing feature of agents when compared to object-oriented systems.
One cannot simply “invoke a method” on an agent for it to do something. What
one can do is to try to influence its behavior, e.g. by requesting the agent to do
something. A whole theory of speech acts [17][202] has been applied in this field,
giving rise to agent communication languages [75][81].
A richer perspective on autonomy is provided by Verhagen [224], who defines
autonomy as an agent’s level of independence with respect to another entity, be it
the environment, other agents, or even the developers of the agent. Furthermore,
Verhagen proposes an agent typology taking autonomy as the central issue:
• Reactive agents are autonomous only in the sense that they react without
human intervention to the environment. Their model of deliberation is
based on stimulus-response.
• Plan autonomous agents are able to choose, for a specific goal, how to
achieve it. They have a repertoire of actions at their disposal that can be
aggregated into plans that will achieve the objective.
• Goal autonomous agents are able to formulate, adopt and prioritize their
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own goals. These agents are said to exhibit strategic reasoning, by compar-
ing different states of the world in terms of degree of goal satisfaction.
• Norm autonomous agents chose which goals are legitimate to pursue based
on a given system of norms. In a goal conflict situation, norm autonomous
agents are able to change the norm system, and this ability is called nor-
mative reasoning (that is, reasoning about norms).
Being a multidisciplinary field as it is, multi-agent systems research has bor-
rowed many concepts from different disciplines, such as economics, decision and
game theory, philosophy, sociology or legal theory. Some inherited concepts are
even addressed in more than one such areas. The cases of norm and normative
behavior are some of such concepts. Before discussing the use of norms in multi-
agent systems, we will start our discussion on norms by disambiguating the term
norm as used in the social sciences and legal-theory.
3.1 Norms
In sociology, a norm is seen as a generalized expectation of behavior. The social
sciences identify the concept of social structure as an underlying framework of
norms that imposes a sense of order and predictability within a group of individ-
uals. Typically, such norms are associated with roles that individuals play in a
society. A role thus represents the way someone is expected to behave in particu-
lar situations, by having an associated set of normative expectations. Such roles
do not have to correspond to well-defined social structures such as a formally
specified organization. Rather, in society we may say that humans play roles
every time they enter in a social relationship.
A clarifying view on social norms in social theory is Tuomela’s [216], who
distinguishes between rules (r-norms) and proper social norms (s-norms). The
former are norms created by an authority and are subject to agreement. They
can be either informal or formal, as can their associated sanctions. Proper social
norms are based on mutual belief, and consist of conventions that may apply to a
large group such as a whole society or to a specific group. These norms typically
have implicit social sanctions attached to them.
In legal theory, norms are viewed as expressions of the obligations and rights
that are connected to the role an individual has. This corresponds to the notion
of r-norms as defined by Tuomela. Legal norms will also have formally specified
sanctions. If we take Roman Law into account (which is the basis for the legal
systems of many continental Europe countries), we also have well-established
hierarchical normative systems that provide an explicit account for norms. These
are typically organized through constitutions, laws and regulations.
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Looking at the definition for norm in BusinessDictionary.com1, we get pre-
cisely the two perspectives discussed above:
1. Informal guideline about what is considered normal (what is correct or
incorrect) social behavior in a particular group or social unit. Norms form
the basis of collective expectations that members of a community have from
each other, and play a key part in social control and social order by exerting
a pressure on the individual to conform. In short, “The way we do things
around here.”
2. Formal rule or standard laid down by legal, religious, or social authority
against which appropriateness (what is right or wrong) of an individual’s
behavior is judged.
In the next section we will discuss the relatively recent introduction of norms
in multi-agent systems research. We will then present an overview of some ap-
proaches for modeling norms.
3.1.1 Norms in multi-agent systems
In multi-agent systems research, social norms (sometimes referred to as conven-
tions, social laws or joint commitments) have been used in the last two decades
as a means to help improve coordination and cooperation [114][229][208][24][45].
As in real-world societies, norms provide us a way to achieve social order [34]
by controlling the environment and making it more stable and predictable. Ar-
guably, one of the main distinguishing factors among researchers using norms in
multi-agent systems is the level of control one has over agents’ autonomy.
In fact, we may find in the literature two kinds of approaches to norms in
multi-agent systems. Most initial research focused on norms as constraints on
behavior [229][208], designed off-line and imposed in a top-down fashion. There-
fore, in these settings norm abidance is not discretionary, i.e., it is not in the
power of agents to decide whether to follow norms. The study of conventions to
model multi-agent interactions follows a similar perspective. Conventions repre-
sent behavioral constraints [229][209][70] that intend to simplify an agent’s de-
cision making process, by dictating courses of action to be followed in certain
situations.
Another trend has then started that considered norm adoption as an impor-
tant property of multi-agent systems [44][59][35][224][20]. The perspective is no
longer to impose cooperation through normative constraints, but rather to study
reasoning processes that lead agents to internalize norms at run-time and change
their behavior accordingly.
Along this line, in [42] (also reviewed in [195]) three different views of norms
as used in multi-agent systems research are identified:
1http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/norm.html
30 Chapter 3. Agents, Norms and Electronic Institutions
• Norms as constraints : this view corresponds to the initial approaches, where
the autonomy of agents is severely affected. In this case “norms” are always
complied with, and can be seen as prohibitions (in the sense that constraints
inhibit deviant behavior).
• Norms as goals : this view puts norms at the level of goals that agents take
into account in their reasoning cycle. It is up to the agent to choose among
competing goals, and in this process the agent does not consider norms as
more socially relevant goals. “Norms” may be abandoned whenever another
goal becomes more relevant, and therefore there is no social control on the
prevalence of norms over private goals.
• Norms as obligations : this view considers norms as first-order entities, a dis-
tinct element over which agents reason about. Furthermore, agents should
be able to reason about the consequences of not fulfilling norms, which
should cost more than abandoning ordinary goals.
We can say that unlike the assumptions present in the initial research on norms
in multi-agent systems, agents are no longer assumed to be fully compliant with
their norms. As noted by F. Dignum [59], norms should not be imposed, but
should instead be used to influence agent decision-making, which allows us to
keep agent autonomy: an agent might violate a norm in order to adhere to a
private goal that it considers to be more important. This possibility of choosing
to comply has been referred to as autonomous norm compliance in [150]. Some
researchers (e.g. [59][26][4]) have expanded the well-known BDI agent architecture
[182] to include normative reasoning.
More recently, normative multi-agent systems has risen as a research area of
its own [23], and is at the intersection of two already established fields: normative
systems and multi-agent systems. A normative system has been defined as a “set
of interacting agents whose behaviour can usefully be regarded as governed by
norms. Norms prescribe how agents ought to behave, and specify how they are
permitted to behave and what their rights are” [116]. Also, “the norms allow
for the possibility that actual behaviour may at times deviate from the ideal, i.e.
that violations of obligations, or of agents’ rights, may occur” [32].
Deontic logic is a formal tool to represent and reason about norms in a norma-
tive system, and is concerned with the normative notions of obligation, permission
and prohibition. As noted by Jones and Sergot [115], deontic logic is particularly
relevant for representing and reasoning about the distinction between ideal and
actual behavior. Therefore, norm violations must be taken into account in any
formalization of a genuine normative system. If agents were assumed to always
conform to norms, the normative dimension ceases to be relevant. This view on
the role of deontic logic makes it appropriate to model normative multi-agent
systems.
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Another line of research on norms in MAS, which is far from our intended
purposes, is the emergence of collective social behaviors as an outcome of an
ongoing interaction process among a group of individuals [123][209][204]. Norms
are, in this sense, seen as conventions or patterns of behavior that emerge bottom-
up from agent interactions. An attempt to provide an integrated view of norms
can be found in [43].
3.1.2 Modeling norms
The conceptualization and specification of norms has been addressed by several
researchers. In this section we present some of the most relevant contributions in
this topic.
Following the research line that uses conventions to model multi-agent inter-
actions, Esteva et al. [70] consider norms as procedural conventions, in the sense
that they dictate what agents must do in such and such situations. These norms
structure interaction protocols and limit the action repertoire of agents in pre-
determined situations. More specifically, a set of so-called normative rules limit
the action capabilities of agents when interacting within a performative structure,
which is a transition graph composed of scenes and connections among scenes 2.
Some actions create commitments for future actions, and other actions may affect
the paths an agent may take through the performative structure. A normative
rule is activated by agent actions at specific scenes and prescribes obligations
that hold. Obligations are here seen as actions that agents must do, and in order
to enforce them the institution encapsulating the performative structure restricts
the actions that an agent can perform while it has not fulfilled the obligations.
This approach therefore does not account for true violation situations, in the
sense that no sanctions are applied; instead, behavior restrictions will eventually
lead agents to fulfill obligations.
In their work on modeling interactions in agent societies, V. Dignum et al.
[66] look at such interactions as being structured in order to achieve some desired
goals. For that, contracts are used to integrate a top-down specification of an
organizational structure with the autonomy of participating agents, by making
explicit the commitments regulating the enactment of roles by individual agents.
A logical formalism based on deontic and branching-time logic is presented to
specify social norms and interaction contracts between agents. A central issue in
this proposal is norm violability. The authors argue that a Logic for Contract
Representation must be able to reason about states in which an obligation has
been violated, which is represented by an explicit viol predicate. In terms of deon-
tic operators, their approach is based on the definition of conditional obligations
with deadlines. Conditional obligations are obligations that only become active
2We will cover this approach more thoroughly when we address existing approaches to
formalize electronic institutions.
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if the precondition becomes valid. Deadlines identify situations when obligations
may become violated. Sanctions (contrary-to-duties) are defined as obligations
that hold in cases of violation of another obligation.
A categorization for norms in agent societies has been proposed by Lo´pez-
y-Lo´pez and Luck [149][151]. They characterize norms by their prescriptiveness
(norms tell an agent how to behave), sociality (norms apply in situations where
more than one agent is involved) and social pressure (norms are subject to mech-
anisms that force agents to comply with them). Taking this into account, a
norm schema is proposed including: normative goals (what ought to be done),
addressee agents (directly responsible agents for the satisfaction of the normative
goals), beneficiaries (agents that benefit from the satisfaction of normative goals),
context (the particular circumstances where a norm applies), exceptions (situa-
tions in which addressees cannot be punished for not complying with norms),
rewards (to be given when normative goals become satisfied) and punishments
(to be applied when normative goals are not satisfied). The norm schema also
includes some constraints on these components, saying that normative goals, ad-
dressees and context must all be non-empty sets, that the attributes describing
both the context and exceptions must be disjoint to avoid inconsistencies and
that the same should be the case for rewards and punishments. Based on this
characterization, a classification for norms is proposed that considers three main
categories:
• Obligations and prohibitions are norms whose purpose is to ensure coor-
dination of individuals in a society. Agents adopt these norms once they
become members of a society, not participating in their creation. The vio-
lation of these norms is always penalized (and therefore punishments must
be non-empty).
• Social commitments are norms derived from agreements or negotiations be-
tween agents, which therefore participate on their creation (defining the
normative goals, rewards and punishments). Social commitments come in
pairs, denoting mutual relationships. Unlike obligations, social commit-
ments are temporary, because they disappear once the normative goals are
satisfied.
• Social codes are norms accepted as general principles and are complied
with as ends in themselves, instead of being forced through punishments
or rewards. An agent complies with social codes because of the perception
other agents have of its social conformity.
The same researchers also introduce the notion of interlocking norms, which
concerns the possibility of chaining norms: e.g. the compliance or non-compliance
of a norm is a condition to trigger another norm. In other words, the context
of the latter is dependent on the state of achievement of the normative goals of
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the former. Particularly relevant within interlocking norms are enforcement and
reward norms. An enforcement norm is activated when another norm is unfulfilled
and includes as normative goals the punishments associated with the unfulfilled
norm. Similarly, a reward norm is activated when another norm is fulfilled and
includes as normative goals the rewards associated with the fulfilled norm.
A different approach to the study of norms in organizations and institutions is
that of F. Dignum [61] and Va´zquez-Salceda [228]. These researchers attack the
problem of norm verification by observing that norms, as used in real-world orga-
nizations, are often specified at a high level of abstraction. This characteristic is
very common in legal texts, where vague terms are used to allow for proper inter-
pretation within different contexts. Va´zquez-Salceda and F. Dignum [228] argue
that in order to check for norm compliance, abstract norms must be translated
to a level where their impact on the institution can be described directly. They
provide the illustrating example of a norm such as “it is forbidden to discriminate
on the basis of age”: it is necessary to bring this norm to the level of the concrete
actions that agents may or may not execute. A multi-level framework for norms
is proposed, from the most abstract level of the normative system to the final
implementation of the organization – the HarmonIA framework [226]:
• The abstract level includes statutes of an organization, objectives, values
and abstract norms.
• The concrete level includes the translation of abstract norms into concrete
ones pertaining to actions described in terms of the organization’s ontology,
together with policies of an organization.
• The rule level is where concrete norms and policies are fully refined, link-
ing the norms with the ways to ensure them; norms can be translated into
restrictions on behavior or into triggers on unwanted behavior of the inter-
acting agents.
• In the procedure level rules and policies are translated in a computationally
efficient implementation to be used by agents.
Links are to be maintained between procedures and rules, and between rules
and norms, in order to allow to track which abstract norms are related to which
procedures.
Aldewereld [3] has followed this layered translation scheme to address the
formalization of laws and regulations as abstract norms, which are then mapped to
operational norms and implemented as institutional constraints. The translation
of abstract norms into protocols, using landmarks at an intermediate level, is also
proposed to address highly regulated systems, where protocols are to be used as
guidelines to tell agents how certain tasks can be achieved with the lowest possible
risk of norm violation. Landmarks define sets of propositions that ought to be
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true in certain intermediate states of a given protocol, allowing for a definition of
that protocol in a two step process with an increasing amount of detail.
Va´zquez-Salceda et al. have also looked into the implementation of norms
and their enforcement. In [227] an operational semantics for the enforcement of
norms is summarized in two possibilities: (i) defining constraints on unwanted
behavior, or (ii) detecting violations and reacting to these violations. Therefore,
a norm-aware environment can operate either preventively (making unwanted
behavior impossible) or reactively. If we recall the issue of autonomy when dis-
cussing agent theory, and the associated lack of total control in a multi-agent
system, we should see reaction to violations as the natural approach to take. In
fact, Va´zquez-Salceda et al. distinguish different kinds of addressees of norms,
depending on the control the designer of the system has over interacting agents,
and discuss different implementation guidelines for each situation. They also char-
acterize norms (comprising obligations, permissions or prohibitions) by whether
they refer to a state or an action, and by the fact that norms may be conditional
or include a deadline, providing implementation guidelines for each situation. A
norm specification is proposed that aggregates, together with what the authors
call a norm condition (but which in fact includes both the conditions for norm
activation and its prescriptions), violation conditions, sanctions and repairs. This
makes up a heavy structure for each norm representation, making it harder to
write norms in the first place; also, it causes the policies used for norm monitoring
and enforcement to become spread among the norms themselves, which might be
hard to maintain.
Also with an implementation concern, Garc´ıa-Camino et al. [87] provide a rule
language for norms that is based on rules as used in production systems, further
allowing constraints to be included in the state of the system. Basically, a rule
has the form LHS  RHS , where LHS consists of atomic formulae (including
constraints) that are to be matched with the current state of affairs, and RHS
is composed of atomic formulae that are to be added or removed from the sate.
Valid atomic formulae include agent actions (in this case utterances) and deontic
operators (obligations, permissions, prohibitions) over utterances.
An approach to model and reason about normative positions based on Event
Calculus [130][207] is proposed by Artikis et al. [13][12]. Besides obligations
and permissions, this work considers also notions such as physical possibility and
empowerments [117]. These normative positions are represented as fluents, and
their interrelationships are expressed using event calculus predicates, which relate
action occurrences with their effects in the values of fluents.
Cranefield [46][47] proposes a language called hyMITL±, a kind of temporal
logic that combines Computational Tree Logic (CTL) with future and past-tense
temporal operators and Metric Interval Temporal Logic (MITL). The language
was designed to allow the expression of social rules with complex temporal proper-
ties, based on the ↓ binder operator from hybrid logics. A subset of this language
allows social expectations to be expressed as rules that are conditional on ob-
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servations, and that allow for run-time compliance monitoring. The language
does not include deontic concepts such as obligations or permissions, addressing
instead the broader notion of social expectations: constraints on the present and
future that result from rules expressing social regularities, whether normative or
not.
An important line of research regarding the representation of directed obliga-
tions is that of Singh et al. on commitments [210][37][36][230]. In this perspective,
a commitment is a directed obligation from one agent to another for achieving
or maintaining a state of affairs. A commitment has the generic form C(x, y, p),
where x is the debtor, y is the creditor and p is the proposition that x is commit-
ted to bring about. Furthermore, base-level commitments are distinguished from
conditional commitments of the form C(x, y, e → p), where e is a precondition
upon which the commitment becomes binding. This approach closely resembles
the notion of conditional obligation as used by other researchers.
Following a similar commitment-based approach, Fornara and Colombetti pro-
pose a lifecycle of commitments in the context of an agent communication lan-
guage [77][78]. The state of a commitment can evolve as an effect of a speech act,
or of environmental events that change the truth value of the commitment’s con-
ditions or content. In this approach, norms are treated as event-driven rules that,
when fired by appropriate events, manipulate (i.e., create or cancel) commitments
affecting the agents that enact a specific role in an interaction.
3.2 Regulated Multi-Agent Systems
The regulation of environments where autonomous agents interact is an important
research topic within the MAS research community. Different models have been
proposed that try to give (artificial) agent societies some coordination and regula-
tion infrastructures. In some approaches organizations are modeled as multi-agent
systems that are assumed to cooperate so as to accomplish an overall goal. In this
case a centralized design may be taken, producing a top-down specification of the
roles agents may take and their associated norms. Other approaches take agents
as representing independent self-interested entities, with no presupposed cooper-
ation besides mere interaction efforts. These settings configure what are usually
called open multi-agent systems [111], where heterogeneous agents arising from
different sources behave and interact in ways that cannot be totally predicted in
advance.
Before we discuss the notion of Electronic Institution as a means for deliv-
ering regulated multi-agent environments, in this section we identify some other
approaches that are concerned with this issue.
Dellarocas [57] proposed the concept of Contractual Agent Society (CAS),
which is a metaphor for building open systems where unknown participants may
enter and leave. The idea is that agents configure themselves automatically
36 Chapter 3. Agents, Norms and Electronic Institutions
through a set of dynamically negotiated social contracts. These social contracts
define the shared context for agent interactions, and should specify normative
behaviors, exceptions and associated prevention and resolution mechanisms. The
process of socialization is defined as the admittance of a new agent into the soci-
ety, by negotiating the terms of a social contract defining the membership of this
new agent. Sub-societies may be formed within the context of a CAS, requiring
additional social contracts that inherit all policies of the CAS. Social contracts
may also include negotiated social control mechanisms, identifying an authority
party that will enforce such a mechanism. The metaphor of CAS is instantiated
in a marketplace scenario.
Hannoun et al. [106] developed an organizational model for multi-agent sys-
tems called MOISE, which has been extended by Hu¨bner et al. [107] into
MOISE+. These researchers view an organization as a global set of constraints
which aims at conducting the agents’ behavior according to what is socially in-
tended. MOISE+ is an organization-centered model where the structure and
functioning of an organization are specified almost independently of each other,
after which a deontic dimension links these aspects. The model is thus based on
a three-folded specification:
• The structural specification defines agents’ relations through the notion of
roles, role relations and groups.
• The functional specification describes how a multi-agent system actually
achieves its global goals, that is, how these goals are decomposed (in plans)
and distributed to the agents (through missions).
• The deontic specification describes the roles’ permissions and obligations
towards the missions; it thus connects the social and functional parts.
In the deontic specification, a permission per(ρ,m, tc) states that an agent
playing role ρ is allowed to commit to mission m within a time constraint tc.
An obligation obl(ρ,m, tc) states that an agent playing role ρ ought to commit
to m in the periods indicated by tc. An obligation entails a permission, and
these deontic concepts are inherited throughout role hierarchies (from roles to
role specializations).
V. Dignum [64] designed a model for agent societies called OperA. This model
focuses on designed societies, with explicit objectives and structure, as opposed
to emergent societies that result from “ad hoc” agent interactions, and tries to
take into account both the structural and the dynamic aspects of an organization.
The organizational framework has three components:
• The organizational model, defining the structure of the society based on
roles and interactions.
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• The social model, where agents adopt roles, in terms of agreements concern-
ing their enactment.
• The interaction model, describing the possible interactions between agents.
Contracts are used to map the organizational model to the social model, and
further to describe specific interaction agreements. Whereas the organizational
model provides, through roles, the social, interaction, normative and communica-
tive structures that shape the organizational characteristics of an agent society,
the actual enactment of such roles by agents is fixed in social contracts that de-
scribe the capabilities and responsibilities of agents within the society. These
social contracts compose the social model, which consists of an agent population
composed of role-enacting agents. They negotiate interaction commitments that
are fixed in interaction contracts. These contracts specify concrete interaction
scenes, which comprise procedural instantiations (i.e. protocols) of scene scripts
that are part of the interaction structures defined at the organizational model.
Scene scripts provide a minimum set of requirements and constraints that allow
an interaction to achieve its desired objectives. Agents choose, by negotiating
interaction contracts, the best course of actions that achieves such objectives,
which are specified as landmarks (states) that are partially ordered in landmark
patterns.
In the next section we introduce and discuss the notion of electronic institu-
tions, which can be seen as another approach towards having environments for
regulated multi-agent systems. Given the importance of this topic in our research,
we will try to provide an overview of the main approaches regarding the concep-
tualization of electronic institutions, but not before we seek to identify the roots
of the concept.
3.3 Electronic Institutions
The concept of institutions has been studied from diverse fields such as law,
economics, philosophy, or computer science. We will start by providing a brief
overview of the most influential authors that have been followed when designing
artificial or electronic institutions.
3.3.1 Institution: a multidisciplinary concept
In the economics field, North [167] defines institutions as “the rules of the game
in a society”. Such rules are “humanly devised constraints that shape human
interaction” and “define and limit the set of choices of individuals”. Institutional
constraints include “formal written rules as well as typically unwritten codes of
conduct that underlie and supplement formal rules”. These rules and informal
codes may at times be violated – a central part of the functioning of institutions
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is the possibility of ascertaining violations and of reacting accordingly through
punishments.
North also makes a distinction between institutions and organizations, which
both provide a structure to human interaction. Organizations are taken to be
“groups of individuals bound by some common purpose to achieve objectives”.
The institutional framework influences what kind of organizations come into exis-
tence and how they evolve. In turn, organizations influence how an institutional
framework evolves. Therefore, there is a bidirectional interaction between insti-
tutions and organizations. The central point in North’s research is precisely the
effect institutions have on the performance of the economy. As he points out, the
“major role of institutions in a society is to reduce uncertainty by establishing
a stable (but not necessarily efficient) structure to human interaction”. We may
say that institutions evolve because of the changes humans introduce at the level
of conventions, codes of conduct, norms of behavior, law and contracts between
individuals.
In the philosophy field, Searle [202][203], looks at institutions as sets of con-
stitutive rules. These rules are distinguished from regulative rules, which regulate
antecedently existing activities. For instance, the rule stating that one should
drive on the right-hand side of the road regulates driving, but driving as an ac-
tivity can exist prior and independently of that rule (in fact, in some countries
the rule does not even apply). On the contrary, constitutive rules create the very
possibility of certain activities, besides regulating them. An example is the game
of chess: the rules of chess make it possible to play the game, which does not exist
prior to the rules. You are not playing chess unless you follow those rules. More-
over, Searle states that (systems of) constitutive rules have the form “X counts
as Y”, or “X counts as Y in context C”. In this reading, a constitutive rule is said
to assign a status-function Y to a fact X, possibly within a certain context C.
Although it might seem otherwise, constitutive rules are not conventions, which
according to Searle imply arbitrariness. Instead, a constitutive rule exists out of
collective intentionality. Therefore, an institution refers to a set of concepts that
exist thanks to a common agreement in a community of agents.
A further distinction that Searle makes is between brute facts and institutional
facts. At the most basic level, brute facts pertain to physical reality, which exists
independently of any human agreement on it. As an example, it is a brute fact
that Mount Everest has snow near the summit. Differently, institutional facts rely
on human institutions to exist. For instance, the fact that a piece of paper counts
as a bill of five euros relies on the institution of money. Similar examples may be
given for institutions like property, elections, marriages, and so on. Therefore, at
a first level constitutive rules allow us to produce institutional facts from brute
facts.
Furthermore, Searle notes that the structure of institutional facts is the struc-
ture of hierarchies of constitutive rules; in other words, the structure “X counts
as Y in C” can be iterated. This means that status-functions can be imposed
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on other status-functions: the X term at a higher level can be a Y term from an
earlier level. Here is a description that is pertinent for this thesis:
“The Y term of one level can be the X term or the C term of
the next level up or even of higher levels. Thus such and such an
utterance as X1 counts as a promise Y1 in a context C1; but under
certain circumstances C2, that very promise, Y1=X2, counts as a
legally binding contract, Y2. Given the contract as a context, Y2=C3,
a particular action as X3 can count as its breach, Y3. In the context
of that breach, Y3=C4, a series of legal actions as X4 may count as a
successful lawsuit, Y4, and hence have the function of remedying the
breach or compensating for it.” (from [203], p. 125)
Constitutive rules may therefore bring additional institutional facts from al-
ready established ones. The bottom line will nevertheless be a brute fact – there
are no institutional facts without brute facts. Abstracting away from this un-
derstanding, we can also consider the set of institutional facts defined by an
institution (considered as a set of constitutive rules) as a bottom line that can be
used for the definition of other institutions. A notorious case, as Searle claims, is
the fact that the institution of language is logically prior to other institutions – a
primitive form of language is required to even express facts in other institutions.
In the computing and formal logic fields, Jones and Sergot [117] provide a
formal account to institutionalized power, that is, to the normative notion of power
as conferred by norm-governed institutions – “designated agents are empowered to
create particular kinds of states of affairs by means of the performance of specified
types of actions”. Typically, such states of affairs are of special significance within
that institution.
Theoretically, this model of institutionalized power is quite similar to the
constitutive rules of Searle, although in this case the semantics of “counts-as”
conditionals have an empowerment flavor: it is meant to distinguish valid from
invalid actions, that is, those that produce a desired effect from those that do not
because the enacting agent is not empowered by the institution. For example, in
an auction house the auctioneer may utter the speech act “the item x is sold”,
which counts as a way of establishing that in fact item x is sold to a particular
bidder. The auctioneer is said to have the power, within the auction house, to
establish that item x is sold. The same action performed by an agent without
this power has no effect.
The general form of a counts-as relation in the Jones and Sergot model is
ExA ⇒s EyF , with the following reading: according to normative system or
institution s, if agent x brings it about that A, then agent y sees to it that F .
Agents y and x may at times be the same. Often, it would be appropriate to
say that the agent y creating the state of affairs F is the institution or normative
system itself. When x exercises his power the situation described by F becomes
an institutional fact relative to institution s.
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Following a long established observation from the legal field, a distinction is
kept by Jones and Sergot between institutionalized power, permission and prac-
tical possibility. While institutionalized (or legal) power confers an institutional
meaning to an agent’s actions, this meaning will still apply regardless of the agent
being permitted to act in such a way. It may be the case that the permission
ceases to exist in specific circumstances, while the effects of action (which charac-
terize the empowerment) may remain in place because the agent is still enacting a
specific role. Of course that in such a case the agent may be sanctioned for doing
something he was not permitted, but nevertheless the harm is done. Practical
possibility refers to the physical ability needed to exercise legal power.
Jones and Sergot also generalize the counts-as relation, as used to define em-
powerment relations, to the notion of institutional constraint, denoted by state-
ments of the form Ds(A → B). As argued, not all conditional sentences defined
within a given institution are of the ‘counts as’ kind. Other conditionals describe
relations of logical, causal or deontic consequence.
After recovering these insights on the notion of institutions, we now turn our
attention to several approaches that deal with the issue of designing artificial or
electronic institutions.
3.3.2 Agent-mediated institutions – IIIA
The research on electronic institutions at Institut d’Investigacio´ en Intel·lige`ncia
Artificial (IIIA) started to take visibility with the work of Noriega [166], who pro-
posed the building of computational environments as agent-mediated institutions.
Such environments would allow heterogeneous agents to successfully interact by
appropriately restricting their behavior. Furthermore, in order to guarantee that
such restrictions were properly enforced, Noriega proposed the notion of agent
governors, which are meant to ensure that external agents behave as supposed,
i.e., adhere to the stipulated interaction protocols and rules. Agent-mediated
institutions together with governors were claimed to allow a computationally re-
alizable notion of accountability. While the work on agent-mediated institutions
at IIIA has been primarily illustrated by means of the Fishmarket metaphor, it
is meant as a more general approach to model any kind of dialogical institution
– governed interaction environments where all agent interactions can be reduced
to illocutions [202], and therefore protocols are described in terms of dialogues.
The formalization of the concept of agent-mediated institutions has been con-
tinued by the work of Rodr´ıguez-Aguilar [188], and further on by Esteva [68], who
mapped the specification of the concept to the construction of tools that allow
for the development of electronic institutions. According to their perspective,
an electronic institution (seen as an institutionalized electronic organization) is
grounded on three main components [71][70]:
• Dialogical framework : In a computational realization of an institution, all
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interactions among agents are realized by means of speech acts (message
exchanges). A dialogical framework thus specifies the illocutions that can
be exchanged between the participants in an electronic institution, including
an ontology definition for the concepts in a given domain. This framework
includes also a specification of the (internal and external) roles that support
the social interactions that may take place. Illocutions comprise a particle
(the action), the sender and the receiver (in terms of agent/role pairs) and
a content (an expression in some content language).
• Performative structure: Interactions between agents take place in agent
group meetings – so-called scenes – that follow well-defined communication
protocols. Each scene protocol is specified by a directed graph with nodes
representing conversation states and directed arcs labeled with illocution
schemes (illocutions that may contain variables) or timeouts. A performa-
tive structure captures relationships among scenes by establishing possible
transitions, embodying the electronic institution with a more complex in-
teraction structure. While a scene models a particular multi-agent dialogic
activity, a performative structure enables the specification of more complex
activities, e.g. by capturing causal dependencies among scenes, by defining
synchronization or allowing parallelism mechanisms involving scenes.
• Normative rules : The performative structure constrains agent behavior
both at intra-scene and inter-scene levels. An additional possibility is for
agent actions within a scene to have consequences that either limit or expand
its acting possibilities in subsequent scenes. Some actions create commit-
ments for future actions, which are interpreted as obligations. Other actions
may affect the paths an agent may take through the performative structure.
These consequences are captured through normative rules. Obligations are
represented as actions to be taken in specific scenes (that is, as arcs that
an agent will be obliged to traverse within a scene).
It should be noted that the obligations prescribed by normative rules are
not true normative constraints (following Castelfranchi’s perspective [34]), in the
sense that agents are not free to violate them. Instead, the electronic institution’s
performative structure and normative rules act as a constraining infrastructure
that makes it impossible for agents to deviate from the desired behavior.
In terms of development tools, Esteva lead the efforts towards the develop-
ment of the ISLANDER editor [69], a tool for the specification and verification of
agent-mediated electronic institutions. ISLANDER facilitates the institution de-
signer by combining graphical and textual specifications. It relies on a declarative
textual language that allows for the specification of the aforementioned concepts.
Its graphical user interface permits the edition of the graphical components of
the scenes, performative structure and dialogical framework.
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A further step in having a complete suite of applications for the development of
agent-mediated electronic institutions was AMELI [72], a middleware that allows
for the execution of electronic institutions as specified with ISLANDER. More
specifically, AMELI provides an infrastructure that mediates agents’ interactions
while enforcing institutional rules. This is accomplished by interfacing every
external agent with a governor (as suggested by Noriega), which filters out any
unauthorized behavior (from the point of view of the performative structure and
standing obligations).
The suite of developed applications for agent-mediated institutions [10] is ar-
guably the most comprehensive one on the design, specification and development
of electronic institutions.
More recently, Garc´ıa-Camino [84] worked on specifying norms for electronic
institutions, where the prescribed obligations may have temporal restrictions and
as such can be violated [85]. He also considered norms that may prescribe, be-
sides obligations, also permissions and prohibitions over utterances, following a
rule-based approach with constraints to represent norms and to apply their se-
mantics [87]. Garc´ıa-Camino also proposed a rule language I [83] that allows
to clarify the semantics of deontic modalities with respect to a computational
system. The grammar for the language includes constructs for assigning differ-
ent operational semantics to deontic operators, namely: ignoring events in order
to avoid unwanted behavior, preventing conditions to hold in certain situations,
forcing events or actions that are mandatory, or expecting events that an agent
is obliged to generate but may even so violate. These different treatments of
deontic operators allow to distinguish norms that can be violated from those that
can not.
3.3.3 Institutions for electronic transactions – University
of Utrecht
F. Dignum started to analyze institutions from the point of view of their impor-
tance in supporting electronic transactions [60]. Institutions are in this sense a
means of enhancing the efficiency of transactions and trust among parties, e.g.
by providing trusted information on potential partners, by defining and enforcing
regulations on behavior during transactions, or by providing a legal backup for
contracts that are closed within the institution.
A minimal infrastructure for electronic institutions should include banking
facilities, communication facilities and an ontology. However, F. Dignum also
suggests that the role played by an electronic institution is different according
to the type of mechanism on which economic transactions are made: markets or
hierarchies. In hierarchical relationships transactions tend to be direct between
supplier and customer, and hence the role of an institution may be smaller; on
the other hand, in markets the institution will typically be an intermediary be-
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tween parties, possibly aggregating several functions such as brokering, setting
interaction protocols (e.g. auctions), providing standard contracts, and so on.
A more detailed account of the roles that an institution may play within a
coordination model (hierarchy, network or market) is given in [65]. An institution
acts as a mediator who brings various skills and services, the most important of
which is to regulate the interaction between members. But precisely because the
way interaction happens between members depends on the coordination model,
institutions need to be defined differently for each coordination model. It is the
latter that determines the needed institutional roles, social norms and interaction
forms in the society.
The main goal of a market model is to facilitate exchange between agents
that provide services or resources, and typically there are several agents offering
or needing the same type of resources. Facilitation roles that are identified for
this setting are registration (of members), machmaking and banking. In a hier-
archy model, some agents control a statically defined hierarchy, and work with
predetermined suppliers instead of selecting them on a regular basis (the automo-
tive industry is a paradigmatic example). Facilitating agents are dedicated to the
overall control and optimization of the system’s activities. Finally, in a network
coordination model general patterns of interaction or contracts are used. Fur-
thermore, coordination is achieved through the use of trusted third parties and
according to well-defined rules and sanctions. Agents in a network society are
said to enter a social contract in which they commit themselves to act according
to such norms and rules. Facilitation agents monitor and register contracts, also
helping other agents form those contracts. Roles such as matchmaking, notary
and monitoring are relevant in this setting.
Also in collaboration with University of Utrecht, Va´zquez-Salceda [228][226]
makes a distinction between institutions and organizations. While institutions
are seen as abstract entities that define sets of constraints, organizations are seen
as instances of such abstract entities. An institutional framework thus exists
within an organization of which different parties are members. A different term –
electronic organization – is used to refer to a computational model that emulates
a given organization by following its institutional framework.3 As a definition,
an electronic institution is seen as a set of templates that can be adapted, pa-
rameterized or instantiated to build an electronic organization. The HarmonIA
framework [228] is precisely devoted to providing guidelines that assist this in-
stantiation, by translating abstract norms to concrete norms and further to their
realization as rules and procedures inside a specific organization.
3In this sense, the approach taken by the IIIA group would comprise electronic organiza-
tions, not institutions.
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3.3.4 Institutional normative positions – Imperial College
London
Research at Imperial College is based on the role of institutions on defining nor-
mative positions among (computational) agents. Stemming from the work by
Sergot on normative positions [205] and institutionalized power [117], Artikis et
al. [13][11] developed a framework where an institution is seen as an external en-
tity ascribing institutional powers, normative positions and sanctions to agents.
According to Artikis, an open agent society may be viewed as a computational
institution without goal orientation. In an open agent society members occupy
roles and their behavior is governed by social laws. This society may include
other groupings – institutions – that have their own constraints, roles, communi-
cation language, and so on. Taking into account different types of institutional
constraints (as identified in [117]), the specification of such constraints is defined
at three levels:
• Valid actions : what actions are to be treated as valid or successfully exe-
cuted?
• Permitted, obliged or prohibited actions : what actions are legal?
• Sanctions and enforcement policies : how does the institution deal with
illegal behavior?
The state of a particular institution contains information about the roles,
institutional powers, normative positions and sanctions of its members.
Concerning implementation, action languages such as the Event Calculus
[130][207] are used for representing the semantics of actions, in terms of what
states of affairs they initiate or terminate. When capturing this semantics, the
distinction between permission, physical capability and institutionalized power
[117] is kept. Power relations (between an agent and an action) are used to cap-
ture valid actions in the context of an institutional state. Invalid actions are
prevented of getting their intended effects on the institutional state. As for other
constraints such as obligations and permissions, two possibilities are possible: ei-
ther treat them as normative constraints, allowing agents to eventually violate
them, or handle them as part of the specification of what counts as valid actions
(something close to the original approach at IIIA). In the former case, sanctions
can be imposed on violating agents.
3.3.5 Artificial institutions – Politecnico di Milano
Colombetti and colleagues investigate around the interplay between agent com-
munication and the creation of institutional reality. Colombetti and Verdic-
chio [39] propose a distinction between natural actions (those that concern the
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activity of an agent in a physical environment) and institutional actions (which
include performing speech acts). They define secondary actions as events inten-
tionally brought about through the execution of another action, and relate this
concept to the “counts as” relation of Searle. An institution defines contextual
conditions for the application of instances of this “counts as” relation, and agents
can exploit them to realize certain institutional actions.
Along this line, Fornara et al. [79] propose regarding an Agent Communication
Language as a set of conventions to act on a fragment of institutional reality,
defined in the context of an artificial institution. They model the context within
which artificial agents operate as consisting of a set of entities that can have
natural and institutional attributes. For instance, a book has a color (natural),
and a price and owner (institutional). Institutional attributes can be affected
by institutional actions. A model of authorizations (quite similar to Jones and
Sergot’s empowerments [117]) that are assigned to roles defines when institutional
actions come into being.
An (artificial) institution [80] is here seen as an abstract description of shared
concepts and rules that regulate a fragment of social reality, instead of the more
usual definition of a framework that regulates the interaction among agents. An
institution will be composed of a core ontology (institutional concepts and ac-
tions that operate on them), a set of authorizations (empowerments of agents
to perform institutional actions), and a set of norms (imposing obligations and
permissions on the agents).
3.3.6 Electronic institutions for B2B – LIACC
The concept of electronic institutions within this group, on which this thesis builds
upon, started to gain form with the work of Rocha and Oliveira [185][187][186].
An Electronic Institution is seen as an agent-based software platform that enables
automatic transactions among different participants according to a set of explicit
rules and norms. These are meant to regulate the social behavior of participating
agents. Additionally, the concept of a Meta Institution is introduced as a tool
enabling the creation of appropriate electronic institutions, when specific needs
in a business domain are detected.
The assistance provided by an electronic institution spans several activities
that may comprise the realization of business transactions. Moreover, Rocha and
Oliveira have devoted their attention to the phases that compose the lifecycle of
Virtual Enterprises. An electronic institution is supposed to help in both the for-
mation (setup) and operation phases of this business paradigm, by offering tools
and services and by supervising business relationships created between parties.
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3.4 Conclusion
The notion of Electronic Institution is a central one in this thesis. Although other
research groups have built on this concept from different perspectives, they either
lack implementation or coverage.
The IIIA approach to agent mediated institutions includes a complete suite
of software that allows to build implementations of their notion of electronic in-
stitutions. However, the environments that can be created are completely prede-
fined and leave almost no room for normative relationships created at run-time.
The view of institutions as mechanisms to support electronic transactions, as
approached at the University of Utrecht, lacks a computational implementation
of the theoretically discussed concepts. The normative positions approach from
Imperial College London, while providing an open perspective, lacks a support-
ing infrastructure assisting agents to obtain normative relationships. Finally,
artificial institutions as viewed by the researchers at Politecnico di Milano are es-
sentially focused on the study of the effect of agent actions (namely speech acts)
on institutional reality.
In the rest of this thesis we will try to provide a detailed account to our
approach towards the Electronic Institution concept. We see our approach as
open-minded and practically guided. By open-minded we mean that it was our
concern not to limit the applicability of the model, in terms of the normative
relationships that potential users may be interested in establishing. By practically
guided we mean that while providing a theoretical account to the concept, we are
eager to apply our Electronic Institution vision to a real-world and increasingly
relevant potential application area: e-contracting.
Part II
Research
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Chapter4
Electronic Institution for Agent-based
B2B E-Contracting
In this chapter we provide an overview of the ingredients that we include in
our own perspective of the Electronic Institution concept to be applied to the
e-contracting domain.
As discussed in Chapter 2, e-contracting encompasses a set of activities that
are carried out before, during and after an e-contract is established. These ac-
tivities can be automated to a certain extent. If we want to effectively assist
e-contracting from an integrative perspective, we must take into account activi-
ties that span a significant part of the process of managing contractual relations.
On the other hand, as discussed in Section 3.3.1, an institution is grounded on
some notion of regulation, which is materialized through rules and norms. While
some researchers take an abstract and immaterial perspective to institutions, we
find it natural, when addressing electronic institutions, to follow a more proactive
stance and ascribe to an EI the role of putting its regulations into practice. For
that, two tasks are of paramount importance: monitoring and enforcement.
In order to embrace e-contracting activities in an EI, we look at the insti-
tutional regulations as governing the contractual relations that agents establish
among them. Furthermore, we also endow the EI with a set of tools that as-
sist computational agents in that very task of contract establishment. That is,
besides monitoring and enforcing norms, institutional services will assist the co-
ordination efforts among software agents which, representing different real-world
entities, interact with the aim of establishing contractual relationships.
According to this perspective, the rationale of an EI is the following:
• To support agent interaction as a coordination framework, making the es-
tablishment of business agreements more efficient;
• To provide a level of trustworthiness by offering an enforceable normative
environment.
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An EI is thus a comprehensive framework that provides a set of institutional
services, while assuring norm enforcement through a normative environment. The
main role of this environment is to provide the necessary level of trust that enables
heterogeneous and independently developed software agents to safely engage in
business interactions. As the establishment of business agreements is central to
our purpose, we consider an evolving normative environment, including the for-
malization of contracts through norms that the EI monitors and enforces. The
EI will, nevertheless, provide a supportive normative framework (embedded into
the normative environment), which agents can exploit in order to establish their
contracts in a more straightforward fashion. This way, contracts can be under-
specified by relying on this normative background.
The services that are to be provided by the EI are concerned with the activities
identified as relevant for e-contracting (as discussed in Chapter 2). However,
we put an emphasis on fostering research on the possible automation of those
activities, following an agent-based approach. Furthermore, we identify a core
infrastructure of the EI – the normative environment – which provides monitoring
and enforcement services, and whose specification is the main focus of this thesis.
4.1 Services in an Electronic Institution
The services that we include in an EI cover a broad range of research issues within
multi-agent systems research1. The research carried out in our group (LIACC-
NIAD&R) has devoted attention to some of such services, namely:
• Negotiation-mediation [172][185]: This service aims at automating partner
selection upon a business opportunity, and is based on appropriate negotia-
tion protocols exhibiting important properties such as information privacy,
qualitative feedback in proposal evaluation and adaptation.
• Ontology-mapping [155][154]: This service is crucial for the mutual under-
standing of software agents in open environments, consisting on establishing
a semantic alignment between possibly disparate representations of similar
business domain concepts.
• Contract monitoring and enforcement : This service addresses the post-
contractual phase, by monitoring parties compliance with contractual terms
and by applying specified sanctions in case of violations.
• Computational Trust and Reputation [219]: This service aims at aggregat-
ing trust information, namely building on past contractual behavior, which
allows agents to make informed decisions regarding the selection of partners
and/or the negotiation of contracts.
1In fact, they are accommodated into the Agreement Technologies research initiative, which
started in 2008 (see Section 2.6).
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Figure 4.1: Electronic Institution Platform for B2B Contracting.
When designing an integrated approach that includes these services, we must
also consider the interconnections among them. For instance, if ontology-mapping
is to be useful, it must be aligned with the preliminaries of negotiation, allowing
parties to resolve their semantic discrepancies before automated negotiation can
take place [148]. Also, in order to move from the negotiation process to contract
monitoring, contract drafting must be taken into account. In this case, we may in-
stantiate contract templates (whose normative content may already be part of the
institution’s normative framework) with the outcome of negotiation, or include
in the negotiation process itself the specification of contract clauses. Contracts
resulting from successful negotiations may then be validated, registered and dig-
itally signed, before being handed to a normative environment for monitoring
and enforcement purposes. Finally, the way agents enact their contracts provides
important information for trust building. A repository of trust and reputation
information may then complete the circle by providing relevant inputs for future
negotiations. The integration of all these stages (as depicted in Figure 4.1) has
been addressed through the development of an Electronic Institution Platform
for B2B Contracting.
In this thesis the issues of contract establishment, monitoring and enforcement
are addressed.
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4.2 Contractual Scenarios
Before going deep into the main subject of this thesis, which concerns the specifi-
cation of an appropriate institutional normative environment for e-contracting, in
this section we discuss the kinds of business relationships that we are looking at.
This will provide some basis for understanding the rationale behind the research
decisions and directions that we have taken, as described in subsequent chapters.
As expressed by Daskalopulu [54], electronic support is not likely to be needed
in contractual situations of the simple purchase kind. In these situations checking
compliance comes down to verifying whether goods are delivered on time and
whether required payments are made. On the other hand, contracts that govern
more lasting business relationships can benefit from tools that assist both contract
formation and performance.
Furthermore, it is often the case that one contractual relation forms the busi-
ness context for further contracts, as noted by Angelov [8]. These new contracts
are dependent on the prior existence of that business relation, in the sense that
contracts do not include every detail related to the (business) context within
which they are formed. In other words, contracts are not always self-contained.
An illustrating example (which can be found in [231]) is that of a wholesaler
who negotiates with manufacturers about frame-contracts on a yearly basis; af-
terwards, the wholesaler will forward specific orders to the manufacturers within
the boundaries of the agreed upon frame-contract.
This notion of contracts that span the lifetime of several subcontracts is ob-
servable in various business contexts, including the so-called Virtual Breeding
Environments. In a VBE [29][30], a pool of enterprises establishes a base long-
term cooperation agreement, which may be seen as a contract, depending on the
courses of action that members commit themselves to (Romero et al. [189] study
what kinds of governance rules can be defined for VBEs). A subset of VBE mem-
bers will then be selected when a business opportunity arises, giving birth to a
Virtual Enterprise that will be governed by a new negotiated contract. The VE
governance rules may be inherited or instantiated from those governing the VBE
within which the VE is created (the VBE fulfills in this way its preparedness
rationale), but can also include other rules defined by VE partners [190].
A contract that governs a VE is also known as an interchange agreement
[200]: a contract specifying the internal relations of a VE in terms of rules, liabil-
ities and duties that exist between the VE members. In order to form a legally
binding contract, the interchange agreement should be specific and unambigu-
ous enough, instead of merely defining general goals or guidelines (the latter are
termed framework clauses in [179]).
An important issue to take into account when attempting to automate con-
tract monitoring is that parties’ obligations should be expressed clearly, namely
by referring to actions or states of affairs that can be verified through electronic
means. It should be possible to determine whether parties’ actions are in accor-
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dance with what was contractually stipulated.
While modeling supply chains using a multi-agent approach, Swaminathan et
al. [211], as well as Verdicchio and Colombetti [223] identify three different kinds
of flows between companies. Material flows from suppliers to clients concern the
delivery of products. Money flows from clients to suppliers are meant for pay-
ments of products. Finally, information flows concern the exchange of several
types of information in both directions, including documents such as orders, or
supply updates such as expected delivery dates. These three kinds of elements
are representative of the kinds of transactions that may occur in any B2B con-
tract concerning the supply of products (in service contracts material flow is not
evident, and quality-of-service metrics are typically employed [119][163]).
Summarizing, we are looking at contracts between a group of agents (rep-
resenting business entities) that may be established in the context of standing
contractual agreements. The commitments that bind agents together in such
contracts regard exchanges of different kinds, which must take place in order for
business to be enacted as planned.
4.3 Discussion
The research work presented in this chapter, namely the conceptual idea of an
Electronic Institution as a service-providing infrastructure that includes a nor-
mative core, can be found in [136][134][133].
Our perspective on Electronic Institutions borrows from the University of
Utrecht approach (see Section 3.3.3) the view of institutions as infrastructures
providing services that are meant to enhance the efficiency of transactions. In
respect to the main coordination models reported in [65], we assume a network
model where the establishment of contracts is a central issue.
While we intend to obtain a computational realization of our concept (and
have indeed progressed in that direction, within LIACC-NIAD&R, by building
an Electronic Institution software platform), the cornerstone of our EI – its nor-
mative environment – has a significant distinction to that of other researchers
as is the case of IIIA’s approach (see Section 3.3.2). We want agents to be able
to dynamically specify the normative relationships they are willing to establish,
instead of providing a predefined normative scenario. Therefore, our perspective
regards an EI not as an end per se, but as a means to facilitate both the creation
and enactment of contracts between agents. The normative environment itself
will be introduced, in the next chapter, with the concern of supporting contract
formation, by incorporating and making available a background normative frame-
work including norms that agents may choose to adopt or otherwise override.

Chapter5
An Institutional Normative Environment
The use of an Electronic Institution as an infrastructure that enables regulation
in multi-agent systems presupposes the existence of an environment including
norms that somehow guide the way agents should behave. The purpose of this
chapter is to present a formalization of an institutional normative environment
addressing this need, envisioning its employment in e-contracting scenarios. We
will start by providing an informal description of the environment we seek to
develop.
5.1 Overview
The role of a normative environment is, besides providing a set of regulations
under which agents’ collective work is made possible, to check whether agents
are willing to follow the norms they commit to (monitoring), and further to em-
ploy correction measures as a means of coercing agents to comply (enforcement).
When building a computational realization of a normative environment, we must
take into account the kinds of interactions that software agents will be able to
carry out. If we are to build a self-contained environment where we are able to
observe every agent activity, then what we get is a completely virtual world. On
the contrary, we aim at providing an infrastructure that maps part of real world
interactions (in an e-contracting environment) that take place between real enti-
ties. These entities are represented by software agents within the EI and, through
them, are able to interact with the computational normative environment through
speech acts.
We want to represent in the normative environment’s structure the normative
relations that correspond to contracts established by real world entities. This
implies that instead of having a predefined normative structure, the shape of
the environment will evolve and adapt to the actual contractual situations that
are established. Furthermore, while monitoring the compliance to norms that
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apply to specific contracts, the normative environment will be recording a map-
ping from the relevant interactions (which concern e-contracting exchanges) that
take place. The connection between real-world interactions and the institutional
environment is made through illocutions (speech acts) that agents perform with
the intent of informing the environment that certain contract-related events have
occurred. With an appropriate interface between the normative environment and
the statements that agents make, we incrementally build a state of institutional
reality, which is an image of relevant real-world transactions that are through this
means institutionally recognized.
The model we have developed is inspired by Searle’s work on the construction
of social reality [203] (as discussed in Section 3.3.1), where the use of constitutive
rules allows facts to count as other institutional facts under some context. The
former facts may be brute facts, or already established institutional facts. In
our case, brute facts do not refer to physical reality, but rather to the illocutions
agents perform towards the normative environment. These are our basic building
blocks in order to build institutional reality. The main mechanism that we shall
use in order to certify a real-world event by promoting it to institutional reality
is that of empowerment as defined by Jones and Sergot [117] (also discussed in
Section 3.3.1): informative illocutions performed by agents enacting specific roles
count as certain institutional facts. In other words, agents enacting such roles
are seen by the EI as trusted third parties, and are as such certified to obtain
specific institutional facts. As an example, consider the acknowledgment of a
monetary exchange: an agent enacting a banking role would be accepted as an
entity asserting that such an exchange has in fact occurred, while the agent that
was responsible to fulfill the transaction would not.
When providing a contract monitoring service, we take the stance that it is in
the best interest of agents to publicize their abidance to contractual commitments.
They do so by provoking the achievement of corresponding institutional facts.
Depending on the constitutive rules that are in place, agents may need to interact
with the institution’s trusted third parties in order to convince the EI that they
are in fact complying.
Since our normative environment is meant to handle several contracts at the
same time, we need to provide some kind of structure to the corresponding nor-
mative relations inside the environment. Taking into account the contractual
scenarios that we have delineated in Section 4.2, we build the environment’s
structure around a central notion: context. Each e-contract will be represented
in the normative environment as a (normative) context. As a result, since in-
stitutional facts map exchanges that pertain to a certain contract, institutional
facts are contextualized (i.e., inside the normative environment they are part of
the respective context’s state).
Because a contract can represent the business context for further contracts,
we organize contexts hierarchically. Starting with a top institutional context
within which every other context is formed, we allow contracts to inherit norms
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through this hierarchical structure. Furthermore, taking into account the aim of
facilitating contract establishment, a supportive normative background may be
included within this contextual structure. Predefined norms may therefore be
inherited into sub-contexts. As in the contract law field, these norms work as
“default rules” [48], and should be seen as facilitating rather than constraining
contractual activity [118]. This means that such norms may be contracted around.
After providing an informal description of the structure of our institutional
normative environment, we will now proceed to formalize it. We will start by pro-
viding a definition for the normative environment itself, together with our notion
of context. A dissection of each component of the normative environment will
follow. We will cover the specification of institutional reality and its handling,
taking into account the aim of providing a contract monitoring and enforcement
service. Afterwards, we will center our attention in the formalization of norms,
explaining their semantics in a normative framework that includes context hier-
archies supporting norm inheritance.
5.2 Normative Environment
We start by providing a definition for the normative environment as the aggre-
gation of different kinds of rules, a normative state and norms.
5.2.1. Definition. Normative Environment NE = 〈REA,BF,CR,NS, IR,N〉
The normative environment NE of an EI is composed of a set REA of role-enacting
agents, a set BF of brute facts, a set of CR of constitutive rules, a normative state
NS, a set IR of institutional rules that manipulate that normative state and a set
N of norms, which can be seen as a special kind of rules.
Each of the elements that compose the normative environment will be defined
below. Every agent participating in the EI will be enacting a role (see Def. 5.4.4),
and will at times utter statements that are recorded as brute facts (see Def. 5.4.3).
Constitutive rules (see Def. 5.4.5) process these brute facts in order to create, in
the normative state (see Def. 5.4.2), institutional facts that represent an institu-
tional recognition of a real-world event. While norms (see Def. 5.6.1) define the
normative positions of each agent, the main purpose of institutional rules (see
Def. 5.4.6) is to relate the normative state with the standing normative positions.
A typical use of institutional rules is illustrated in Section 5.5, where they are
employed to implement the semantics of deontic statements – rules monitor the
normative state in order to detect the fulfillment or violation of deadline obli-
gations. On the other hand, norms “produce” those deontic statements upon
certain normative state conditions.
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5.3 Contexts
Our model is based on structuring the normative environment with contexts. In
this section we introduce the notion of context and context hierarchies.
5.3.1. Definition. Context C = 〈PC ,CA,CI,CN〉
A context C is a section of the normative environment representing the fact that a
group of agents identified in set CA commits to a joint activity partially regulated
by a set CN ⊆ N of norms. A context includes a set CI of contextual info that
makes up a kind of background knowledge for that context (see Def. 5.3.3). PC
is the parent context within which context C is formed. Let PCA be the set of
agents in context PC : we have that CA ⊆ PCA.
Contexts allow us to organize norms according to a hierarchical normative
structure. Norm set N is partitioned into the several contexts that may exist,
that is, sets CN for each context are mutually disjoint. Typically, we will have
CN ⊂ N, in which case more than one context has a non-empty set CN; only if
all norms in N are defined in the same context we may have CN = N. A norm
inheritance mechanism, as explained later (in Section 5.6.2), justifies the fact that
the locally-defined set CN of norms only partially regulates the activity of agents
in set CA. We identify an institutional top level context from which all other
contexts are (directly or indirectly) formed; every agent is associated with this
institutional context.
We now introduce the notion of sub-context.
5.3.2. Definition. Sub-context C ′ = 〈PC ′,CA′,CI′,CN′〉
A context C ′ is a sub-context of a context C = 〈PC ,CA,CI,CN〉, denoted C ′CC,
if PC ′ = C or if PC ′ C C . When C ′ is either a sub-context of C or C itself, we
write C ′ E C. From Def. 5.3.1 we also have that CA′ ⊆ CA.
A sub-context defines a sub-activity committed to by a subset of the parent
context’s agents. Notice that the sub-context relationship is an explicit one.
Every context is a sub-context of the institutional context.
We now turn to the definition of background information that may be defined
as a foundational element of a context.
5.3.3. Definition. Contextual info InfoC
Contextual info InfoC is a fully-grounded atomic formula in first-order logic com-
prising founding information regarding a context C = 〈PC ,CA,CI,CN〉. Look-
ing at Definition 5.3.1, we have that InfoC ∈ CI.
The CI set in a context definition is therefore composed of first-order logic
atomic formulae that provide background information for that context.
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The rationale of this context/sub-context relationship comes from the fact
that in B2B a contract is often dependent on the existence of another business
relation, which forms the business context for the new contract. Each contract
contains a set of definitions regarding the role of the participants, the values to be
exchanged (e.g. products and money) or any parameters defining their provision.
In our model, these comprise information that is intrinsic and foundational to the
context associated with this contract – hence the name contextual info.
5.4 Institutional Reality
Now that the central notion of context has been introduced, we can proceed to
formalize the representation of institutional reality, as well as its manipulation.
5.4.1 Normative state
The normative state is organized through contexts, and composed of elements
describing the current situation. We call every formula in NS an institutional
reality element, or IRE . Each IRE pertains to a specific context within which it
is relevant.
5.4.1. Definition. Institutional reality element IREC
An institutional reality element IREC is an occurrence regarding context C. We
distinguish the following kinds of IREC with the following meanings:
IfactC (f ) – fact f is institutionally recognized as having occurred
TimeC (t) – instant t has elapsed
OblCa (f ≺ d) – agent a is obliged to bring about fact f until deadline d
Fulf C (obl) – obligation obl was fulfilled
ViolC (obl) – obligation obl was violated
The use of subscripts and superscripts in formulae is only a syntactical con-
venience – both contextual info and institutional reality elements are first-order
atomic formulae (e.g., C could be used as a first argument in each of these formu-
lae). While contextual info is confined to background information that is part of
the context definition, institutional reality elements represent occurrences taking
place after the context’s creation, during its lifetime.
We consider institutional facts as agent-originated, since they are obtained
(using constitutive rules) as a consequence of some agent action. The remaining
elements are environment events, asserted in the process of norm application and
monitoring. Our model of institutional reality is based on a discrete model of
time. The Time elements are used to signal instants that are relevant to the
context at hand. Obligations are deontic statements, and we admit both their
fulfillment and violation1. Some of the IRE ’s are interrelated: for instance, a
1In Chapter 6 we extend this to consider further states for obligations.
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fulfillment connects an obligation to bring about a fact with its achievement as
an institutional fact. These interrelations are captured with institutional rules.
5.4.2. Definition. Normative State NS = {IREC11 , IREC22 , ..., IRECmn }
The normative state NS is a set of fully-grounded atomic formulae IRECji in
first-order logic.
The normative state will contain, at each moment, all elements that charac-
terize the current state of affairs in every context. In that sense, NS could be
seen as being partitioned among the several contexts that exist, as is the case
with norms; however, IRE ’s are not part of each context’s definition, since they
are obtained at a later stage, during the context’s operation.
5.4.2 Constitutive rules
Constitutive rules make a connection between what is said and what is taken
for granted. Before we formally define constitutive rules, we must provide a
representation for informative illocutions, which comprise brute facts (elements
of BF, as in Def. 5.2.1).
5.4.3. Definition. Brute fact Bfact(a, s)
A brute fact Bfact(a, s) is a statement s (regarding some context), uttered by
agent a.
Since constitutive rules are, in part, based on the roles enacted by agents that
perform illocutions, we also need to define a structure for storing role-enacting
agents information (elements of REA, as in Def. 5.2.1).
5.4.4. Definition. Role-enacting agent Rea(a, r)
An agent a enacting role r is represented as Rea(a, r).
We are now in a position to define constitutive rules.
5.4.5. Definition. Constitutive rule CR ::= FactConds → IfactC
A constitutive rule CR specifies, for one or more brute facts and the roles of the
agents creating them, or from one or more institutional facts, what institutional
fact should be added to the normative state. The constitutive rule’s conditional is
a conjunction of patterns of Bfact and Rea, or a conjunction of patters of IfactC ,
which may contain variables:
FactConds ::= BruteFactConds | InstFactConds
BruteFactConds ::= Term | Term ∧ BruteFactConds
Term ::= Bfact(...) | Rea(...)
InstFactConds ::= IfactC (...) | IfactC (...) ∧ InstFactConds
The constitutive rule’s conclusion is an institutional fact that is allowed to contain
bounded variables.
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When using brute facts, the context ascribed to the obtained institutional
fact is extracted from brute fact statements, which are expressed according to
some well-defined ontology. Constitutive rules must inspect brute facts in order
to obtain the corresponding institutional facts. This corresponds to mapping
between two different ontologies: one for brute facts and another for institutional
facts. Although agents are free to utter any statements they like, only a subset
of these will have a meaning inside the EI, namely those that are recognized by
constitutive rules.
When the brute fact patterns are matched against the brute facts in BF using
a first-order logic substitution Θ, the fully-grounded institutional fact obtained
by applying Θ to the rule’s conclusion is added to the normative state. The same
is true when matching institutional fact patterns against the normative state NS.
Examples of constitutive rules
Since we are concerned with business scenarios involving transactions, we de-
fine three main roles that provide a connection to real-world events: a bank role
certifies money exchanges (i.e., payments); a delivery tracker role certifies ma-
terial exchanges (i.e., product deliveries); a messenger role certifies information
exchanges (e.g. documents). The following comprise examples of constitutive
rules regarding these kinds of transactions (variables are represented by lower-
case identifiers).
Consider a situation in which an agent ought to make a certain payment to
another. Although the agent may claim to have paid its debt, that does not
make it the case. However, if a trusted financial third party agent states that a
currency transfer referring to a certain context (e.g. a sales contract) has taken
place, it would be safe to consider that the payment took place:
Bfact(b,CurrencyTransf (Context :ctx ,Ref :r ,From :a1 ,To :a2 ,Amount :am))∧
Rea(b,Bank)
→ Ifactctx (Payment(Ref :r ,From :a1 ,To :a2 ,Amount :am))
In this example, CurrencyTransf (Context :ctx , ...) is a statement that a cur-
rency transfer of am from a1 to a2 has taken place regarding overall transaction
r within context ctx . The purpose of using a reference for the overall transaction
is that of enabling the occurrence of similar brute or institutional facts within the
same context (the reference, e.g. an invoice number, assigns a unique identifier
to each payment, in this case).
We can also say that if both agents (the payer and the receiver) state that a
payment took place, it would also be safe to conclude the associated institutional
fact:
BFact(a1 ,Paid(Context :ctx ,Ref :r ,To : a2 ,Amount :am))∧
BFact(a2 ,Collected(Context :ctx ,Ref :r ,From :a1 ,Amount :am))
→ Ifactctx (Payment(Ref :r ,From :a1 ,To :a2 ,Amount :am))
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In this case, a1 is stating that, within context ctx and regarding overall trans-
action r , he has paid am to a2 , while a2 is stating that he has collected am from
a1 . It might be questionable whether the receiver’s statement would be sufficient.
The same approach may be defined concerning material exchanges:
Bfact(dt ,Delivered(Context :ctx ,Ref :r ,From :a1 ,To :a2 ,Product :p,Quantity :q))∧
Rea(dt ,DeliveryTracker)
→ Ifactctx (Delivery(Ref :r ,From :a1 ,To :a2 ,Product :p,Quantity :q))
BFact(a1 ,Sent(Context :ctx ,Ref :r ,To :a2 ,Product :p,Quantity :q))∧
BFact(a2 ,Received(Context :ctx ,Ref :r ,From :a1 ,Product :p,Quantity :q))
→ Ifactctx (Delivery(Ref :r ,From :a1 ,To :a2 ,Product :p,Quantity :q))
In this case, a1 is stating that, within context ctx and regarding overall trans-
action r , he has sent q units of i to a2 , while a2 is stating that he has received
q units of i from a1 .
Finally, a similar approach for information exchanges:
Bfact(m,MsgDelivered(Context :ctx ,Ref :r ,From :a1 ,To :a2 ,Msg :msg))∧
Rea(m,Messenger)
→ Ifactctx (MsgDelivery(Ref :r ,From :a1 ,To :a2 ,Msg :msg))
BFact(a1 ,MsgSent(Context :ctx ,Ref :r ,To :a2 ,Msg :msg))∧
BFact(a2 ,MsgReceived(Context :ctx ,Ref :r ,From :a1 ,Msg :msg))
→ Ifactctx (MsgDelivery(Ref :r ,From :a1 ,To :a2 ,Msg :msg))
In this case, a1 is stating that, within context ctx and regarding overall trans-
action r , he has sent message msg to a2 , while a2 is stating that he has received
message msg from a1 .
In principle, any information exchange could be treated with this approach.
However, since constitutive rules can be based on institutional facts, we can
acknowledge business-related documents such as orders, invoices and so on. As
an example, we may acknowledge the placement of an order using the following
constitutive rule:
Ifactctx (MsgDelivery(Ref :r ,From :a1 ,To :a2 ,Msg :msg))∧
msg = Order(Product :p,Quantity :q)
→ Ifactctx (Order(Ref :r ,From :a1 ,To :a2 ,Product :p,Quantity :q))
The advantage of having this constitutive rule is that it makes it easier to
express norms that are based on orders: instead or relying on a “message” fact,
we can make an explicit reference to an order document. What is important
to retain from this last example is that by inspecting the contents of a message
(which may have a more or less complex structure) we can infer specific documents
to have been delivered.
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5.4.3 Institutional rules
Given the “contextualization” of the normative state, we are now able to introduce
the notion of institutional rules. These rules allow us to update the normative
state of the system, by capturing interrelations between IREC ’s.
5.4.6. Definition. Institutional rule IR ::= Antecedent → Consequent
An institutional rule IR defines, for a given set of conditions, what other elements
should be added to the normative state. The rule’s Antecedent is a conjunction
of patterns of IREC (see Def. 5.4.1), which may contain variables; restrictions
may be imposed on such variables through relational conditions over expressions.
We also allow the use of negation (as failure):
Antecedent ::= Term | Term ∧ Antecedent | ¬Antecedent
Term ::= IREC | relational -condition
The rule’s Consequent is a conjunction of IREC which are not deontic statements
(referred to as IRE -C ), and which are allowed to contain bounded variables or
expressions using bounded variables:
Consequent ::= IRE -C | IRE -C ∧ Consequent
When the antecedent matches the normative state using a first-order logic
substitution Θ, and if all the relational conditions over variables hold, the atomic
formulae obtained by applying Θ to the consequent of the rule are added to the
normative state as fully-grounded elements.
5.5 Monitoring Deadline Obligations
One of the most important roles for institutional rules is in monitoring obligations
that agents acquire through norms. As defined in Def. 5.4.1, obligations that are
part of the normative state are deadline obligations, in the sense discussed in [62].
In this section we specify, in a first attempt, the semantics of deadline obli-
gations and further implement this semantics through institutional rules. This
approach will be revised in Chapter 6, where we take a different perspective on
modeling contractual obligations.
5.5.1 Semantics of deadline obligations
In order to model the semantics of deadline obligations, we will make use of linear
temporal logic (LTL) [67] with a discrete time model: time has an initial moment
with no predecessors, and is infinite into the future. Let x = (s0, s1, s2, ...) be a
timeline, defined as a sequence of states si. The syntax x |= p reads that p is true
in timeline x. We write xk to denote state sk of x, and x
k |= p to mean that p is
true at state xk.
We will use a weak version of the before LTL operator B, where the left
operand is mandatory, while the right operand is not:
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• x |= (p B q) iff ∃j (x j |= p ∧ ∀k<j (x k |= ¬q)).
This before operator is not strict, since it also succeeds when both operands
become true at the same time point. We will also make use of the henceforth
LTL operator G:
• x |= G q iff ∀j (x j |= q)
The following relationships express how deadline obligations are fulfilled or
violated:
OblCa (f ≺ d) ∧ (IfactC (f ) B TimeC (d))⇒ G Fulf C (OblCa (f ≺ d)) (5.1)
OblCa (f ≺ d) ∧ (TimeC (d) B IfactC (f ))⇒ G ViolC (OblCa (f ≺ d)) (5.2)
With this approach, we are basically depending on which comes first: the
deadline or the accomplishment of the obliged fact (this is in line with the se-
mantics followed by Broersen et al. [27]).
We want obligations not to persist after the deadline. This allows us to model
both cases of legal obligations, namely obligations that stand even when violated
and those that do not. For instance, Dignum et al. [62] provide the following
examples: an obligation to pay for a fine will persist if it is not fulfilled until the
deadline, while an obligation to submit a conference paper will not persist after
the submission deadline (because submitting makes no sense at that stage). For
modeling a standing obligation, the obligation can be reinstated after a violation
is detected, by means of an appropriate sanctioning norm.
This property can be stated as follows: a fulfilled obligation cannot be violated
anymore, and a violated obligation cannot be fulfilled anymore.
OblCa (f ≺ d) ∧ Fulf C (OblCa (f ≺ d))⇒ G¬ViolC (OblCa (f ≺ d)) (5.3)
OblCa (f ≺ d) ∧ViolC (OblCa (f ≺ d))⇒ G¬Fulf C (OblCa (f ≺ d)) (5.4)
These relationships remove the obligation’s effect after it has been fulfilled or
violated.
5.5.2 Implementation with institutional rules
Institutional rules, being used to maintain the normative state of the system,
allow us to implement the semantics of deadline obligations, as defined above.
The Fulf C and ViolC terms in Def. 5.4.1 are meant to allow us to reason about
the fulfillment and violation of obligations as soon as they occur, by defining
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norms that take these elements into account (see Def. 5.6.1). Institutional rules
enable the specification of conditions for fulfillment and violation detection.
According to the deadline obligation semantics described above, namely (5.1)
and (5.2), we may have the following institutional rules (variables are represented
by lowercase identifiers):
Oblca (f ≺ d) ∧ Ifactc(f ) ∧ ¬Timec(d)→ Fulf c(Oblca (f ≺ d)) (5.5)
Oblca (f ≺ d) ∧ Timec(d) ∧ ¬Ifactc(f )→ Violc(Oblca (f ≺ d)) (5.6)
A problem with these rules is that it is unclear what is supposed to happen
when both the institutional fact and the deadline temporal reference hold. That
is, in a situation where the institutional fact occurs exactly at the deadline, we
should have both elements Ifactc(f ) and Timec(d) added to the normative state
before rules are evaluated again – in this case, none of the rules will apply. If we
add a rule for dealing specifically with this case, we may say:
Oblca (f ≺ d) ∧ Ifactc(f ) ∧ Timec(d)→ Fulf c(Oblca (f ≺ d)) (5.7)
However, this is not acceptable, because the rule will still apply when the
deadline is obtained before the institutional fact. Instead, we need to keep the
property that after being violated, the obligation cannot be fulfilled anymore (as
in (5.4) above). We could thus replace rule (5.5) for:
Oblca (f ≺ d) ∧ Ifactc(f ) ∧ ¬Violc(Oblca (f ≺ d))→ Fulf c(Oblca (f ≺ d)) (5.8)
It is tempting to also explicitly state that violations can only occur if no
fulfillment was achieved before. We could write:
Oblca (f ≺ d) ∧ Timec(d) ∧ ¬Fulf c(Oblca (f ≺ d))→ Violc(Oblca (f ≺ d)) (5.9)
However, when taken together with (5.8), this would imply that a simulta-
neous occurrence of Ifactc(f ) and Timec(d) could bring either a fulfillment or a
violation! We therefore must join (5.6) with (5.8). (Notice that the pairing of
(5.5) with (5.9) would bring a violation in the simultaneity case.)
This approach is based on the implicit assumption that rules are evaluated
at every normative state update, otherwise we may get unwanted results. For
instance, let us assume that the following are elements of the current normative
state, and that they are obtained in this order: OblCA (F ≺ D), TimeC (D) and
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IfactC (F ). In this case, we have reached the deadline before the institutional
fact was added. However, if rules are applied only at a time later than D, the
violation would go unnoticed: rule (5.8) would apply, while rule (5.6) would not.
If we are to relax the rule evaluation policy, the two rules for fulfillment and
violation detection must become independent. A way to achieve this is to enrich
IRE ’s that are used by monitoring rules, by time-stamping them: IfactC (f )t ,
Fulf C (obl)t and ViolC (obl)t now include an explicit temporal reference t for their
occurrence. We are now in a position to rewrite our monitoring rules as follows:
Oblca (f ≺ d) ∧ Ifactc(f )t ∧ t < d → Fulf c(Oblca (f ≺ d))t (5.10)
Oblca (f ≺ d) ∧ Timec(d) ∧ ¬(Ifactc(f )t ∧ t < d)→ Violc(Oblca (f ≺ d))d (5.11)
The shortcoming of this approach is that it is directly applicable only when
considering temporal deadlines (in previous rules the Timec element could be
easily replaced by, e.g., an institutional fact used as a deadline).
Another assumption that we make regards the instantaneous recognition of
each IRE . That is, an institutional fact occurring at time T is added at that
same instant T to the normative state. Were that not the case, we could get into
situations where certain violations would need to be retracted as new knowledge
is acquired, otherwise inconsistencies might occur (an extra ¬Timec(d) test in
rule (5.10) would avoid getting an obligation both violated and fulfilled, although
the normative state would still be inconsistent). The approach that we take
in Chapter 6 will allow us to make this model less demanding in terms of fact
recognition.
5.6 Normative Framework
As introduced in Section 5.1, and formalized in Section 5.3, contexts provide us
an hierarchical structure through which norms may be inherited, from contexts
to sub-contexts. This structure enables us to assert a contract in the context
of another previous contractual agreement, and will allow the new contract to
inherit applicable norms from that previously established relationship. Looking
at this feature from a broader perspective, the EI may include, in its institutional
(top level) context, a supportive normative framework embedded in the normative
environment. This will facilitate contract establishment by providing predefined
norms that regulate specific types of contracts. However, agents should be able
to contract around these regulations, which should be seen as “default rules” [48].
In order to enable this approach, in this section we properly formalize the use of
norms throughout our context hierarchies, including how and when they are to
be inherited.
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5.6.1 Norms
Before explaining the mechanism for applying norms in our hierarchical context
structure, we must start by defining the very concept of norm. As with institu-
tional reality elements, norms are contextual.
5.6.1. Definition. Norm N C ::= SituationC
′ → PrescriptionC ′
A norm NC is a rule with a deontic consequent, defined in a specific context C.
The norm is applicable to a context C ′EC. The norm’s situation is a conjunction
of patterns of InfoC
′
and IREC
′
. Both kinds of patterns are allowed to contain
variables; restrictions may be imposed on such variables through relational con-
ditions. We also allow the use of negation (as failure):
SituationC
′
::= Term | Term ∧ SituationC ′ | ¬SituationC ′
Term ::= InfoC
′ | IREC ′ | relational -condition
The norm’s prescription is a (possibly empty) conjunction of deontic statements
(obligations), which are allowed to contain bounded variables or expressions using
bounded variables; the same context C ′ is assigned to prescribed deontic state-
ments:
PrescriptionC
′
::=  | Obls
Obls ::= OblC
′
(...) | OblC ′(...) ∧Obls
Conceptually, the norm’s Situation can be seen as being based on two sets
of elements: background (Sb) and contingent (Sc). Background elements are
those that exist at context creation (founding contextual info), while contingent
elements are those that are added to the normative state at a later stage. This
distinction will be helpful when describing the norm inheritance model.
We emphasize the distinction between the context where the norm is defined,
and the context to which the norm applies. While, in order to make the model
simpler to follow, we defined a norm as being applicable to a specific context,
in Section 5.6.3 we will enlarge the norm’s scope, which will in part clarify the
usefulness of the model.
5.6.2 Contextual norm inheritance and defeasibility
model
In this section we define the semantics of norms and formalize a model for norm
inheritance and defeasibility within the sphere of a supportive normative frame-
work. We start by exploring norm applicability according to the normative state.
For that, we make use of the notion of substitution in first-order logic. We write
f ·Θ to represent the result of applying substitution Θ to atomic formula f .
5.6.2. Definition. Norm activation
A norm NC = SC
′ → PC′ , applicable to a context C ′ = 〈PC ′,CA′,CI′,CN′〉, is
said to be activated if there is a substitution Θ such that:
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• ∀c∈Sc c ·Θ ∈ NS, where Sc is the set of contingent conjuncts (IREC ′ pat-
terns) in SC
′
; and
• ∀b∈Sb b ·Θ ∈ CI′, where Sb is the set of background conjuncts (InfoC ′ pat-
terns) in SC
′
; and
• all the relational conditions over variables hold.
We are now able to define the notion of conflicting norm activations, as follows.
5.6.3. Definition. Norm activation conflict
Let Act1 be the activation of norm N
C1
1 = S1 → P1, obtained with substitution
Θ1, and Act2 the activation of norm N
C2
2 = S2 → P2, obtained with substitution
Θ2. Let NS1 = {c ·Θ1 |c ∈ Sc1}, and NS2 = {c ·Θ2 |c ∈ Sc2}, where Sc1 and Sc2
are the sets of contingent conjuncts of S1 and S2, respectively. Both NS1 and
NS2 represent fractions of the whole normative state NS. Norm activations Act1
and Act2 are in conflict, written Act1
⊗
Act2 , if NS1 = NS2 and either C1CC2
or C2C C1.
Succinctly, we say there is a norm activation conflict if we have two applicable
norms activated with the same fraction of the normative state and defined in
different contexts. Notice that the fact that both norms are activated with the
same contextual IRE ’s already dictates that the norm contexts, if different, have
a sub-context relationship (there is no multiple inheritance mechanism in our
normative structure). This becomes clearer when taking into account the sub-
context (Def. 5.3.2) and norm (Def. 5.6.1) definitions: a context has a single
parent context, and a norm NC applies to a context C ′ E C.
In principle, all norm activations are defeasible, according to the following
definition.
5.6.4. Definition. Norm activation defeasance
A norm activation Act1 for norm N
C1
1 defeats a norm activation Act2 for norm
NC22 if Act1
⊗
Act2 and C1C C2.
A defeated norm activation is discarded, that is, the defeated activation is
not applied to the normative state fraction used for activating the norm. Only
undefeated norm activations will be effective: the substitution that activated
the norm is applied to its prescription and the resulting fully-grounded deontic
statements are added to the normative state (recall that there are no free variables
in the prescription part of norms). At this point we should stress the fact that we
do not talk about norm defeasance, but rather norm activation defeasance. Thus,
the defeasance relationship may only materialize on actual norm applicability.
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5.6.3 Norm contextual target
Let us restate the purpose of having defeasibility in norms as presented in the
model above: to have a normative background that can fill-in details of sub-
contexts, which are created later and can benefit from this setup by being under-
specified. Thus, part of the normative environment’s norms will be predefined, in
the sense that they are preexistent to the applicable contexts themselves. What
we need is to typify contexts in order to be able to say that a norm applies
to a certain type of contexts, instead of a particular individual context. This
way, a norm might be defined at a super-context and applicable to a range of
sub-contexts (of a certain type) to be subsequently created.
We can do this adaptation by considering the context identifier C, as used in
the patterns composing norms, as a pair id : type, where id is a context identifier
and type is a predefined context type. In a norm NC = S → P (see Def. 5.6.1),
patterns of InfoC
′
and IREC
′
inside S, as well as obligations inside P , will be
rewritten to accommodate this kind of context reference, optionally using a vari-
able in place of the context id . For instance, an IRE id :T pattern, where id is a
variable, would match IRE ’s of any sub-context of type T . When activating a
norm with this kind of pattern, the substitution Θ (as used in Def. 5.6.2) would
have to bind id to a specific context identifier; every further occurrence of id
within the norm becomes thus a bounded-variable.
This approach allows us to maintain our definitions of norm activation conflict
and defeasance, with minor syntactical changes. Typifying contexts also opens
up the possibility to define context-type hierarchies (much the same way as we
have class hierarchies in object-oriented programming): we may define a general
context type from which every other context (directly or indirectly) extends.
Using this approach, we can specify general policy norms that span multiple
context types; for instance, we may define a general norm saying that in principle
every deadline violation is supposed to bring some kind of penalty to the violator,
regardless of the context type at hand. This norm will then be defeasible inside
particular contexts, if one wishes to do so.
5.6.4 Example
The exploitation of our normative environment, especially when considering its
role in providing a supportive normative background, demands for knowledge
engineering efforts focused in building appropriate normative structures that may
be of use in recurrent real-world contracting situations. When doing so, it will
be necessary to specify, for each type of contract, an appropriate ontology for
contextual information (see Def. 5.3.3) needed when creating a contract of that
type. Although the normative core of a contract may be inherited, the specific
information that instantiates a particular contract must be expressed in a per-
contract basis (in many cases this information can be regarded as a set of contract
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parameters). Users must therefore know this “interface” when instantiating a
contract of a predefined type.
While in Chapter 7 we will illustrate the use of the normative environment in
some stereotyped situations, in this section we sketch a simple example that will
help on understanding how norm inheritance and defeasibility work in practice.
For that, we will make use of the timestamped version of institutional reality
elements (as introduced in Section 5.5.2), namely Ifact id:C (f )t and Fulf id:C (obl)t .
The scenario that we use here is that of a “supply agreement”: each of a group
of companies (agents) provides different resources that may need to be combined
in order to present a value-added offering to third-parties. For that, they will
agree on a standing agreement for the supply of their products to any contract
partner according to specific conditions. The contextual information that is to
be provided when forming a contract of this predefined type (a supply-agreement
SA) has the following format:
SupplyInfoid :SA(Agent :a,Product :p,UnitPrice :up)
This formula indicates that agent a commits to supply product p at unit price
up.
This type of contract is regulated by the following norm, defined in the top
institutional context:
N Inst1
Ifact id :SA(Order(Ref :r ,From :a1 ,To :a2 ,Product :p,Quantity :q))t∧
SupplyInfoid :SA(Agent :a2 ,Product :p,UnitPrice :up)
→
Obl id :SAa2 (Delivery(Ref :r ,From :a2 ,To :a1 ,Product :p,Quantity :q) ≺ t + 2 )∧
Obl id :SAa1 (Payment(Ref :r ,From :a1 ,To :a2 ,Amount :q ∗ up) ≺ t + 2 )
Norm N Inst1 states that in any supply-agreement, when an order is placed that
matches the supply information of the receiver, the latter is obliged to deliver the
requested products, while the ordering agent is obliged to make the corresponding
payment; both exchanges are due at the same deadline (within 2 days).
Now, let SA3 be an actual supply agreement between three agents: Jim, Sam
and Tom. This will translate into a context SA3:SA in the normative environ-
ment, with SA3:SAC Inst . Suppose we have the following founding contextual
information for context SA3:SA:
SupplyInfoSA3 :SA(Agent :Jim,Product :P1 ,UnitPrice :1 )
SupplyInfoSA3 :SA(Agent :Sam,Product :P2 ,UnitPrice :1 )
SupplyInfoSA3 :SA(Agent :Tom,Product :P3 ,UnitPrice :1 )
Furthermore, the agents also chose to add a few norms to their contractual
relationship, as follows.
5.6. Normative Framework 71
N SA3 :SA1
IfactSA3 :SA(Order(Ref :r ,From :a1 ,To :Jim,Product :p,Quantity :q))t∧
SupplyInfoSA3 :SA(Agent :Jim,Product :p,UnitPrice :up) ∧ q > 99
→
OblSA3 :SAJim (Delivery(Ref :r ,From :Jim,To :a1 ,Product :p,Quantity :q) ≺ t + 5 )∧
OblSA3 :SAa1 (Payment(Ref :r ,From :a1 ,To :Jim,Amount :q ∗ up) ≺ t + 2 )
Norm N SA3 :SA1 expresses the fact that agent Jim, when receiving orders with more
than 99 units, has an extended delivery deadline.
N SA3 :SA2
IfactSA3 :SA(Order(Ref :r ,From :Sam,To :a2 ,Product :p,Quantity :q))t∧
SupplyInfoSA3 :SA(Agent :a2 ,Product :p,UnitPrice : )
→
OblSA3 :SAa2 (Delivery(Ref :r ,From :a2 ,To :Sam,Product :p,Quantity :q) ≺ t + 2 )
N SA3 :SA3
Fulf SA3 :SA(OblSA3 :SAa2 (Delivery(Ref :r ,From :a2 ,To :Sam,Product :p,Quantity :q) ≺ d))t∧
SupplyInfoSA3 :SA(Agent :a2 ,Product :p,UnitPrice :up)
→
OblSA3 :SASam (Payment(Ref :r ,From :Sam,To :a2 ,Amount :q ∗ up) ≺ t + 2 )
These two norms express the higher position of agent Sam who, as opposed to
other agents, is only obliged to pay after receiving the merchandise.
Table 5.1 shows what might happen in different normative states. Lines la-
beled with
⊗
in the first column show which norm activation conflicts come about
(and how they are resolved) when the institutional reality elements of their previ-
ous line (labeled with NS) are present. Lines labeled with NS′ show the normative
state after applying the defeating norm activation.
The first example shows a trivial situation which falls into the general insti-
tutional norm. Therefore, in this case NS′ contains NS together with the pre-
scription of norm N Inst1 (after applying the substitution that activated the norm).
In the second example there is no conflict since norm N SA3 :SA1 is not activated
because of a variable restriction (the ordered quantity is within regular limits).
The third example shows the particular case of an order that is handled by the de-
feating norm N SA3 :SA1 . The fourth and fifth examples are in sequel, and illustrate
Sam’s advantage in being obliged to pay only after the delivery has been fulfilled
– first N SA3 :SA2 obtains Tom’s obligation to deliver and then N
SA3 :SA
3 prescribes
Sam’s obligation to pay.
In each case we rely on refraction (a principle used in rule-based systems)
to avoid firing a defeating norm more than once on the same activation (which
would otherwise happen since our normative state is monotonic).
72 Chapter 5. An Institutional Normative Environment
Table 5.1: Different normative states and norm activation conflicts.
NS IfactSA3 :SA(Order(Ref :1 ,From :Jim,To :Tom,Product :P3 ,Quantity :5 ))1⊗
none, N Inst1 applies
NS′ IfactSA3 :SA(Order(Ref :1 ,From :Jim,To :Tom,Product :P3 ,Quantity :5 ))1
OblSA3 :SATom (Delivery(Ref :1 ,From :Tom,To :Jim,Product :P3 ,Quantity :5 ) ≺ 3 )
OblSA3 :SAJim (Payment(Ref :1 ,From :Jim,To :Tom,Amount :5 ) ≺ 3 )
NS IfactSA3 :SA(Order(Ref :2 ,From :Tom,To :Jim,Product :P1 ,Quantity :5 ))1⊗
none, N Inst1 applies
NS′ IfactSA3 :SA(Order(Ref :2 ,From :Tom,To :Jim,Product :P1 ,Quantity :5 ))1
OblSA3 :SAJim (Delivery(Ref :2 ,From :Jim,To :Tom,Product :P1 ,Quantity :5 ) ≺ 3 )
OblSA3 :SATom (Payment(Ref :2 ,From :Tom,To :Jim,Amount :5 ) ≺ 3 )
NS IfactSA3 :SA(Order(Ref :3 ,From :Tom,To :Jim,Product :P1 ,Quantity :100 ))1⊗
N SA3 :SA1 defeats N
Inst
1
NS′ IfactSA3 :SA(Order(Ref :3 ,From :Tom,To :Jim,Product :P1 ,Quantity :100 ))1
OblSA3 :SAJim (Delivery(Ref :3 ,From :Jim,To :Tom,Product :P1 ,Quantity :100 ) ≺ 6 )
OblSA3 :SATom (Payment(Ref :3 ,From :Tom,To :Jim,Amount :100 ) ≺ 3 )
NS IfactSA3 :SA(Order(Ref :4 ,From :Sam,To :Tom,Product :P3 ,Quantity :5 ))1⊗
N SA3 :SA2 defeats N
Inst
1
NS′ IfactSA3 :SA(Order(Ref :4 ,From :Sam,To :Tom,Product :P3 ,Quantity :5 ))1
OblSA3 :SATom (Delivery(Ref :4 ,From :Tom,To :Sam,Product :P3 ,Quantity :5 ) ≺ 3 )
NS IfactSA3 :SA(Order(Ref :4 ,From :Sam,To :Tom,Product :P3 ,Quantity :5 ))1
OblSA3 :SATom (Delivery(Ref :4 ,From :Tom,To :Sam,Product :P3 ,Quantity :5 ) ≺ 3 )
IfactSA3 :SA(Delivery(Ref :4 ,From :Tom,To :Sam,Product :P3 ,Quantity :5 ))2
Fulf SA3 :SA(OblSA3 :SATom (Delivery(Ref :4 ,From :Tom,To :Sam,Product :P3 ,Quantity :5 ) ≺ 3 ))2⊗
none, N SA3 :SA3 applies
NS′ IfactSA3 :SA(Order(Ref :4 ,From :Sam,To :Tom,Product :P3 ,Quantity :5 ))1
OblSA3 :SATom (Delivery(Ref :4 ,From :Tom,To :Sam,Product :P3 ,Quantity :5 ) ≺ 3 )
IfactSA3 :SA(Delivery(Ref :4 ,From :Tom,To :Sam,Product :P3 ,Quantity :5 ))2
Fulf SA3 :SA(OblSA3 :SATom (Delivery(Ref :4 ,From :Tom,To :Sam,Product :P3 ,Quantity :5 ) ≺ 3 ))2
OblSA3 :SASam (Payment(Ref :4 ,From :Sam,To :Tom,Amount :5 ) ≺ 4 )
5.7 Discussion
The research work described in this chapter has evolved through a number of
publications. A preliminary hierarchical model of a normative framework sup-
porting norm inheritance can be found in [136], where a three layered approach
was followed. In this case, aiming at Virtual Enterprise settings, we have iden-
tified an institutional layer for predefined “default rules”, a constitutional layer
for specifying norms that will regulate a particular VE, and an operational layer
that includes instantiations of constitutional norms as the operation of the VE
takes place. A first step towards using contexts for framing norms is in [135]. A
model for institutional reality, together with a formalization of rules and norms for
providing a dynamic normative environment was presented in [139], and a more
practical account was given in [137]. Finally, the generalization of the three-
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layered approach outlined above into the model as presented in this chapter can
be found in [140] and [141].
5.7.1 Environment specification
In general, the notion of multi-agent systems assumes the existence of a common
environment, where agent interactions take place. Recently more attention has
been given to the environment as a first-class entity [234][233]. Electronic institu-
tions provide an environment whose main task is to support governed interaction
by maintaining the normative state of the system, embracing norms that apply
to each of the interacting agents. An EI can thus be seen as an interaction-
mediation infrastructure (as discussed by Weyns et al. [233]). Other researchers
have made a deeper analysis of electronic institutions as environment engineering
tools, namely in [10] and [220].
Our approach to create institutional reality resembles the notion of “influence
and reaction” as proposed by Ferber and Mu¨ller [74]. In our case, influences
comprise agents’ illocutions (brute facts), through which they try to modify the
state of the normative environment, trying to convince the EI that certain events
took place. The environment then reacts to such influences by applying the
constitutive and institutional rules (the “laws of the world” [74]) and producing
elements of institutional reality. However, ours is an asynchronous action model,
since agents can run asynchronously and independently of the environment itself
(closer to the model by Weyns and Holvoet [232]). The normative environment
comprises an active service that can change the state of the system independently
of agents’ actions [170]. For instance, a violation can be caused by the absence
of an institutional fact (which denotes the absence of an appropriate agent ac-
tion) at a certain deadline. Of course this approach assumes the existence of a
synchronized clock mechanism for every agent.
One of the most important principles of our approach is the assumption of
a non-static normative environment; this means that we depart from a more
conservative view of norms seen as a set of preexistent interaction conventions
that agents are willing to comply with (as in the adscription approach in [10]).
We pursue an EI that provides a supportive normative framework whose main
purpose is to facilitate the establishment of further commitments among a group
of contracting agents.
The possibility of having an underlying normative framework, from which
norms may be inherited, is a distinguishing feature of our approach, as is the
“loose coupling” between norms and contrary-to-duties. Also, the institution
includes norm monitoring policies that span all created contracts. This is in
contrast with other approaches, namely [227], where these policies and repair
measures are spread among the norms themselves. This prevents the use of inher-
itance mechanisms that make the normative framework more flexible. Our norm
formalism allows us to implement norm monitoring as a context-independent ac-
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tivity. Specifically, we distinguish violation detection from sanction imposition.
While the detection of violations is a general and institutionally defined concept,
the prescription of sanctions may be contract-specific.
Lo´pez-y-Lo´pez and Luck [149] presented a theoretical norm schema that in-
cludes, besides normative goals, preconditions and addressees, also rewards and
punishments. While in order to be effective norms do need such elements (e.g.
an obligation needs punishments), within a normative framework rewards and
punishments are enforcement measures that may be institutionally defined. We
adopt a simpler and more modular norm specification, keeping sanctions apart of
each norm definition. The specification of norms in a contract often configures a
chaining of obligations, which resembles the notion of interlocking norms in [149]:
norms that get activated through the fulfillment or violation of other norms.
Garc´ıa-Camino et al. [87] present a grammar for rules that combines both
our rule and norm definitions. However, our concern is to distinguish a priori
rule definition as a normative state maintenance issue from norm definition as a
contracting activity.
A recent proposal to define a programming language for programing normative
artifacts has been made by Tinnemeier et al. [215], which incorporates several
notions that we have included in our model. Norms define states of the world
to be achieved, and are as such “declarative” (as opposed to “procedural” norms
referring to actions). Specific elements are used to express brute and institutional
facts, as well as violations.
We regarded (institutional) roles, namely those defined for trusted-third par-
ties, strictly as a means to define which agents are empowered to create institu-
tional facts. However, the notion of role has typically a set of norms attached
that agents enacting the role are expected to follow. V. Dignum [64] considers
that a role-enacting agent has a social contract attached, which may include a
set of contract clauses (defined as deontic expressions). In the case of OperA, a
role description defined at the organizational model may be inherited into a so-
cial contract, which therefore need not specify any additional clauses. The same
approach could be adopted for our institutional roles: an agent enacting a role
could be seen as establishing a social contract with the EI, thereby creating a
context that would inherit predefined norms describing how the enacting agent
should behave.
5.7.2 Institutional facts and normative positions
Several researchers have taken inspiration from Searle’s theory of constitutive
rules [202][203], as well as from Jones and Sergot’s institutionalized power [117].
In our case, we worked on the concept of institutional reality in order to bring into
an institutional environment a mapping of real-world events recognized by the EI.
Constitutive rules, by defining “counts-as” relations, specify empowerments [117]
(also called authorizations in [79]) of agents performing specific roles, which are
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thus seen by the EI as trusted third parties. Given that our main intention in
defining such roles is not to regulate how agents enacting them should behave, but
instead to grant them a privileged position concerning the creation of institutional
facts, we assume that agents are permitted to make their authorized statements.
Knottenbelt [126][127] uses a model of authorization that enables agents par-
ticipating in a contract to initiate event calculus fluents pertaining to contract
enactment. The definition of authoritative agents specifies how informational
messages affect the contract state. The same mechanism is used to identify
trusted-third parties, by making them authoritative regarding certain events (e.g.
bank for payments, delivery tracker for deliveries). A non-authorized attempt will
have no effect in the contract state (that is, will not initiate any fluent). This
approach is similar to ours: informative illocutions which do not have associated
constitutive rules will have no effect in producing institutional facts. However,
we also included the possibility of defining constitutive rules that require a com-
bination of statements made by different agents, and illustrated this approach by
relying directly on the parties involved in a specific exchange.
Garc´ıa-Camino et al. [87] include in their concept of institutional rules the val-
idation of attempts to utter illocutions. Such attempts become “legal utterances”
if they are permitted. Conceptually, it seems that in this case agents cannot even
make statements that they are not allowed to do, although they might be pun-
ished for attempting to make them. This is due to the fact that their approach
in modeling electronic institutions, through a performative structure based on
scenes, is highly dialogical. An emphasis is thus put in what agents are allowed
to utter in each scene.
Modgil et al. [162] propose a monitoring framework that includes observers
as entrusted entities that accurately report the behaviors that they observe from
contractual agents. This is quite similar to Jones and Sergot’s model of institu-
tionalized power [117] that we incorporated in our own approach.
Norms are typically related with the deontic notions of obligation, permission
and prohibition. However, in the contracting domain obligations are of primary
importance. Legal theorists define contract law as being part of the law of obli-
gations, “concerned with obligations that people owe to others as a result of the
relations and transactions in which they become involved” ([16], p. 1). Contract
law puts an emphasis on obligations incurred through promises that parties make
with respect to some action to be performed or state of affairs to bring about. For
this reason, we essentially rely on obligations to specify contractual commitments.
Contractual rights are dealt with in an implicit way: norms can be triggered with
institutional facts, which therefore can be used to exercise a right of demanding
a certain contribution from a contractual partner.
Our approach to monitor obligations assumes that it is in the best interest
of contractual partners to inform the institution of their abidance to obligations.
Detecting violations of prohibitions is much harder, because it demands for a
pervasive character of the institution; actions may be performed which are not
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observable by the enforcing entity (Va´zquez-Salceda et al. [227] study different
levels of verifiability).
Although we are primarily concerned with deadline obligations, the inclusion
of permissions or prohibitions as deontic statements prescribed by norms would
demand no changes in our norm activation defeasibility approach. We do not
rely on conflicts between the content of deontic statements (which are deontic
conflicts), but instead on norm activation conflicts.
5.7.3 Context
The notion of context as used in our approach seeks to capture the notion of
“business context” that seems to be present in many B2B contractual situations.
Furthermore, Searle’s constitutive rules have contexts attached that we believe
could be seen as contractual contexts as we model them. This would enable us
to iterate through institutional facts inside specific contractual relations: each
contract gives birth to a context within which certain constitutive rules would
apply. While we did not include this extension in the model as presented in this
chapter (but have considered it before [139][138]), we believe that it makes sense
because it allows contract fulfillment to be adjusted by matters of trust between
contractual partners or due to business specificities – in a specific contract an
institutional fact can count as another institutional fact. This approach also
opens up the possibility of extending the ontology for institutional facts.
The idea of context for normative reasoning has been studied before. However,
in most cases the notion of context comes from the ‘counts-as’ relation [203][117]:
“X counts-as Y in context C”. For instance, in [228][103] a context gives an inter-
pretation to abstract norms of a broader context. There is a leveled structuring
of contexts, which broadly contemplates institutions, sub-institutions and orga-
nizations, from the most abstract to the most concrete level. However, concrete
norms (refined as rules and implemented as procedures) are used to model pre-
existent organizations. Concept abstraction is studied in [104]. In this case, it is
not the norm that is abstract, but instead the concepts in which it is expressed.
A norm based on abstract concepts may be further specified in a more specific
context. Our approach has a different concern: we use the context structure for
designing a model of defeasibility for norms, which may be added to the system
at runtime. We do not tackle with abstraction.
The “contextualization” of contracts within higher normative structures has
also been advanced in [38]. In this case, a contract is modeled as an institu-
tion itself (see also [21]), and can be governed by another (super) institution.
This relationship is expressed through a mechanism of empowerment. States are
described by fluents and evolve according to rules expecting events. Empower-
ments are defined by normative fluents allowing the creation of events and the
initialization or termination of fluents. With this approach, a rule defined in an
institution may operate on another institution’s state if the rule’s effects are ex-
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plicitly empowered. In our approach, contracts are modeled as contexts within a
single institution. Norms can also operate in contexts other than the one where
they are defined, but this property is based on a structured normative framework,
and not on a discretionary basis that may be cumbersome to express.
5.7.4 Normative conflict handling
From the law field, three normative conflict resolution principles have been de-
fined and are traditionally being used. The lex superior is a hierarchical criterion
implying that a norm issued by a more important legal entity prevails, when in
conflict with another norm (e.g. the Constitution prevails over any other legal
body). The lex posterior is a chronological criterion indicating that the most
recent norm prevails. The lex specialis is a specificity criterion establishing that
the most specific norm prevails. While not firmly adopting any of these options,
our approach resembles more the lex specialis principle. However, the defeating
norms are more specific in the sense that they are defined at (as opposed to ap-
plied to) a more specific context (a kind of “lex inferior”). The lex specialis flavor
comes from the fact that in most cases a defeating norm should apply to a nar-
rower context-set. These properties of our norm defeasance approach result from
the fact that the original aim is not to impose predefined regulations on agents,
but instead to help them in building contractual relationships by providing a nor-
mative background (which can be exploited in a partial way through adaptation).
A feature of our approach that exposes this aim is that all norms are defeasible.
In this respect we follow the notion from law theory of “default rules” [48], which
should be seen as facilitating rather than constraining contractual activity [118].
This notion of “default rules” might be misleading; it has not a direct corre-
spondence with default logic formalizations [184]. We do not handle the defeasi-
bility of conclusions of default rules in that sense, but instead model defeasibility
of the application of the rules themselves (which are called norms).
From a theoretical logical stance, norm defeasibility has been addressed in,
e.g., [192][198][221]. Typically, deontic reasoning [169] guides these approaches,
and thus conflicts regard the deontic operators themselves. Our approach is
centered instead on the applicability of norms, not on their conclusions.
The work by Garc´ıa-Camino et al. in [86] addresses the issue of conflict reso-
lution in a structured setup of compound activities. These resemble our context
and sub-context relationships. However, those authors model deontic conflicts
(e.g. an action being obliged and prohibited), while we model norm (activation)
conflicts. They study the inheritance of normative positions (obligations, permis-
sions, prohibitions), based on an explicit stamping of each one of them with a
priority value and a timestamp; the specificity criterion is based on the compound
activities’ structure. We address the inheritance of norms and provide a means
to override norm activations based on their defeasibility.
Our approach of context and sub-context definitions, together with the norm
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defeasibility model presented, is similar to the notion of supererogatory defeasibil-
ity in [194]. They model defeasibility in terms of role and sub-role definitions. In
fact, they also consider express defeasibility, which is based on the specificity of
conditions for norm applicability, but this approach has been followed by several
others.
The problem of normative conflict resolution has been also addressed through
more practical approaches (e.g. in the B2B domain). The application of business
rules in e-commerce has been addressed in [98], where courteous logic programs
allow for an explicit definition of priorities among rules. An extension based on
defeasible [168] and deontic logic has been advanced in [94] for the representation
of business contracts (and not merely business rules). However, this approach
does not consider defeasibility of norms between a contract and an underlying
normative framework. Finally, [89] also addresses defeasible reasoning in the e-
contracts domain, based on the translation of contracts from event calculus to
default logic, and on the definition of dynamic priorities among rules (by using
domain-dependent criteria). Conflicts are, in this case, based on the normative
positions of agents.
Finally, we assume a close connection between norm activation conflicts as
we model them and the notion of conflict set (or agenda) in rule-based forward-
chaining systems (e.g. [82]). In those systems, a conflict arises whenever there
is a possible application of more than one rule at the same time, and a conflict
resolution strategy will decide which rule to apply in each step of the reasoning
process. In our case, conflict resolution is based on hierarchical relationships
between the contexts where norms are defined.
Chapter6
Revisiting Contractual Obligations
The essence of contract is commitment [156]: contracts provide a legally binding
agreement including legal sanctions in case of failure to honor commitments. Nev-
ertheless, real-world business relationships have an essentially cooperative nature.
Therefore, the importance of successfully proceeding with business demands for
flexibility of operations: contractors should try to facilitate the compliance of
their partners. This common goal of conducting business is based on the fact
that group success also benefits each partner’s private goals. These goals are
not limited to the ongoing business relationship, but may also concern future
opportunities that may arise.
This observation renders inappropriate the usual semantics of deadline obli-
gations as used in MAS (for which a representative source is [62], which we also
followed in Chapter 5): deadline obligations are violated if the obliged action
or state is not obtained until the deadline is reached. The problem is that this
generic statement is too rigid, and abstracted away from a potential application
domain. We argue that in some domains – such as in business contracts – this
approach is not desirable.
In this chapter an alternative view to address contractual obligations is pro-
posed, which will also imply changes in the elements that compose the normative
state. We will provide a formalization, based on temporal logic, of our approach
to model contractual obligations. Afterwards we will adequate the use of insti-
tutional rules to this new semantics, which will then enable us to provide an
unambiguous implementation in Chapter 7.
6.1 Obligations in Contracts
Contract law treats obligations in contracts as distinct from other kinds of obli-
gations. Atiyah [16] points the following particularities of contractual obligations
(also analyzed in [50]):
79
80 Chapter 6. Revisiting Contractual Obligations
• they have a private character, in the sense that they apply only to those
parties that have assumed them;
• they are owed by individuals to other individuals specifically, rather than
the public in general;
• they are enforceable only by the persons to whom they are owed, i.e., no
public authority will take initiative to enforce the contract;
• they are self-imposed, i.e., they are obligations arising from an agreement,
promise, or other undertaking.
From this characterization we emphasize two important points. First, con-
tractual obligations become applicable only when individuals commit to them
through a process of contract establishment. Second, contractual obligations are
directed from a contractual party to another contractual party.
This last observation has lead to the notion of directed obligations [110]: obli-
gations seen as directed from a bearer (responsible for fulfilling the obligation) to
a counterparty. In fact, some researchers, such as Ryu [194], define contractual
obligation as an obligation with an “obligor” (bearer) and an “obligee” (coun-
terparty). The relationship between these two roles in a directed obligation has
been studied, giving rise to two different theories. The benefit theory promotes
the fact that the counterparty of an obligation is intended to benefit from its
fulfillment (see [110] for a benefit theory perspective of directed obligations). A
more relevant approach, at least in which contract enforcement is concerned –
the claimant theory – takes the stance that obligations are interpreted as claims
from counterparties to bearers (see [212] for a claimant theory support).
In general, claimant approaches are based on the following definition for di-
rected obligation (adapted from [212]):
Oblb,c(f ) =def Oblb(f ) ∧ (¬f ⇒ Permc(lab))
A directed obligation from agent b towards agent c to bring about f means that
b is obliged to bring about f and if b does not bring about f then c is permitted
to initiate legal action against b. The concept of legal action is, however, rather
vague. A similar approach is taken in [59], where agent c is said to be authorized to
repair the situation in case b does not fulfill his obligation. Repair actions include
demanding further actions from b; e.g., c may demand compensation for damages.
It is interesting to note that such definitions are careful enough to base the claims
of the counterparty on the non-fulfillment of the obligation, not on its violation.
In fact, these definitions do not include deadlines, which are often the basis for
violation detection. Another significant issue is the discretionary nature of the
counterparty’s reaction (he is permitted or authorized), instead of an automatic
response based on the non-fulfillment of the bearer (as would be the case in
automatic violation detection approaches based on deadlines, complemented with
the definition of violation reaction norms).
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6.2 Directed Obligations with Flexible Time
Windows
In this section we propose a new model for contractual obligations that is based
on combining deadline obligations with directed obligations, obtaining directed
deadline obligations. While presenting our model, we will make use of a real-
world legislation on trade contracts, namely the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) [217]. Among several other
issues, this convention establishes what parties may do in case of deadline viola-
tions. In some cases they are allowed to fulfill their obligations after the deadline
(Article 48), or to extend the deadlines with the allowance of their counterparties.
Furthermore, a party may extend his counterparty’s deadlines (Articles 47 and
63), which denotes a flexible and even collaborative facet of trade contracts.
While using the CISG convention as a source for modeling contractual obli-
gations, we believe that the features we are trying to extract from this legislation
are general enough to be representative of any kind of contractual relationship.
6.2.1 Directed deadline obligations
Our proposal combines directed [110][212] and deadline [27] obligations, in order
to obtain a more precise definition of when it is that a counterparty may claim
against the inability of a bearer to fulfill the obligation. We will motivate and
formalize the notion of directed deadline obligation – Oblb,c(f ≺ d): agent b is
obliged towards agent c to bring about f before d. An extension of directed (con-
tractual) obligations with temporal restrictions is also introduced in [194], but
that approach is based on a rigid model of violations, in that they are automati-
cally obtained at the deadline. In our approach deadlines have a distinct role in
the semantics of obligations. We will introduce the notion of deadline violation
(as opposed to obligation violation) in order to obtain a flexible approach to han-
dle non-ideal situations: each deadline violation is different, since each may have
a different impact on the ongoing business; furthermore, each deadline violation
occurs between a specific pair of agents with a unique trust relationship.
In fact, deadline handling is central to define the semantics of contractual
obligations. Looking at the CISG convention [217], we have:
Article 48: (1) [...] the seller may, even after the date for delivery, remedy
at his own expense any failure to perform his obligations, if he can do so
without unreasonable delay [...]; (2) If the seller requests the buyer to make
known whether he will accept performance and the buyer does not comply
with the request within a reasonable time, the seller may perform within
the time indicated in his request. [...]
This means that even though a deadline has been violated, the bearer may
still be entitled to fulfill the same obligation. This kind of delay is also called a
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Figure 6.1: Directed obligation with deadline.
grace period : a period beyond a due date during which an obligation may be met
without penalty or cancellation.
Figure 6.1 illustrates the intuitive semantics of directed deadline obligations.
The shaded area represents the period of time within which the achievement of
f will certainly bring a fulfillment of the obligation. The region to the right of d
indicates that counterparty c is entitled to react if f is not accomplished; however,
as long as no reaction is taken, b can still fulfill his obligation.
Therefore, a deadline violation brings a counterparty authorization. Autho-
rizations are taken into account in the normative system by having rules and
norms that are based on the materialization of such authorizations.
6.2.2 Livelines and deadlines
The deadline approach is often taken to be appropriate for specifying temporal
restrictions on obligations. However, in certain cases a time window should be
provided. In international trade transactions, for instance, storage costs may be
relevant. Also, perishable goods should be delivered only when they are needed,
not before. This is why in CISG [217] we have:
Article 52: (1) If the seller delivers the goods before the date fixed, the
buyer may take delivery or refuse to take delivery.
Therefore, anticipated fulfillments are not always welcome. We find it neces-
sary to include a variation of directed deadline obligations, to which we add a
liveline: a time reference after which the obligation should be fulfilled. In this
case we have Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d): agent b is obliged towards agent c to bring about
f between l (a liveline) and d (a deadline). Figure 6.2 illustrates the intuitive
semantics of this kind of obligation. The shaded area represents the period of
time within which the achievement of f will certainly bring a fulfillment of the
obligation. If f is accomplished before l, however, it may be the case that c is not
willing to accept such a fulfillment, or at least that he may not be happy about
it – the region to the left of l entitles c to react if f is accomplished. The region
to the right of d is as with (simple) directed deadline obligations.
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Figure 6.2: Directed obligation with liveline and deadline.
We escape from an approach with a fixed time reference for obligation fulfill-
ment (an obligation for bringing about f at time t), which would be suggested by
the term “date fixed” in CISG’s Article 52 transcription above. We find it more
convenient to define a fixed date as an interval, say, from the beginning till the
end of a specific day.
6.2.3 Handling liveline and deadline violations
After we have advocated a counterparty authorization approach to temporal vio-
lations, in this section we analyze the kind of actions that the counterparty may
take in such situations.
The successful enactment of a contract is dependent on the need to make
contractual provisions performable in a flexible way. The importance of having
flexible trade procedures is apparent, once again, in the CISG convention [217]:
Article 47: (1) The buyer may fix an additional period of time of reasonable
length for performance by the seller of his obligations.
Article 63: (1) The seller may fix an additional period of time of reasonable
length for performance by the buyer of his obligations.
These articles emphasize, once more, the need for flexible deadlines. Note that
the counterparty’s benevolence on conceding an extended deadline to the bearer
does not prescribe a new obligation; instead, the same obligation may be fulfilled
within a larger time window. Furthermore, it is also in the counterparty’s best
interest that this option is available, given the importance of reaching success in
the performance of the contract.
In some other cases, a party may decide that the non-fulfillment of an obli-
gation should be handled in a more strict way. The CISG convention specifies
conditions for cancelling a contract in case of breach:
Article 49: (1) The buyer may declare the contract avoided: (a) if the
failure by the seller to perform any of his obligations [...] amounts to a
fundamental breach of contract; [...]; (2) However, in cases where the seller
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has delivered the goods, the buyer loses the right to declare the contract
avoided unless he does so: (a) in respect of late delivery, within a reasonable
time after he has become aware that delivery has been made; [...]
Article 64: (1) The seller may declare the contract avoided: (a) if the
failure by the buyer to perform any of his obligations [...] amounts to a
fundamental breach of contract; [...]; (2) However, in cases where the buyer
has paid the price, the seller loses the right to declare the contract avoided
unless he does so: (a) in respect of late performance by the buyer, before
the seller has become aware that performance has been rendered; [...]
These articles allow contract termination in both non-performance and late
performance cases. However, the second case is limited to the awareness of the
offended party.
From these excerpts we can distinguish two kinds of reactions to non fulfill-
ments: a smoother one (from Articles 47, 48 and 63), in which parties are willing
to recover from an initial failure to conform to an obligation; and a stricter one
(Articles 49 and 64), where the failure is not self-containable anymore. Based on
these options, we propose a model for a directed deadline obligation lifecycle.
6.2.4 Modeling the semantics of directed obligations with
time windows
Following the discussion above, in Table 6.1 we identify the possible states for an
obligation, together with the elements1 we shall use to signal some of those states
(when obtained, these elements are supposed to persist over time).
We now proceed to formalize each type of obligation. As with deadline obli-
gations in the previous chapter, we will make use of linear temporal logic.
Directed deadline obligations
Figure 6.3 illustrates, by means of a state transition diagram, the lifecycle of di-
rected deadline obligations. We take obligations as being prescribed from condi-
tional norms; the confirmation of the norm’s conditions will change the prescribed
obligation’s state from inactive to active. The obligation is also automatically
pending, since it may be legitimately fulfilled right away. We set the obligation
to have a violated deadline – DViol(obl) – when the deadline occurs before the
obliged fact.
The counterparty’s reaction to a deadline violation will only change the obli-
gation’s state if the option is to deem the obligation as violated, by denouncing
this situation. For this we introduce the element Denc,b(obl), which is a denounce
from agent c towards agent b regarding the failure of the latter to comply with his
1For simplification, context references are omitted.
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Table 6.1: States of directed obligations with time windows.
inactive the obligation is not yet in effect, but will eventually be
prescribed by a norm
active:
Oblb,c(f ≺ d) or
Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)
the obligation was prescribed by a norm
pending the obligation may be fulfilled from now on
liveline violation:
LViol(obl)
the fact being obliged in obl has been brought ahead of
time
deadline violation:
DViol(obl)
the fact being obliged in obl should have been brought
already
fulfilled : Fulf (obl) obligation obl was fulfilled
violated : Viol(obl) obligation obl was violated and cannot be fulfilled any-
more
Figure 6.3: Lifecycle of a directed deadline obligation.
obligation obl . Denounces may be obtained through a constitutive rule based on
message deliveries, as shown in Section 5.4.2. Since we consider the achievement
of facts to be common knowledge, a party may only denounce the non-fulfillment
of an obligation while the obliged fact is not obtained2.
Formally, we start by identifying the (absolute) fulfillment case:
Oblb,c(f ≺ d) ∧ (Ifact(f ) B Time(d)) |= Fulf (Oblb,c(f ≺ d)) (6.1)
Then we state the consequence of reaching a deadline with no achievement of
the obligated fact:
Oblb,c(f ≺ d) ∧ (Time(d) B Ifact(f )) |= DViol(Oblb,c(f ≺ d)) (6.2)
Note that, differently from the usual treatment of deadline obligations (such
as [27] and the preliminary approach that we have shown in the previous chapter),
we set the obligation to have a violated deadline – DViol(Oblb,c(f ≺ d)) – but
not to be violated in itself (i.e., the obligation may still be fulfilled).
2This is a simplification of what Articles 49 and 64 of CISG suggest.
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Figure 6.4: Lifecycle of a directed obligation with liveline and deadline.
Finally, we identify two possible outcomes from the violated deadline case:
DViol(Oblb,c(f ≺ d)) ∧ (Ifact(f ) B Denc,b(Oblb,c(f ≺ d)))
|= Fulf (Oblb,c(f ≺ d))
(6.3)
DViol(Oblb,c(f ≺ d)) ∧ (Denc,b(Oblb,c(f ≺ d)) B Ifact(f ))
|= Viol(Oblb,c(f ≺ d))
(6.4)
Directed obligations with liveline and deadline
Figure 6.4 shows the state transition diagram for directed obligations with liveline
and deadline. In this case, the obligation will only be pending when l arises, since
only then it may be fulfilled in a way that is compliant with the terms of the
contract. We have now two kinds of temporal violations: liveline violations of the
form LViol(obl) and deadline violations of the form DViol(obl). In both cases, a
denounce (Denc,b(obl)) may establish the obligation as violated, if issued before
l or f , respectively.
The lifecycle of directed obligations with liveline and deadline is formalized
as follows:
Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d) ∧ (Ifact(f ) B Time(l)) |= LViol(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)) (6.5)
LViol(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)) ∧ (Time(l) B Denc,b(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)))
|= Fulf (Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d))
(6.6)
LViol(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)) ∧ (Denc,b(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)) B Time(l))
|= Viol(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d))
(6.7)
Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d) ∧ (Time(l) B Ifact(f )) ∧ (Ifact(f ) B Time(d))
|= Fulf (Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d))
(6.8)
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Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d) ∧ (Time(d) B Ifact(f )) |= DViol(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)) (6.9)
DViol(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)) ∧ (Ifact(f ) B Denc,b(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)))
|= Fulf (Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d))
(6.10)
DViol(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)) ∧ (Denc,b(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)) B Ifact(f ))
|= Viol(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d))
(6.11)
6.2.5 Smoother authorizations on violations
The diagrams in figures 6.3 and 6.4 only include events that produce a change in
an obligation’s state. The denouncement of the non-fulfillment of an obligation,
making it violated and consequently not fulfillable any longer, denotes a situation
in which a bearer’s attempt to fulfill the obligation will no longer be significant to
the counterparty, and thus a consummated violation should be handled according
to applicable norms. These may bring sanctions, further obligations or ultimately
a contract cancellation, as in Articles 49 and 64 of CISG.
In order to accommodate less strict situations, we consider that in liveline and
deadline violation states, while the obligation can still be fulfilled, the counter-
party may react to the non-ideal situation. These possibilities are not illustrated
in figures 6.3 and 6.4 because they do not bring state changes. For instance, in
international trade transactions storage costs may be relevant. The counterparty
may therefore be authorized to demand for payment of storage costs from an
early compliant bearer. Another example for the deadline violation case:
Article 78: If a party fails to pay the price or any other sum that is in
arrears, the other party is entitled to interest on it [...]
While obligation state transitions are processed with appropriate rules (includ-
ing rules that take denounces into account), authorizations expressing the coun-
terparty’s right to demand for compensation are handled by the system through
appropriate norms, which may be defined in a contract basis.
6.3 Monitoring Contractual Obligations with
Institutional Rules
Now that we have a new model for contractual obligations, in this section we re-
implement their semantics through institutional rules. We will start by providing
an essentially direct mapping from the semantics provided in Section 6.2.4.
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In order to detect the moment at which the before relation holds, we translate
terms of the form (e1 B e2) into a conjunction e1 ∧ ¬e2. For directed obligations
with liveline and deadline, we obtain the following rules3 (which correspond to
formulae (6.5) to (6.11)):
Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d) ∧ Ifact(f ) ∧ ¬Time(l)→ LViol(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)) (6.12)
LViol(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)) ∧ Time(l) ∧ ¬Denc,b(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d))
→ Fulf (Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d))
(6.13)
LViol(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)) ∧Denc,b(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)) ∧ ¬Time(l)
→ Viol(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d))
(6.14)
Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d) ∧ Time(l) ∧ ¬LViol(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)) ∧ Ifact(f )∧
¬Time(d)→ Fulf (Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d))
(6.15)
Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d) ∧ Time(d) ∧ ¬Ifact(f )→ DViol(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)) (6.16)
DViol(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)) ∧ Ifact(f ) ∧ ¬Denc,b(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d))
→ Fulf (Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d))
(6.17)
DViol(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)) ∧Denc,b(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)) ∧ ¬Ifact(f )
→ Viol(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d))
(6.18)
Rule 6.15 demanded a more careful construction, since we have, in formula
6.8, two consecutive before relations – we need to ensure that there is no liveline
violation when both Time(l) and Ifact(f ) are true.
6.3.1 Reasoning with time
In Section 5.5.2 we have already acknowledged the benefits of time-stamping
events, namely the possibility of relaxing the rule evaluation policy: rules need
no longer be evaluated at every normative state update. Furthermore, in business
contracts it is common to have deadlines that are dependent on the fulfillment
date of other obligations. Therefore, instead of having fixed (absolute) dates,
these may at times be relative, calculated according to other events. CISG [217]
expresses this by saying that dates can be determinable from the contract:
Article 33: The seller must deliver the goods: (a) if a date is fixed by or
determinable from the contract, on that date; (b) if a period of time is
fixed by or determinable from the contract, at any time within that period
[...]
3The simpler case of directed deadline obligations is a simplification over these rules.
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Table 6.2: Institutional reality elements.
Ifact(f )t : fact f is institutionally recognized as having occurred at
time t
Time(t) : instant t has elapsed
Oblb,c(f ≺ d)t : agent b is obliged, since t, towards agent c to bring about
f until d
Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)t : agent b is obliged, since t, towards agent c to bring about
f between l and d
LViol(obl)t : there was a liveline violation of obligation obl at time t
DViol(obl)t : there was a deadline violation of obligation obl at time t
Fulf (obl)t : obligation obl was fulfilled
Viol(obl)t : obligation obl was violated
Denc,b(obl)
t : agent c has denounced, at time t, the failure of agent b
to fulfill obligation obl
Article 59: The buyer must pay the price on the date fixed by or deter-
minable from the contract [...]
It is therefore useful to timestamp each event, that is, institutional reality ele-
ments. Rules and norms will make use of these temporal references. In Table 6.2
we present a modified version of institutional reality elements. As compared
with Def. 5.4.1, for simplification we did not include a context reference in these
elements (within rules the context of each element is assumed to be the same).
6.3.2 Re-implementing rules
Now that events include a timestamp, we are able to re-implement monitoring
rules by taking advantage of this feature. We also need our rules to assign times-
tamps to the institutional reality elements that they add to the normative state.
The following institutional rules implement the semantics of directed obligations
with liveline and deadline:
Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)i ∧ Ifact(f )t ∧ t < l → LViol(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)i)t (6.19)
LViol(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)i)j ∧ Time(l) ∧ ¬(Denc,b(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)i)u ∧ u < l)
→ Fulf (Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)i)l
(6.20)
LViol(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)i)j ∧Denc,b(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)i)u ∧ u < l
→ Viol(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)i)u
(6.21)
Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)i ∧ Ifact(f )t ∧ l < t ∧ t < d → Fulf (Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)i)t (6.22)
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Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)i ∧ Time(d) ∧ ¬(Ifact(f )t ∧ t < d)
→ DViol(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)i)d
(6.23)
DViol(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)i)j ∧ Ifact(f )t∧
¬(Denc,b(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)i)u ∧ u < t)→ Fulf (Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)i)t
(6.24)
DViol(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)i)j ∧Denc,b(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)i)u∧
¬(Ifact(f )t ∧ t < u)→ Viol(Oblb,c(l ≺ f ≺ d)i)u
(6.25)
These rules take into account the timestamps associated with each institu-
tional reality element in order to add other elements with accurate timestamps.
The use of relational conditions to assess the temporal ordering of events ends up
having a closer reading to the LTL before operator.
6.4 Decision-making on Directed Deadline
Obligations
The authorization approach described in this chapter enriches the decision-making
space of agents concerning norms. Since obligations can be violated, agents (as
human delegates) may decide whether to fulfill them or not. Furthermore, be-
cause the violation state is determined by the counterparty’s choice to denounce
this situation, both parties associated with a directed deadline obligation are in a
position to decide over it after the deadline. In this section we make a preliminary
study on the courses of actions agents may take.
In order to model this decision making process, we need to assess each agent’s
valuations on the obligation states and facts they are able to bring about. We
will write va(f) and va(S) to denote the valuation agent a makes of fact f or
state S, respectively (similarly to the valuation model used by Desai et al. [58]).
When valuating an obligation’s state (namely a fulfillment or a violation), agents
should take into account two different sorts of effects. First, since an obligation
is taken to be a part of a wider contract that should benefit all participants, the
obligation cannot be taken in isolation, as its fulfillment or violation may trigger
further commitments. Second, an agent’s reputation is affected by whether or
not he stands for his commitments. In the following we assume that an agent is
capable of anticipating and evaluating the consequences of his actions within a
contract.
For an obligation Oblb,c(f ≺ d) we have the following valuation constraints
for b:
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vb(Oblb,c(f ≺ d)) < 0 : an obligation is a burden to its bearer
vb(f ) < vb(Oblb,c(f ≺ d)) : there is a heavier cost associated with bringing
about f
vb(Fulf (Oblb,c(f ≺ d))) > 0 : b gains from fulfilling his obligation
vb(Viol(Oblb,c(f ≺ d))) < 0 : b loses from violating his obligation
The notions of gain and loss for the bearer extend to outside this obligation.
For instance, fulfilling an obligation may bring an entitlement (a new obligation
where the bearer becomes the counterparty). Violating an obligation will poten-
tially bring penalties to the bearer, hence the negative valuation. In both cases,
the reputation of agent b is affected (positively or negatively). Unlike in [58],
we do not impose that vb(Viol(Oblb,c(f ≺ d))) < vb(f ) + vb(Fulf (Oblb,c(f ≺ d))).
This states that an agent is always better off fulfilling an obligation (taking into
account the cost of the fact to bring about) than violating it. However, an agent
may be able to exploit a contract flaw by considering that in a specific situation
he is better off violating his obligation. Of course that even if the above condition
holds, agent b may still choose to violate his obligations, because of other con-
flicting goals: he may lose with respect to the outcome of this specific contract,
but may possibly win across several other contracts.
As for the counterparty c, we have:
vc(Oblb,c(f ≺ d)) > 0 : an obligation is an asset for the counterparty
vc(f ) > vc(Oblb,c(f ≺ d)) : c benefits from f
vc(Fulf (Oblb,c(f ≺ d))) ≤ 0 : c may acquire obligations after fulfillment
vc(Viol(Oblb,c(f ≺ d))) ≥ 0 : c may obtain compensations after violation
Note that both fulfillments and violations may bring no value if they have no
further consequences in the contract.
In a rough attempt to model the decision making process of a counterparty of
an obligation whose deadline was violated, we could state that he should denounce
(and thus obtain the obligation’s violation) if4
vc(f ) + vc(Fulf (Oblb,c(f ≺ d))) < vc(Viol(Oblb,c(f ≺ d))).
We consider that valuations may possibly vary over time. Were that not the
case, the above condition would only need to be checked right after d, at which
point the counterparty would either denounce or decide to wait indefinitely for
the bearer to fulfill his obligation. For instance, we believe that it makes sense
to think of vc(f) as possibly decreasing with time (like a resource that should
be available but is not yet). Even when the above condition does not hold, the
counterparty may still prefer to tolerate the less preferred situation of failure for
matters of conflicting goals (just as with the bearer).
Until now we have discussed the possibility of agents (both bearers and coun-
terparties) deciding on breach over compliance (either by assessing intra-contract
4We assume there is no cost associated with the denouncing action.
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consequences or by inter-contract conflicts). But in scenarios enriched with social
features agents can exploit, it may be the case that agents decide to behave coop-
eratively even when they have to bear a contained disadvantage. In such settings,
more than being altruistic, agents may try to enhance their trust awareness in
the community, from which they will benefit in future interactions or contracts.
6.5 Discussion
The approach to model contractual obligations as directed deadline obligations
(and possibly with livelines) has been published in [143] and [146]. A more prac-
tical perspective, including implementation, can be found in [144] and [147].
6.5.1 Enacting business contracts
In B2B relationships contracts specify, through obligations, the interdependencies
between different partners, and provide legal options to which parties can resort
in case of conflict. However, when this joint activity aims at pursuing a common
goal, the successful performance of business benefits all involved parties. There-
fore, when developing automated monitoring tools, one should take into account
that agents may be cooperative enough to allow counterparties’ deviations.
Using flexible livelines and deadlines ensures a degree of freedom for agents
to make decisions in the execution phase of contracts, which is important for
dealing with business uncertainty. Our approach is based on real-world evidence
from business contracts (namely the CISG convention [217]), which denotes a
flexible and even cooperative facet of trade contracts.
The CISG convention has been widely studied in the research domain of Ar-
tificial Intelligence and Law. Moreover, the Legal Expert System project [240]
aimed at creating a deductive legal knowledge base, and was applied to CISG.
The idea was to deduce appropriate answers to questions about legal states of
affairs at any time point, as a result of applying CISG provisions to a concrete
case.
6.5.2 Directedness and temporal flexibility
We have developed a novel model for contractual obligations, where these are
seen as either directed deadline obligations or directed obligations with liveline
and deadline. Following a claimant theory approach [212], the directed aspect
concerns the need to identify the agent who will be authorized to react in case of
non-fulfillment. We started from previous theoretical approaches to model such
authorizations, and developed a more concrete formalization by linking autho-
rizations with a flexible model of livelines and deadlines. Obligation violations
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are now dependent on the counterparty motivation to claim them. We have also
considered in our model smoother authorizations.
Most implementations of norms in multi-agent systems ignore the need for
having directed obligations from bearers to counterparties. The most likely reason
for this is that in those approaches obligations are seen as (implicitly) directed
from an agent to the normative system itself. It is up to the system (e.g. an
electronic organization [228] or an electronic institution [71]) to detect violations
and to enforce the norms which are designed into the environment (in some cases
they are even regimented in such a way that violation is not possible). On the
contrary, our flexible approach towards an Electronic Institution allows agents to
specify the norms that will regulate their mutual commitments.
The need to identify two opposite roles in deontic operators is not exclusive
of obligations. In [212] the concept of directed permission is described on the
basis of interference and counter-performance. If a party is permitted by another
to bring about some fact, the latter is not allowed to interfere with the attempt
of the former to achieve that fact. The authors also sustain a relation between
directed obligations and directed permissions: Oblb,c(f) → Permb,c(f), that is,
if an agent b has an obligation towards an agent c, then b is permitted (by c)
to bring about the obliged fact and c is not permitted to interfere. This is very
important in international trade transactions, especially when storage costs can
be high. Some evidence from CISG [217] brings us once more the same insight:
Article 53: The buyer must pay the price for the goods and take delivery
of them [...]
Article 60: The buyer’s obligation to take delivery consists: (a) in doing
all the acts which could reasonably be expected of him in order to enable
the seller to make delivery; and (b) in taking over the goods.
In this case the permission is described in terms of an obligation of the coun-
terparty (the buyer).
Our model of directed obligations with livelines and deadlines has some con-
nections with research on real-time systems, where a time-value function valuates
a task execution outcome depending on the time when it is obtained. Soft real-
time systems use soft deadlines: obtaining the result after the deadline has a
lower utility. In contrast, for hard real-time systems the deadline is crisp: af-
ter it, the result has no utility at all, and missing the deadline can have serious
consequences. Our approach seems to be soft with a hard-deadline discretion-
ally declared by the counterparty of the task to achieve. Deadline goals are also
analyzed in [105] in the context of goal-directed and decision-theoretic planning.
Goals are given a temporal extent and can be partially satisfied according to this
temporal component. The authors propose a horizon time point somewhere after
the deadline, after which there will be no benefit in achieving the goal. In our
case the horizon is not static, but can be defined by the counterparty.
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6.5.3 Obligation lifecycles
Other authors have proposed different lifecycles for commitments and deontic
operators. Directed social commitments are modeled by Pasquier et al. [175]
in the context of dialogical frameworks. Violated commitments resort to their
cancellation, which may bring sanctions. Furthermore, the bearer may explicitly
cancel his commitment, allowing the counterparty to apply sanctions. Updating
is also allowed through cancellation of the commitment and creation of a new one.
A more compact model is that of Wan and Singh in [230], also considering the
possibility to update commitments. However, fulfillment and violation are not
dealt with explicitly in this model; instead, a commitment is discharged when
fulfilled, or else may be canceled. Our approach is more expressive and provides
greater flexibility by identifying states that are based on deadlines (and livelines)
on which obligations are due. These states, on which counterparties may act,
accommodate the possibility to define sanctions with different strengths, making
it possible to react to delays differently than violations.
Fornara and Colombetti [78] propose that a commitment’s violated state can
be recovered by including a description of actions to be performed by the debtor
(i.e. bearer) in case of violation (which are termed d-sanctions). This is seen as
an opportunity for the debtor to remedy the violation, and if so the commitment
will progress to an extinguished state. In case these sanctions fail to produce
the desired effect (that is, the debtor still does not conform), the commitment
becomes irrecoverable, and a second type of sanctions is available (e-sanctions)
which concerns actions that the norm enforcer is authorized to perform. It seems
that with this approach more than one violation is associated with a commit-
ment’s lifecycle: failing to comply with the commitment and failing to execute
the remedying actions. We prefer to model these as separate obligations (in which
the second is a sanction prescribed by a different norm), with which we obtain a
more flexible approach that allows us, for instance, to prescribe more than one
sanction in a specific violation case.
Taking a cooperative approach to contract fulfillment, the obligation lifecycle
model proposed by Salle´ [196] includes states that are used in a contract ful-
fillment protocol. Agents communicate about their intentions to comply with
obligations, and in this sense an obligation can be refused or accepted. After
being accepted, the obligation may be canceled or complied with. These states
are reached according to the enactment of a contractual relationship. Our model,
in practice, also requires that agents communicate their intentions regarding an
obligation with a violated deadline. In fact, CISG’s Article 48 seems to go in this
direction, in order to protect the bearer’s efforts toward a late fulfillment of the
obligation.
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6.5.4 Decision-making
The decision-making space of agents concerning contractual obligations is en-
riched by our model of authorizations. Both parties involved in a directed deadline
obligation may have a say regarding its violation. When considering obligations as
interlinked through norms in a contract, agents should evaluate the consequences
of fulfillment and violation states as prescribed in the contract. Furthermore, in
“socially rich” environments, agents should explore the value of future relation-
ships by enhancing their perceived trustworthiness and predisposition to facilitate
compliance, something that is made possible by our directed deadline obligations
approach.
A model for commitment valuations, on which we have based our decision-
making prospect, has been proposed in [58]. However, while their work is centered
on checking correctness of contracts, we focus on valuations in the course of a
contract execution. We do not assume that a contract is correct from a fairness
point of view. This difference in concerns has brought divergent considerations
when valuating fulfillment and violation states.
Other authors have studied agent decision-making regarding norm compliance.
For instance, violation games, put in perspective of a game-theoretic approach to
normative multi-agent systems in [22], model the interactions between an agent
and the normative system that is responsible to detect violations and sanction
them accordingly. That line of research analyses how an agent can violate obli-
gations without being sanctioned. In our case, while we assume that temporal
violations are always detected by the normative environment, we explore agents’
decision-making from the point of view of both the bearer and the counterparty
of a directed obligation.

Chapter7
Putting the Normative Environment into
Practice
In this chapter, our intention of providing an implementation of an institutional
normative environment is satisfied. Based on the proposals we have made in the
previous chapters, here we provide a computational infrastructure that may be
of assistance both in e-contract establishment and enactment, by providing an
automatic monitoring service.
In the next section we will provide an overview of our institutional norma-
tive environment implementation. Later on this chapter we will illustrate the
use of the normative environment with some typified scenarios. We will show
the creation of e-contracts using appropriate representation formalisms (both for
contextual information and norms). We will also show possible situations for
e-contract enactment, together with the normative environment’s response as an
e-contract monitoring service.
7.1 A Rule-based Implementation
Our approach towards implementing a normative environment is based on a
declarative representation of rules and norms, together with the normative state.
As it follows from Chapter 5, rules and norms lend themselves to a rule-based
implementation. Furthermore, since the normative environment is based on the
occurrence of events, using a data-driven (i.e., forward chaining) rule engine is
appropriate. This kind of inference engine was initially known as a production
system, widely used in the realm of expert systems [90]. One of the main charac-
teristics of production systems is the conceptual separation between knowledge
representation and its application – in our case, between norms and their use in
contractual relationships, through monitoring rules.
In general terms, a rule-based system is composed of three main components:
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a (i) knowledge base contains a collection of rules that represent the problem-
solving abilities to be applied in a specific problem domain; (ii) working memory
includes the available data that characterize the state of a problem as it is being
solved, including partial results; an (iii) inference engine tries to match rules in
the knowledge base with data in working memory and decides, using appropriate
conflict resolution strategies, which rules to apply in each step of the reason-
ing process. In our case, rules (both constitutive and institutional) and norms
compose the knowledge base, while the normative state is included in working
memory. The inference engine, besides applying rules that respond to events as
they are added to working memory, will be responsible to put in action the norm
activation defeasibility model described in Section 5.6.
From the available choices, we selected Jess [82] as our rule-based engine. Jess
includes a number of interesting features that we exploit in our implementation,
namely:
• a very efficient inference-engine using an enhanced version of the Rete algo-
rithm, which optimizes the pattern matching phase of the inference process;
• an organization of rules and templates in modules, which allows us to orga-
nize the complexity of having multiple norms that apply to different contexts
with hierarchical relationships;
• a representation of working memory elements supported by slot-based tem-
plate declarations, also enabling slot inheritance through template exten-
sion;
• an easy integration with Java, by enabling the use of Java classes from Jess
as a scripting language and by allowing a full Java application to embed a
Jess component.
Although the first three items listed above are advantageous in the process
of implementation of a normative environment, the last item should not be dis-
regarded, since it is also our concern to integrate the normative environment
within a full-fledged Electronic Institution Platform, which is being developed at
LIACC-NIAD&R as a JADE [18] agent-based system.
While explaining our implementation throughout the following subsections,
we will intentionally hide some intricate details that are more difficult to grasp
for a non Jess-familiar reader. Nevertheless, in Appendix A we provide a full Jess
code listing of our approach.
7.1.1 Contexts
We will start by providing a means to represent contexts and their hierarchical
relations. Each e-contract that is created will give birth to a context inside the
normative environment.
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A Jess template (defined with the deftemplate construct) aggregates the ba-
sic information for a context definition, including an id, the name of its parent
(super) context, a starting date for the associated contract and a list of partici-
pants:
(deftemplate MAIN::context
"Context for norms"
(slot id) (slot super-context (default INSTITUTIONAL-NORMS))
(slot when) (multislot who) )
Initially, a top level institutional context is available, from which every context
descends. It is represented by identifier INSTITUTIONAL-NORMS, which is the
default value for the super-context slot.
The contextual information that is defined for each specific contract is based
on the following template:
(deftemplate MAIN::contextual-info
"Contextual information"
(slot context) )
The typification of contexts is made possible by extending both the context
and contextual-info templates. We will provide some examples in Section 7.2.
When creating a new context, a new Jess module is defined (by using the
defmodule construct) within which specific norms may be included. This defini-
tion of norms inside modules is useful for handling the complexity associated with
having a potentially large number of norms defined in different contexts1. Again,
in Section 7.2 we provide example uses of context creation and context-specific
norm definitions.
7.1.2 Normative state
In order to properly represent institutional reality elements that will compose the
normative state, we define a set of templates and take advantage of Jess template
inheritance, via the extends keyword.
(deftemplate MAIN::IRE
"Institutional reality element"
(slot context) (slot when) )
(deftemplate MAIN::ifact extends IRE
"Institutional fact"
(multislot fact) )
1While this Jess feature may also be used to control rule firing, we use it merely with an
organizational aim.
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(deftemplate MAIN::time extends IRE
"Time event" )
(deftemplate MAIN::obligation extends IRE
"Obligation"
(slot bearer) (slot counterparty) (multislot fact)
(slot liveline (default 0)) (slot deadline) )
(deftemplate MAIN::liveline-violation extends IRE
"Liveline violation of an obligation"
(slot obl) (slot ifa) )
(deftemplate MAIN::deadline-violation extends IRE
"Deadline violation of an obligation"
(slot obl) )
(deftemplate MAIN::fulfillment extends IRE
"Obligation fulfillment"
(slot obl) (slot ifa) )
(deftemplate MAIN::violation extends IRE
"Obligation violation"
(slot obl) )
(deftemplate MAIN::denounce extends IRE
"Temporal violation denouncement"
(slot obl) )
Deadline obligations can be modeled by letting the liveline slot of obliga-
tions get its default value of 0, which means no liveline (it can never be the case
that the obliged fact is obtained before the liveline). In liveline-violations and
fulfillments we included, besides the underlying obligation, a reference to the in-
stitutional fact (ifa) based on which these elements were obtained. The assertion
of time events (e.g. associated with livelines and deadlines) that are relevant in
a specific context is made by scheduling time alerts using a system clock. Inside
ifact and obligation, the unstructured content of a fact (which is declared
as a multislot, that is, a list of values) is meant to increase readability in the
examples provided throughout this chapter.
For practical reasons we also add two events that allow us to grasp the lifetime
of a context:
(deftemplate MAIN::start-context extends IRE
"To indicate that a context has started" )
(deftemplate MAIN::end-context extends IRE
"To indicate that a context has ended" )
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These institutional reality elements (whose instances will be part of the nor-
mative state) provide a temporal window that allows us to filter out any events
related to contexts that are no longer active. We establish this connection between
an active context and the start-context and end-context events by defining
an additional template and a Jess rule (through the defrule construct):
(deftemplate MAIN::active-context
"To indicate that a context is active"
(slot context) )
(defrule MAIN::active-context-rule
"Active context state"
(logical (start-context (context ?ctx)))
(logical (not (end-context (context ?ctx))))
=>
(assert (active-context (context ?ctx))) )
This rule, in particular, states that while a context is started and not ended,
it is active. The logical keyword produces a dependence between the rule’s
conditions and the rule’s assertion (i.e., the active context state). Therefore, if
the context has not yet started or if it has ended, the active-context Jess fact
will not be part of working memory. We will make use of this context property
in constitutive rules.
Jess rules are quite simple to read. The left-hand-side (before the =>) is
composed of Jess fact patterns, which may be bound to variables (identifiers
starting with a question mark ’?’) to be used later. In the right-hand-side we
may include any function calls, which in our case consist of assertions to be made
in the normative state.
7.1.3 Brute facts, roles and constitutive rules
Brute facts are encoded as illocutions in the normarive environment:
(deftemplate MAIN::bfact
"Brute fact"
(slot agent) (slot context) (multislot statement) (slot when) )
In this case we are making more evident a reference to the context regarding
which a statement is being made that something has happened at instant when.
Role enacting agents are represented by an appropriate template:
(deftemplate MAIN::rea
"Role enacting agent - agent takes a role"
(slot agent) (slot role) )
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The example constitutive rules shown in Section 5.4.2 have a straightforward
translation to Jess rules (some are included in Appendix A). For instance:
(defrule CONSTITUTIVE-RULES::payments
"Constitutive rule for acknowledging payments"
(bfact (agent ?a) (context ?ctx) (when ?wh)
(statement currency-transfered $?data) )
(active-context (context ?ctx))
(rea (agent ?a) (role Bank))
=>
(assert (ifact (context ?ctx) (when ?wh)
(fact payment $?data) ) ) )
This constitutive rule is based on a brute fact, and checks that the statement
is made regarding an active context. A constitutive rule that allows us to create
a denounce from the corresponding institutional fact is as follows:
(defrule CONSTITUTIVE-RULES::denounces
"Acknowledging denounces"
(ifact (context ?ctx) (when ?wh)
(fact msg-delivery ref ? from ?fr to ?to msg denounce $?fact) )
?obl <- (obligation (context ?ctx) (bearer ?to) (counterparty ?fr)
(fact $?fact) )
=>
(assert (denounce (context ?ctx) (obl ?obl) (when ?wh))) )
In this case we search for an obligation whose fact to bring about matches
the denounced fact. We bind such obligation to a variable (?obl) and use it as a
reference inside the denounce element.
7.1.4 Institutional rules: monitoring contractual
obligations
Institutional rules for monitoring contractual obligations (see Section 6.3.2), are
translated into Jess rules. For instance:
(defrule INSTITUTIONAL-RULES::detect-liveline-violation
"Detect a livelive violation of an obligation"
?obl <- (obligation (context ?c) (fact $?f) (liveline ?liveline))
?ifa <- (ifact (context ?c) (fact $?f) {when < ?liveline})
=>
(assert (liveline-violation (context ?c) (when ?ifa.when)
(obl ?obl) (ifa ?ifa) ) ) )
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In this case, the rule is applied when there is an obligation and an institutional
fact with the same fact contents, and it binds these two elements with variables.
If the institutional fact occurs before the liveline, a liveline violation is asserted,
passing to it references to the elements used to fire the rule.
The whole set of monitoring rules is included in Appendix A.
7.1.5 Norms and defeasibility
At a first glance, norms are represented in Jess quite similarly to institutional
rules. They use patterns in their left-hand-side and they assert obligations (or
an end-context element signaling a contract termination) in their right-hand-
side. And in fact for contract-specific user-defined norms this is all the user needs
to know. The concrete Jess coding of norms in our normative environment is,
however, a bit more intricate, as we now explain.
The conflict resolution strategies set forth by Jess do not distinguish rules
(norms) according to the normative contexts in which they are defined (see Sec-
tion 5.6.2). Although it is possible to program a specific resolution strategy, our
norm defeasibility model demands that not only we decide which norm to apply,
but also that we prevent defeated norms from being fired. Since our normative
state is monotonic (i.e. we never retract institutional reality elements), we need
to guide the inference engine in order to apply norms in a selective way.
Our approach consists of a special handling process of institutional reality
elements and on some additions made to the representation of norms in Jess.
Each IRE includes an additional slot indicating its processing context. When an
IRE is first added to the normative system, this processing-context slot is set
to be the context that the IRE refers to. After norms that are defined in that
context have had a chance to fire, the IRE’s processing context is set to be the
super-context of the current processing context. This step is repeated until we
cross the INSTITUTIONAL-NORMS context, which is the top normative context. In
Appendix A we include an implementation of this algorithm using Jess rules.
Norms will be allowed to fire using a set of IREs if and only if at least one of
them has the norm context as its processing context. Furthermore, while firing
norms we make sure that the normative environment remembers what normative
state fractions have been used to fire norms throughout contexts. A norm will
only fire if there was no other norm, defined at a different context, that fired on
the same set of IREs. If there was such a norm, then it necessarily is defined in
a sub-context, because of the way the processing-context slot is updated.
The general simplified appearance of a norm is as illustrated in Figure 7.1.
Each norm is defined at a specific module (INSTITUTIONAL-NORMS or any context
module), which is expressed by the label between defrule and the :: separator.
In each left-hand-side pattern any templates extending those presented (context,
contextual-info or IRE) may be used.
In order to implement the norm defeasibility model as explained above, a
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(defrule <NORM-CONTEXT>::simplified-norm-codification
"Brief description of the norm"
(context (id ?ctx) ...)
(contextual-info (context ?ctx) ...)
...
(IRE (context ?ctx) ...)
...
=>
(assert (obligation (context ?ctx) ...))
... )
Figure 7.1: Simplified norm codification.
(defrule <NORM-CONTEXT>::concrete-norm-codification
"Brief description of the norm"
(context (id ?ctx) ...)
(contextual-info (context ?ctx) ...)
...
?ire_1 <- (IRE (context ?ctx) ... (processing-context ?pc_1))
...
?ire_n <- (IRE (context ?ctx) ... (processing-context ?pc_n))
; at least 1 IRE has this module as its processing-context?
(test (member$ <NORM-CONTEXT> (list ?pc_1 ... ?pc_n)))
; is there no norm-fired-on with these IREs and another context?
(not (norm-fired-on
(ires $?ires&:(equal-sets? ?ires (list ?ire_1 ... ?ire_n)))
(context ~<NORM-CONTEXT>)) )
=>
(assert (obligation (context ?ctx) ...))
...
; save norm-fired-on information
(assert (norm-fired-on (ires ?ire_1 ... ?ire_n)
(context <NORM-CONTEXT>) ) ) )
Figure 7.2: Concrete norm codification.
norm is in fact coded in the normative environment as shown in Figure 7.2. The
template norm-fired-on is used to save information regarding contexts in which
norms have fired on particular IREs. The use of a tilde (~) in the context slot
of pattern norm-fired-on negates the value following it: in this case, we want
to eliminate the possibility of having a norm fired on the same IREs but that is
defined in a different context. The tests that are made can be simplified in case
the norm includes only one IRE pattern.
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7.2 E-Contracting Scenarios
E-contracts are established as a result of negotiation among autonomous agents.
Nevertheless, the normative environment does not require e-contracts to be ne-
gotiated within the Electronic Institution Platform. In order to be monitorable
by the normative environment, however, e-contracts should be written according
to the XML Schema specification provided in Appendix E. This schema enables
agents to exploit the adaptability and extensibility features of the normative
framework. Besides including a header section where information regarding con-
text definition is to be provided, the schema also allows norms to be specified.
When handed to the normative environment, an XML contract representation
based on this schema is converted into Jess constructs, giving birth to a new con-
text that includes contextual information as defined in the contract header and,
optionally, context-specific norms.
The specification of types of contracts, together with their default normative
core, is a knowledge engineering effort that should take place so that the norma-
tive environment can be exploited to its full extent. Legislative bodies or business
practices are important sources for carrying out this task. While being less am-
bitious in our quest, in this section we will illustrate the use of the normative
environment using some e-contracting examples. We will not express contracts
using XML, but will instead concentrate on the e-contract representation as used
inside the normative environment. In order to increase readability, we will show
the simplified version of norms, as explained in the previous section.
7.2.1 Contract of sale
A contract of sale is a contract between two parties by which a seller agrees to
sell to a buyer a specific asset for a given amount of money. Although we have
pointed out, in Section 4.2, that this kind of contract is perhaps too simplistic
to demand for electronic monitoring tools, we will use it as a starting example in
the task of exploiting our normative environment.
Appendix B includes Jess code for defining a contract of sale:
• the contract-of-sale template construct as an extension of the contract
template;
• the contract-of-sale-data contextual information as an extension of the
contextual-info template;
• a set of predefined institutional norms regulating contracts of sale.
The first couple of norms define the normal situation: when the contract starts,
the seller will be obliged to deliver the product (norm CoS_delivery); when he
does so, the buyer will be obliged to make the corresponding payment (norm
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CoS_payment). The two norms following these prescribe what should happen
in abnormal situations: norm CoS_no-delivery dictates that in case the seller
violates his obligation to deliver the product then the contract shall be terminated;
on the other hand, norm CoS_no-payment indicates that any failure to meet the
payment deadline shall result in an additional obligation to pay an interest of 10%
applied on the amount due. Finally, norm CoS_end-of-contract captures the
normal situation for reaching the end of a contract execution: both delivery and
payments have occurred, and there are no pending (i.e., not fulfilled) payment
obligations (e.g. interests).
The two sanctioning norms are applied in two different types of violations:
while the interest to be applied on the payment due is automatic once a dead-
line violation is detected, the prescription of a contract cancellation by norm
CoS_no-delivery requires the buyer to denounce the inability of the seller to
fulfill the delivery. It is therefore up to the buyer to wait further and accept
a delayed delivery or not. If the agreed upon contract conditions are impor-
tant enough, allowing a counterparty deviation (and hence taking a cooperative
attitude regarding the compliance of the contract) may be a good decision.
A typical contract of sale
According to the definitions presented above, a new contract of sale may be
created just by providing the corresponding template instantiations. For instance,
inside the normative environment we may have:
(contract-of-sale
(id CoS-T12)
(when ...)
(who ForOffice LIACC) )
(contract-of-sale-data
(context CoS-T12)
(seller ForOffice) (buyer LIACC)
(product computer-desk) (quantity 10) (unit-price 20.0)
(delivery-rel-liveline 3000) )
In this contract LIACC is purchasing computer desks to ForOffice, and does
not want them before the stipulated liveline. We will now show some possible
outcomes of the monitoring process in different contract enactment situations.
In Appendix C, figures C.1-C.5 show the response of the normative environ-
ment to different enactment situations, from the start till the end of contract
execution. The listings in these figures include relevant IRE that are produced
by rules and norms, together with institutional facts originated from agent ac-
tions (these are marked with an asterisk). Relevant time events (associated with
livelines and deadlines) triggered by a system clock are also shown.
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Figure C.1 shows the normative state after a perfect contract enactment,
where everything goes as agreed. No temporal violations are detected in this
case, since agents abide to their obligations.
Figures C.2-C.4 depict different enactment outcomes in which delivery prob-
lems are detected. In enactments at Figures C.2 and C.3 the delivery liveline or
deadline is violated (and detected by rules adding f-40 and f-43, respectively),
while the counterparty (LIACC) does not denounce this situation. Enactment
at Figure C.4 shows a situation in which the counterparty chooses to denounce
(f-41) the violation of the delivery deadline (as detected in f-39); as prescribed
by contractual norm CoS_no-delivery, this results in a contract end (f-45). Fi-
nally, Figure C.5 shows an enactment in which the payment deadline was violated,
causing an interest to be applied according to contractual norm CoS_no-payment.
Agent LIACC eventually payed both the price (f-57) and the interest (f-60),
bringing the contract to an end (f-62), according to norm CoS_end-of-contract.
An atypical2 contract of sale
So far we have not made any use of the flexibility of the normative framework
provided by the norm defeasibility model. In this section we start doing so.
The way we defined templates that contain contract of sale data allows us to
adjust some parameters simply by overriding default values (in fact in the previous
contract example we did so for the delivery-rel-liveline slot). By exploiting
the defeasibility feature of the normative framework, we may also create a contract
of sale that does not work exactly as prescribed by predefined institutional norms.
As an example, consider the following contract:
(contract-of-sale
(id CoS-A12)
(when ...)
(who CPUStore LIACC) )
(contract-of-sale-data
(context CoS-A12)
(seller CPUStore) (buyer LIACC)
(product laptop-computer) (quantity 1) (unit-price 800.0) )
(defrule CoS-A12::void
"Nothing after delivery"
(contract-of-sale (id CoS-A12))
(fulfillment (context CoS-A12) (obl ?obl) (when ?w))
?obl <- (obligation (context CoS-A12) (bearer ?s) (counterparty ?b)
(fact delivery $?))
=> )
2Atypical here means not exactly as predefined in the normative environment. It is not
meant to indicate that the corresponding contractual norms are not common in the real world.
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(defrule CoS-A12::payment
"After delivery and no return within period, buyer obligation to pay"
(contract-of-sale (id CoS-A12))
(contract-of-sale-data (context CoS-A12) (seller ?s) (buyer ?b)
(product ?p) (quantity ?q) (unit-price ?up)
(payment-rel-deadline ?prd) )
(fulfillment (context CoS-A12) (obl ?obl) (when ?w))
?obl <- (obligation (context CoS-A12) (bearer ?s) (counterparty ?b)
(fact delivery $?) )
(time (context CoS-A12) (when =(+ ?w 10000)))
(not (ifact (context CoS-A12)
(fact delivery ref ? from ?b to ?s product ?p quantity ?q)
{when <= (+ ?w 10000)} ) )
=>
(assert (obligation (context CoS-A12) (bearer ?b) (counterparty ?s)
(deadline (+ ?w ?prd))
(fact payment ref CoS-A12 from ?b to ?s
amount (* ?q ?up)) ) ) )
(defrule CoS-A12::end-of-contract
"Delivery and product return lead to end of contract"
(contract-of-sale (id CoS-A12))
(contract-of-sale-data (context CoS-A12) (seller ?s) (buyer ?b)
(product ?p) (quantity ?q) (unit-price ?up)
(payment-rel-deadline ?prd) )
(fulfillment (context CoS-A12) (obl ?obl_del))
?obl_del <- (obligation (context CoS-A12) (bearer ?s) (counterparty ?b)
(fact delivery ref ? from ?s to ?b
product ?p quantity ?q) )
(ifact (context ?CoS-A12)
(fact delivery ref ? from ?b to ?s product ?p quantity ?q)
(when ?w_ret) )
=>
(assert (end-context (context CoS-A12) (when ?w_ret))) )
In this contract LIACC is purchasing a laptop to CPUStore. This contract
includes three specific norms, where the parties specify that a trial period is set
within which the laptop may be returned to the seller. Norm CoS-A12::void is
meant to defeat norm INSTITUTIONAL-NORMS::CoS_payment (according to the
defeasibility model), since we do not want to raise the payment obligation as
soon as LIACC gets the laptop. Norm CoS-A12::payment establishes that the
payment obligation arises only if the laptop is not returned within a specific time
period. Finally, norm CoS-A12::end-of-contract states that the contract is
considered terminated upon a product return. The rest of the norms defined at the
INSTITUTIONAL-NORMS level remain applicable to this contract. In Appendix C,
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Figure C.6 shows a smooth enactment of this contract, while Figure C.7 depicts
a situation where LIACC has decided to return the laptop.
7.2.2 Standing agreements
In the previous section we have used a one-off business case, based on the contract
of sale. However, it is with standing agreements that we make most sense out
of the hierarchical normative structure that we have included in our normative
environment design. In this section we try to provide an illustrating scenario.
As we have noted in Section 4.2, in many cases a contractual relation forms
the business context for further contracts. Therefore, it is within some previously
established cooperation agreement that more specific and short-term contracts
are formed. We now build a scenario with three hierarchical levels.
A group of agents (representing companies) forms a cluster that agrees on
a set of principles regarding potential collaboration in business opportunities.
Each agent has competences in a specific area (e.g. as defined in ISIC3). This
acquaintance forum is represented, under our approach, by the following contract
type and contextual information:
(deftemplate MAIN::cluster extends contract
"A cluster of acquainted enterprises" )
(deftemplate MAIN::acquainted-info extends contextual-info
"International Standard Industrial Classification for each agent"
(slot agent)
(slot isic-code) )
An example of a norm governing a cluster is the following:
(defrule INSTITUTIONAL-NORMS::cluster_cfp-prop
"A cfp demands for a proposal within a reasonable time"
(cluster (id ?ctx))
(acquainted-info (context ?ctx) (agent ?ag1) (isic-code ?isic))
?ifa <- (ifact (context ?ctx) (when ?w)
(fact cfp ref ?ref from ?ag to ?ag1
isic-code ?isic $?))
=>
(assert (obligation (context ?ctx) (bearer ?ag1) (counterparty ?ag)
(deadline (+ ?w 10000))
(fact proposal ref ?ref from ?ag1 to ?ag
isic-code ?isic $?) ) ) )
3International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities, Rev.4 – http:
//unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/isic-4.asp
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This norm simply states that members of a cluster are expected to answer
call-for-proposals related with their ISIC code within a reasonable time. While
we will not specify any consequence in case of violation, this norm can be seen as
a behavior guideline to which deviations could be handled in the future.
A specific cluster
With the following illustration we show the potential of the hierarchical normative
structure, by creating a cluster that includes specific particularities. These are
expressed as norms to be applied to “cooperation agreements” that might be
established among a subset of the cluster’s members. Therefore, norms created
at run-time (i.e., they are not defined at the top institutional level) will regulate
e-contracts that are to be created at a latter stage.
We now create cluster Cluster-12345. First, the cluster’s definitions:
(cluster
(id Cluster-12345)
(when ...)
(who E1 E2 E3 E4 E5) )
(acquainted-info
(context Cluster-12345) (agent E1) (isic-code 261) )
(acquainted-info
(context Cluster-12345) (agent E2) (isic-code 261) )
(acquainted-info
(context Cluster-12345) (agent E3) (isic-code 262) )
(acquainted-info
(context Cluster-12345) (agent E4) (isic-code 262) )
(acquainted-info
(context Cluster-12345) (agent E5) (isic-code 263) )
We thus have a cluster composed of five different agents, although some have the
same ISIC code.
Then, the notion of cooperation agreement as defined in Cluster-12345:
(deftemplate Cluster-12345::coop-agreement extends contract
"A cooperation agreement where parties promise to supply products
within agreed criteria" )
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(deftemplate Cluster-12345::coop-effort extends contextual-info
"Cooperation effort of a coop-agreement partner"
(slot agent)
(slot product)
(slot min-qt (default 1))
(slot max-qt (default 1))
(slot unit-price (default 0.0)) )
Each coop-effort entrance specifies the criteria (namely, the ordered quan-
tity range) according to which a partner commits to sell the product for a given
unit price. This is expressed by the following norms governing cooperation agree-
ments that might be created within context Cluster-12345 (this is the context
where the norms are defined):
(defrule Cluster-12345::CA_order-accept
"A partner must accept orders conforming to his coop-effort promise"
(coop-agreement (id ?ctx) (who $?who))
(coop-effort (context ?ctx) (agent ?ag1) (product ?p)
(min-qt ?min_q) (max-qt ?max_q) )
(ifact (context ?ctx) (when ?w)
(fact order ref ?ref from ?ag to ?ag1
product ?p quantity ?qt) )
(test (member$ ?ag $?who))
(test (and (>= ?qt ?min_q) (<= ?qt ?max_q)))
=>
(assert (obligation (context ?ctx) (bearer ?ag1) (counterparty ?ag)
(deadline (+ ?w 5000))
(fact accept ref ?ref from ?ag1 to ?ag
product ?p quantity ?qt) ) ) )
(defrule Cluster-12345::CA_accept-CoS
"Accepting an order means to establish a new contract-of-sale"
(coop-agreement (id ?ctx))
(coop-effort (context ?ctx) (agent ?ag1) (product ?p)
(unit-price ?upr) )
(ifact (context ?ctx) (when ?w_order)
(fact order ref ?ref from ?ag to ?ag1 product ?p quantity ?qt) )
(ifact (context ?ctx) (when ?w_accept)
(fact accept ref ?ref from ?ag1 to ?ag product ?p quantity ?qt) )
=>
; establish contract-of-sale
(create-contract-of-sale super-context ?ctx when ?w_accept
seller ?ag1 buyer ?ag product ?p
quantity ?qt unit-price ?upr) )
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Norm Cluster-12345::CA_order-accept expresses the obligation of a part-
ner agent to accept orders respecting the promised criteria, provided that the or-
dering agent is also a cooperation agreement partner. This however does not pre-
vent the agent from accepting orders not matching the quantity criteria. Obliged
or not, however, norm Cluster-12345::CA_accept-CoS establishes that should
the agent accept an order, a contract of sale (see Section 7.2.1) is created that
will operationalize the product supply. In this case we extend the definition of
norms in order to make use of a Jess function allowing us to create a new contract
of sale.
In order to show the use of these norms, we define the following cooperation
agreement CA-123 among three of the cluster’s agents:
(Cluster-12345::coop-agreement
(id CA-123)
(super-context Cluster-12345)
(when ...)
(who E1 E3 E5) )
(Cluster-12345::coop-effort
(context CA-123) (agent E1) (product motherboard)
(min-qt 90) (max-qt 100) (unit-price 40.0) )
(Cluster-12345::coop-effort
(context CA-123) (agent E2) (product desktop-computer)
(min-qt 90) (max-qt 100) (unit-price 500.0) )
(Cluster-12345::coop-effort
(context CA-123) (agent E2) (product monitor)
(min-qt 90) (max-qt 100) (unit-price 150.0) )
(Cluster-12345::coop-effort
(context CA-123) (agent E3) (product modem)
(min-qt 90) (max-qt 100) (unit-price 120.0))
This cooperation agreement has been signed between agents E1, E2 and E3.
The latter committed to supply two different products, while the others have
only one kind of contribution. It is worth pointing out that the super context
for coop-agreement CA-123 is Cluster-12345: this will enable context CA-123
to inherit norms defined in context Cluster-12345 that apply to cooperation
agreements.
In Appendix C, Figure C.8 shows what happens when agent E3 orders 90
motherboards to agent E1. When the order is placed (f-88) an obligation to
accept the order is added (f-89), which when fulfilled (f-93) causes a contract
of sale to be created (f-95, f-96). What follows is a smooth enactment of the
contract of sale, similar to that of Figure C.1.
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7.2.3 Workflow contracts
A final example we would like to provide is that of a multi-party contract between
a set of companies that agree on establishing some kind of inter-organizational
workflow practice among them, as modeled by Xu [239]. According to this ap-
proach, two main concepts may be identified: action and constraint. An action
indicates who is responsible for executing a task and towards whom that task
is to be performed (these are the sender and receiver of the action), together
with a relative deadline. A constraint expresses restrictions on the occurrence
order of actions in a business process. Abstracting from this model, we define a
workflow contract as a contract where obligations regard actions to be executed
in a particular order (i.e., with ordering constraints) between contractual agents.
The workflow contract is represented as follows:
(deftemplate MAIN::workflow-contract extends contract
"A workflow contract" )
(deftemplate MAIN::action extends contextual-info
"An action to be taken by a workflow-contract participant"
(slot name)
(slot sender)
(slot receiver)
(slot rel-deadline (default 0)) )
(deftemplate MAIN::constraint extends contextual-info
"A constraint on the order of two actions"
(slot action1)
(slot action2) )
Two norms govern workflow-contracts. Norm WfC-starting-actions re-
sponds to an action starting the workflow process. We identify this action by
checking that there is no precedence constraint over it. Once the starting action
has been executed, we prescribe as obligations any actions constrained by that
action.
(defrule INSTITUTIONAL-NORMS::WfC-starting-actions
"Dealing with the starting action"
(workflow-contract (id ?ctx))
(action (name ?action) (sender ?fr) (receiver ?to))
; check that this is a starting action
(not (constraint (action2 ?action)))
; get a next-action depending on this one
(constraint (action1 ?action) (action2 ?next-action))
(action (name ?next-action) (sender ?s) (receiver ?r)
(rel-deadline ?d) )
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; when the action is executed
(ifact (context ?ctx) (when ?w)
(fact ?action ref ?ref from ?fr to ?to) )
=>
; create an obligation for the next-action
(assert (obligation (context ?ctx) (bearer ?s) (counterparty ?r)
(deadline (+ ?w ?d))
(fact ?next-action ref ?ref from ?s to ?r) ) ) )
Norm (WfC-obliged-actions) handles the rest of the workflow sequence:
(defrule INSTITUTIONAL-NORMS::WfC-obliged-actions
"Dealing with obliged actions"
(workflow-contract (id ?ctx))
(action (name ?action) (sender ?fr) (receiver ?to))
; get a next-action depending on this one
(constraint (action1 ?action) (action2 ?next-action))
(action (name ?next-action) (sender ?s) (receiver ?r)
(rel-deadline ?d))
; when the action is fulfilled
(fulfillment (context ?ctx) (when ?w) (obl ?obl))
?obl <- (obligation (context ?ctx)
(fact ?action ref ?ref from ?fr to ?to))
; check that no precedence is pending for next-action
(not (and (constraint (action1 ?prev-action) (action2 ?next-action))
(test (neq ?prev-action ?action))
(action (name ?prev-action) (sender ?s1) (receiver ?r1))
(not (and (fulfillment (context ?ctx) (obl ?obl_))
?obl_ <- (obligation (context ?ctx)
(fact ?prev-action ref ?ref
from ?s1 to ?r1) ) ) ) ) )
=>
; create an obligation for the next-action
(assert (obligation (context ?ctx) (bearer ?s) (counterparty ?r)
(deadline (+ ?w ?d))
(fact ?next-action ref ?ref from ?s to ?r) ) ) )
When an obliged action is fulfilled, we get a next action waiting for (i.e. con-
strained by) this one and check if every precedence of that action is fulfilled. If
so, we add an obligation concerning that action.
Car insurance scenario
The example provided by Xu [239] regards a car insurance scenario, which we
will try to replicate with our approach. A brief explanation is as follows:
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“This case outlines the manner in which a car damage claim is han-
dled by an insurance company (AGFIL). The contract parties work
together to provide a service level which facilitates efficient claim set-
tlement. The parties involved are called Europ Assist, Lee Consulting
Services, Garages and Assessors. Europ Assist offers a 24-hour emer-
gency call answering service to policyholders. Lee C.S. coordinates
and manages the operation of the emergency service on a day-to-day
level on behalf of AGFIL. Garages are responsible for car repair. As-
sessors conduct the physical inspections of damaged vehicles and agree
upon repair figures with the garages.” (from [239], p. 121)
Appendix D includes the definition of the car insurance scenario, including:
• a workflow-contract instance with participating agents: policyholder,
agfil, euro_assist, lee_cs, garage and assessor;
• an action instance for each action to be executed by an agent;
• a constraint instance for each action pair ordering restriction.
Also included in Appendix D is a normal enactment when the policy holder
places a phone claim. Every constraint is satisfied as a result of their usage in
norms prescribing obligations for the actions to be taken.
7.3 Discussion
The illustration, through practical examples, of the functioning of our normative
environment proposal has been our concern mainly in [137], [144] and [147]. We
have also made a proposal for an XML contract schema [138] that allows agents
to take advantage of the adaptability and extensibility features of the normative
framework, by going from a mere predefined contract type instantiation to the
inclusion of contract specific norms.
7.3.1 Declarative rule-based approach
Our implementation using a forward-chaining rule-based approach is applicable
to run-time monitoring of contracts. A requirement of this kind of usage however
is that events are reported in a timely fashion to the normative environment. We
assume that agents are interested in publicizing their abidance to commitments.
An advantage of a declarative normative framework is that agents can have
access to their applicable norms, and can use what-if analysis to predict and rea-
son about possible outcomes of both their and other agents’ actions. This may
be important in contracting situations, allowing potential contract breaches to
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be detected and prevented, or to minimize their damages. For that, the moni-
toring capabilities of our implementation may be used as a tool to alert agents
when certain contract-related events are eminent, such as a forthcoming deadline.
Jess allows for an easy integration of our monitoring rules implementation with
other rules including function calls that address the level of responsiveness that
is intended.
We have shown how the normative environment may effectively monitor con-
tract enactment at run-time. Monitoring rules may also be used a posteriori, in
order to check off-line if contractual norms were indeed followed by every partner.
In this case, after collecting all events concerning a contract, the inference engine
may run in order to check if the contract was enacted in a conforming way.
A less demanding approach in terms of run-time state maintenance is that
of event-calculus, such as in the usage proposed by Knottenbelt [127]. Events
initiate or terminate fluents regarding the normative positions of agents within
a contract. Appropriate rules capture the fulfillment or violation of obligations.
A meta-interpreter enables an agent to query what obligations are active with
respect to a contract. The distinguishing feature in this approach is that the
truth value of fluents (e.g. obligation states) is dynamically obtained when asked
for, instead of a monitoring process that keeps maintaining the normative state
through real-time assertions. However, in our approach we do need to keep an
updated normative state in order to provide a run-time contract monitoring fa-
cility.
Other approaches have followed a rule-based approach to norm representa-
tion and monitoring. For instance, in [87] the authors seem to implement in a
backward-chaining logic program (based on Prolog) the semantics of a forward-
chaining production system. We follow a more intuitive approach by employing
a forward-chaining shell.
7.3.2 Normative settings
Some approaches to define normative languages illustrate their application in
simplistic auction scenarios (e.g. [79][87]). With a bit of effort, our approach
could also be used to model these cases. However, instead of providing these
“pre-formatted institutions”, the rationale behind our normative environment
development is quite different since the beginning: that of allowing agents to
create the normative relationships they want to establish.
In Section 7.2 we have provided some examples of contracts that might be
established by agents. We have extended the kinds of normative consequences
that norms may bring, by showing, in Section 7.2.2, a case where agent actions
within a contract have as a consequence the creation of a new contract. In rigor,
this demands for a refinement on our norm definition (which has been initially
defined as a rule that prescribes obligations). Another way of formally taking into
account this possibility is to read the creation of a new contract as a “counts-as”
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conditional, e.g. by saying that an order and its acceptation count as the creation
of a contract of sale between the involved parties.
A question that arises when we look at contractual responses to violations,
which mostly consist on prescribing, as sanctions, new obligations, is what should
happen when an agent does not fulfill his contrary-to-duties. Our current imple-
mentation does not account for further direct consequences within the normative
environment. However, being integrated in an overall Electronic Institution Plat-
form, the normative environment does provide reports on contract enactment to a
Computational Trust and Reputation service, as explained in Section 4.1. There-
fore, the normative environment does in fact contribute to enable the application
of “social sanctions” by the Electronic Institution.
In the next chapter we provide an initial approach towards enriching a nor-
mative environment with corrective measures when agents tend not to fulfill their
commitments.

Chapter8
Norm Enforcement
As discussed in Chapter 4, in order to put its regulations into practice an EI
needs to carry out two complementary tasks. In the previous chapters we have
mainly dealt with the monitoring process. The other task – enforcement – was
partially addressed by providing an executable implementation of norms: they are
applied to capture the normative consequences of violations. While, as discussed
by Va´zquez-Salceda et al. [227], norm enforcement may be addressed from two
perspectives – preventively by constraining unwanted behavior or reactively by
detecting violations and responding to them – we strongly believe on the latter
as the only viable approach to address e-contracting scenarios.
In this chapter we look into other means an EI may have at its disposal
in order to enforce norm compliance. We will design and propose an abstract
representation of the normative content of contracts in order to apply a domain-
independent adaptive model of sanctions.
8.1 Rationale
A contract’s normative structure will certainly reflect the coarse business work-
flow between the involved agents, but will probably include provisions for the
most likely possible violations only. Further contingencies will often not be dealt
with when establishing a contract, because it may be costly or even impossible
to anticipate them. Even when relying on a preexistent normative framework
(such as the one provided with our approach), contrary-to-duties may be poorly
designed for some situations, or may simply be inexistent. This is when other
coercive approaches may be relevant, in situations where agents try to take ad-
vantage of their potential gain when violating norms (because they might be more
self-interested than socially concerned).
In the literature (e.g. [175][102]) we find, among others, two basic kinds of
sanctions that an institution may apply in order to incentive norm compliance (or,
119
120 Chapter 8. Norm Enforcement
to put it another way, to discourage deviations). Direct material sanctions have
an immediate effect, and consist of affecting the resources an agent has (e.g. by
applying fines). Indirect social sanctions, such as changing an agent’s reputation,
may have an effect that extends through time. Depending on the domain and on
the set of agents that inhabit the institutional environment, the effectiveness of
such sanctions may be different: if agents are not able to take advantage of other
agents’ reputation information, material sanctions should be used instead.
There are two general policies used when applying (direct) sanctions, which
concern their intended effects: (i) deterrence aims at punishing the violator so
as to discourage future violations; (ii) retribution aims at compensating the ad-
dressee of the violation. Bringing these policies to the electronic institution realm,
we see retribution sanctions as those specified in contractual norms, be they ne-
gotiated or inherited from a preexistent normative framework. In this case the
institution, while monitoring norm compliance, acts as a mediator. As for deter-
rence sanctions, they will be applied by the institution itself, and may be used so
as to maintain order (by motivating agents to comply) and consequently trust in
the system. A similar distinction is made by Fornara and Colombetti [78]: active
sanctions describe actions to be performed by the violator (and if he does so the
violation will become extinguished), while passive sanctions describe actions that
the norm enforcer is authorized to perform.
Deterrence has also been studied from a different perspective in political sci-
ence [241], where theories are proposed for explaining international relations in
tense periods such as the Cold War. In this case, deterrence is based on threats
that are made between different nations.
Economic approaches to law enforcement have suggested analyzing sanctions
and their amplitude by taking into account their effects on parties’ activities.
Agents committing to norms that have associated deterrence sanctions enter risky
activities, because they may unintentionally violate them. It has been argued
[177] that under strict liability (where violators are always sanctioned) sanctions
should equal harm done. An increase in the level of activity brings an increase in
the expected harm; if damages equal harm, parties will have socially correct incen-
tives to engage in risky activities (that is, to establish commitments). However,
this conclusion relies on the additional assumption that parties are risk-neutral.
If they are risk-averse, the optimal level of damages tends to be lower than harm.
This comes from the fact that with risk-aversion, a sanction imposes a cost which
does not exist under risk neutrality. As explained in [88], risk-aversion introduces
costless deterrence and the policy-maker (an Electronic Institution in our case)
should take that into account when choosing the optimal sanction.
The presence of social sanctions will also influence the behavior of agents con-
cerning their commitments. Reputation-aware environments should have a lesser
need for deterrence sanctions (see, for instance, [153]). Besides reducing agents’
risk (see above), a reduction of deterrence mechanisms may be important for other
reasons. On one hand, both the enforcement activities and the completion of di-
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rect sanctions may be costly, which asks for either lowering the resources used in
those activities or eliminating sanctions in non-compensating cases. On the other
hand, we can imagine (at least in theory) a computational system where these
costs can be marginal: assuming that automatic norm monitoring is computa-
tionally inexpensive and that sanctions consist e.g. of fines that are debited from
agents’ accounts administered by the system. But in this case, higher fine levels
require higher financial warranties from agents, which may once again decrease
their level of activity: some agents may not meet such requirements, which will
inhibit them from committing to certain normative relationships.
In this chapter we seek to explore these issues inside an institutional environ-
ment, under the following assumptions:
• Strict liability: norm violation is always detected.
• Costless enforcement: monitoring and sanctioning have a negligible cost to
the institution.
• Unknown agent population: concerning agents’ risk tolerance and social
awareness.
We envisage a normative framework that is able to adapt itself (by changing
applicable sanctions) according to some measurement of success, which will have
to manage the following conflicting goals: i) keep the normative framework as
simple as possible, by avoiding over-constraining the environment; and ii) max-
imize trust on the institutional environment’s use. These conflicting goals must
be balanced well enough in order to encourage agents to increase their level of
activity, when the agent population’s risk tolerance is unknown beforehand. Ob-
viously, we assume that agents’ preferences regarding the kinds of sanctions we
employ are known: agents prefer not to be fined.
In order to develop an experimental model that allows us to test adaptation
skills of an institutional normative environment, we will make use of an abstract
model for contractual commitments. We then present a simple adaptation ap-
proach that consists on adjusting deterrence sanctions, based on which a set of
experiments were drawn.
8.2 The Model
In our approach we take the stance that agents are truly autonomous, and thus
cannot be forced to fulfill their obligations. The institution may, however, im-
pose certain fines as deterrence sanctions: those fines are assumed to be fully
regimented (that is, agents cannot escape them, e.g. because they were required,
upon entering the institution, to make a deposit that is in control of the institu-
tion). Sanctions other than fines could also be envisaged as deterrence measures.
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Figure 8.1: Sample commitment tree.
We are mainly concerned with e-contracting scenarios, wherein agents make
mutual commitments and create business expectations. Violations, even when
handled by contractual norms, should be seen as exceptional situations. Hence,
if a certain kind of violation becomes frequent, response should be taken through
an increase of sanctions.
8.2.1 Commitment trees
In order to obtain a tractable model for handling contractual commitments, we use
a tree-based representation for interdependent obligations. This representation is
useful for understanding the simulation model that we describe later on.
When establishing contracts, agents create a network of directed obligations,
some of which are dependent on the fulfillment or violation of other obligations.
For the sake of illustration, consider the following two-party contract: agent x
will pay p currency units to agent y, after which y will deliver good g to x. In case
y fails to deliver, he must return p′ = p+ δ to x. This sequence of commitments
is illustrated in Figure 8.1, in a tree-like structure – a commitment tree. Each
node (i.e., each commitment) represents a directed obligation from a bearer b
to a counterparty c to bring about a fact f – Ob,c(f) (unlike directed deadline
obligations introduced in Section 6.2.1, for simplification we omit the temporal
dimension). Bringing about the obliged fact is assumed to imply a cost to the
obligation’s bearer, and presumably produces some benefit to the counterparty
(we will take this into account when providing a more formal account to the
representation of nodes in the commitment tree). Each labeled directed edge in
Figure 8.1 indicates, in the child node pointed to, what follows when the obligation
contained in the parent node is fulfilled (fulf ) or violated (viol). In this simple
example nothing is specified should agent x violate his commitment to pay p, or
should agent y violate his commitment to return p′. On the other hand, returning
p′ is seen as a sanction applied to y if he violates his obligation to deliver g.
Typically, a viol child node includes a contrary-to-duty that remedies the
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failure of the bearer to fulfill his previous obligation, potentially allowing for the
contract to be resumed. A fulf child node will usually define a complementary
obligation where the bearer and counterparty roles are switched.
While this example shows a simple binary tree, one can imagine multi-party
contracts with a potentially complex commitment tree structure. The tree will
not be binary if each obligation fulfillment or violation may lead to more than one
consequence. Also, if we consider that a norm can prescribe an obligation if two
or more fulfillments or violations occur, we end-up with a directed acyclic graph
instead of a tree, since each node may have more than one parent. However,
this is not very common in the case of violations (which are our main concern
here): each violation will typically be handled in isolation (as in the model of
“reparation chains” in [95]).
The violation of an obligation with a prescribed sanction may simply denote
a case where an agent preferred to incur the sanction for matters of conflicting
goals (e.g. he had another more important contract, and could not stand for
both). If such violation becomes frequent, however, this may denote a flaw in the
normative system that agents are being able to exploit to their own advantage.
8.2.2 Adaptation
The importance of adaptation in a normative framework resides in the fact that
contracts may be unfair in certain execution outcomes. If self-interested agents
exploit such flaws to their own profit, action should be taken in order to discourage
such behaviors.
In order to build a model that adapts the normative framework in a domain-
independent way, we will concentrate on adding deterrence fines to the system
(which are not violable), instead of changing the prescribed obligations in each
violation situation. The normative framework’s adaptation is based on associ-
ating, with each obligation, a fine that can be strengthened or weakened (see
Figure 8.21). With this approach, every obligation will have a (possibly null) fine
to be imposed on the bearer in case of violation; this fine is added up to the
violation consequence in the child node already in the tree, if there is one.
In order to correctly model appropriate responses to specific situations, we
need to assess how often an obligation is used, and how often it is violated.
Fines will be updated according to these measurements. The basic principle
that we rely on is that the strength of a fine should be directly proportional to
its application frequency. As such, fines should increase when they are applied
often, and decrease when they are not used. A low level of fine usage indicates
that obligations are being fulfilled or they are not being used as often as desired:
in both cases fines should be decreased, since they either are not needed or are
1From now on, we will only consider the case for binary commitment trees (this simplifica-
tion does not limit the applicability of our approach, while it does make it easier to follow).
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Figure 8.2: Binary commitment tree with null fines.
Figure 8.3: A node in a BCT.
inhibiting activity. On the other hand, a high level of fine usage means that
agents still prefer to go through the sanction, and as such it should be increased
as a deterrence mechanism. In summary, this approach tries to make fines (a)
strong enough to discourage deviation and (b) weak enough to avoid unnecessary
or counterproductive institutional control.
8.3 Simulation Environment
Aiming at the development of a simulation prototype that allows us to test the
adaptation model briefly described above, we designed the following experimental
scenario.
A number of agents will be in the environment, and each will be given the
opportunity to sign a contract, whose structure is defined by the number of en-
acting roles and by an underlying binary commitment tree (BCT from now on).
In the BCT structure, contract roles are used as bearers or counterparties of obli-
gations. Furthermore, each obligation has an associated cost (to be supported
by a fulfilling bearer) and benefit (to be collected by the counterparty of a ful-
filled obligation). Therefore, when an obligation is fulfilled, the agent enacting
the bearer role bears the cost of fulfillment, while the agent enacting the counter-
party role gets the benefit. Figure 8.3 summarizes the characterization of a node
in a BCT.
When an agent decides to sign a contract, he will enact the corresponding
commitment tree with a role assigned to him before contracting. We say that the
state of a contract enactment is the commitment currently under appreciation.
If the bearer of such a commitment is the agent that decided to contract, he will
be asked for a play: either to fulfill or to violate the commitment. If the commit-
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ment’s bearer is not the agent, the system will decide whether the commitment
will be fulfilled or not, according to a uniform strategy.
The current state will be updated according to the decision taken: if the choice
is to fulfill, then the root commitment of the fulfillment sub-tree will become
the current state; if the choice is to violate, then the root commitment of the
violation sub-tree will become the current state. The contract terminates when
the state becomes null (i.e. when no fulfillment/violation sub-tree exists upon a
fulfill/violate decision).
8.3.1 Agent decision-making
Each agent has two distinct kinds of decisions to make. If he does not currently
have an ongoing contract, he is given the opportunity to sign one. For that,
a random role from the contract structure is selected and the agent is asked
if he wants to contract with that role. Each agent is configured with a risk
tolerance parameter Rt ∈ [0 ; 1 [, which denotes his willingness to contract in the
presence of violation fines. If Rt = 0 , the agent will only decide to contract if
he will be subject to no fines at all. On the other extreme, if Rt ≈ 1 , the agent
will always risk to contract, regardless of any fines. An agent will decide to
contract depending on the highest fine that is associated with commitments for
the assigned role. In order to contract, the following relation should be true:
highestFine(role) ≤ b ∗ Rt/(1 − Rt) (8.1)
where b is a slope parameter associated with the agent’s budget.
We assume that agents always prefer to contract, regardless of commitment
costs or benefits. A contract is presumably beneficial to all partners should they
fulfill all their commitments. Having said this, we allow a contract to be unbal-
anced or incorrect from a safeness point of view, in the sense discussed in [58].
In our case, we consent that participating in the contract may in some cases
be worse-off than not participating, depending on the behavior of contractual
partners.
When an agent has an ongoing contract, whenever the contract’s state is a
commitment where he is the bearer he will decide whether to fulfill or to violate
such a commitment. Depending on a so-called in-contract strategy, the agent
will explore the contract’s BCT in order to decide which option is best for him.
Such strategies may vary from simply comparing the cost of fulfillment with the
applicable fine in case of violation, to computing the path with the best outcome
from the whole BCT. Some possible strategies will be presented in Section 8.4.1.
Agents are essentially expected utility maximizers. This means that, in prin-
ciple, they will fulfill obligations only when the expected outcome from this choice
is better than the expected outcome from violating (according to his in-contract
strategy). We do however embed in our agents some notion of social welfare,
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which impels them to fulfill even when they do not have a strict advantage in
doing so. While for now we do not consider the effect of reputation in future con-
tracts, we allow in our model that agents are not all equally self-interested. For
that we introduce a social awareness parameter Sa ∈ [0 ; 1 [. If Sa = 0 , the agent
will violate whenever the outcome from this choice is better than the outcome
from fulfilling. On the other extreme, if Sa ≈ 1 the agent will always choose to
fulfill. The agent will decide to fulfill an obligation O whenever the following
relation is true:
violationOutcome(O)− fulfillmentOutcome(O) ≤ b ∗ Sa/(1 − Sa) (8.2)
where b is as before. The violation/fulfillment outcomes are calculated by the
in-contract strategy.
8.3.2 Fine update policy
In each simulation step, all agents running in the simulation will have a chance to
play. After this, the contract structure will have a chance to adapt, that is, the
fines associated to the BCT will be updated. Each fine is updated independently
of all other fines.
In order to delineate a fine update policy, we first need to define the goal
function that will be pursued. As mentioned before, fine updates should take into
account how often they are applied. We define a threshold parameter Th ∈ [0 ; 1 ]
that roughly indicates the highest percentage of fines that the system should
accept as normal. For instance, with a value Th = 0 .1 we are saying that if more
than 10% of the agents running in the simulation violate a given obligation the
normative system will raise the fine in the next step – in this case, we say that 10%
of the total number of agents is the number of tolerated violations. Furthermore,
since not all agents will be in the same state at a given time point, we adjust
the threshold according to the number of agents that did in fact make a decision
concerning the fulfillment or violation of a specific obligation (because they were
in that state). For instance, if with a group of 1000 agents we have 10 violations
of a specific obligation in a simulation step, this may have a different response
from the normative environment depending on the number of agents that went
through that same obligation at that time step. If there were 10 play decisions
taken on that obligation, this makes a 100% percentage of violations; if there were
100 plays, that percentage comes down to 10%. While in none of these cases we
exceed 10% of the total number of agents (1000), it seems clear that the system
should react in the former case.
The fine associated with each state will be increased if the number of violations
exceeds the following tolerated violations function:
toleratedViolations = 2 ∗ Th ∗Nag/(1 + e−(5/Nag)∗x )− Th ∗Nag (8.3)
8.4. Experimental Evaluation 127
where Nag is the number of agents running in the simulation and x is the number
of agents that were in this state. This is a sigmoid function with an upper bound
set at Th ∗ Nag (a percentage of the total number of agents). The steepness
parameter is 5/Nag , which makes the sigmoid curve approach the upper bound
close to Nag , which is the ceiling for x (there can be no more than Nag agents at
this state).
The fine will be decreased whenever the number of violations does not exceed
the number of tolerated violations. Fines are increased heavier than they are
decreased. We have set an increase step of 0.1 and a decrease step of 0.01. This
fixed update policy determines the convergence rate for fines. Furthermore, fines
will be applied rounded to the first decimal place, which gives a sense that it
takes ten simulation steps (without exceeding the tolerated violations function)
to decrease the fine value.
8.4 Experimental Evaluation
In this section we provide, through a set of experiments, an evaluation of the
adaptation model using the simulation environment described above.
8.4.1 Settings
What we want to study with the simulation scenario described in the preceding
section is whether the normative framework is able to adapt and stabilize fine
changes in a situation with a static agent population. Furthermore, the system
should keep fines as low as possible, while still conforming to the goal function
outlined above. This is because the system aims to avoid excessive control and
through that maximize agents’ contracting activity, which should be obtained
with less risk exposure in an agent population with unknown risk tolerance.
If we change the agent population in the middle of the simulation, then we
have a moving target setting, which is out of the scope of the experiments we
report in this chapter. However, since we lower fines whenever the tolerated
violations are not exceeded, we believe that the system will quickly adapt in a
moving target setting.
Contract structures
Since we are not concerned with the correctness of the contract to be signed, we
may abstract away from the concrete meaning of the contract that is represented
by a BCT. In other words, we may carry out experiments with a large number
of arbitrary BCTs. Figure 8.42 shows some possibilities, all considering two roles
2For simplicity, fines are not shown; however, every node (including leaf nodes) should be
seen as shown in Figure 8.3.
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Figure 8.4: Binary commitment trees: each node Idi ,j is an obligation, where i is
the bearer and j is the counterparty.
only. For instance, (d) includes two complementary obligations 0 and 1, and
their respective contrary-to-duties 3 and 2. We shall call obligation 1 the to-duty
obligation of obligation 0.
We will present some experimental results based on some of these BCTs. In all
cases, obligation costs were set at 10.0 and benefits at 12.0 (setting benefits higher
than costs tries to give all partners some gain when the contract is well-balanced
and is smoothly enacted). Also, fines were initialized at 0.0.
Agents
As noted before, we aim at testing the normative framework’s adaptation when
the agent population is unknown, concerning agents’ risk tolerance and social
awareness. For that reason, all agents in the system have a uniform random
distribution concerning the risk-tolerance and social-awareness parameters. Also,
for these parameters the slope value b was set to 10.0. This makes the right hand
side of Equation 8.1 reach 10.0 when a middle value of 0.5 is used for Rt . It also
turns out to make 10.0 a ceiling for fines.
Several in-contract strategies can be devised, representing different reason-
ing abilities of agents when deciding whether to fulfill or violate an obligation.
As explained before, the in-contract strategy will be used to compute the fulfill-
ment and violation outcomes at a given state. We consider the following simple
strategies, which may have different relevance depending on the BCT being used:
i Local : considers only local information with respect to the obligation being
analyzed.
Fulfillment outcome (FO): – fulfillment cost
Violation outcome (VO): – fine
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ii LocalCtd : considers the cost of fulfilling the contrary-to-duty obligation (if
there is one); ignores possible entitlements in case of fulfillment
FO: – fulfillment cost
VO: – fine – contrary-to-duty cost
iii LocalTd : considers the benefit to gain from the to-duty obligation’s fulfill-
ment (if there is one); ignores possible normative sanctions in case of violation
FO: – fulfillment cost + to-duty benefit
VO: – fine
iv LocalBoth : a mixture of LocalCtd and LocalTd
FO: – fulfillment cost + to-duty benefit
VO: – fine – contrary-to-duty cost
v FulfillmentBalance : considers the balance (net gain) obtained if the con-
tract is enacted without any violations
FO: net gain if every participant fulfills the contract
VO: – fine
vi DoubleFulfillmentBalance : considers two possible balances, one as in Ful-
fillmentBalance and another by assuming that there will be no further viola-
tions from the contrary-to-duty obligation onwards (in this case the agent is
fined)
FO: net gain if every participant fulfills the contract
VO: net gain if every participant fulfills the contract from the contrary-to-
duty obligation onwards – fine
vii BestPathCompliantPartners : explores the whole BCT in order to find
the best net gain for every possible path, assuming that contract partners will
always fulfill
FO: best net gain from the fulfillment subtree – fulfillment cost
VO: best net gain from the violation subtree – fine
viii BestPathMinimax : explores the whole BCT in order to find the best net
gain for every possible path, considering that contract partners will use the
same strategy
FO: best net gain from the fulfillment subtree – fulfillment cost
VO: best net gain from the violation subtree – fine
Strategies iii through vii assume that partners will always fulfill their obliga-
tions. Analyzing these strategies together with the BCTs depicted in Figure 8.4,
we can see that, for instance, FulfillmentBalance will only make sense in tree (e),
since in all other BCTs the same outcome can be achieved with less computa-
tionally demanding strategies.
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Strategy viii is a minimax strategy: the agent will maximize his own expected
utility while assuming that the other agent will do the same. For instance, con-
sidering BCT (d) at Figure 8.4 with no fines, the agent will choose to violate
on every obligation. While this seems obvious for obligations 1, 2 and 3 (there
is no personal benefit in fulfilling), in obligation 0 the agent chooses to violate
because he assumes that the counterparty will violate on 1 and 2, bringing him
no benefit that can compensate the cost of fulfilling on 0. This strategy seems
counterintuitive with the very decision of establishing a contract. However, for
the sake of testing the adaptation capabilities of the normative framework, this
agent decision practice is bearable.
8.4.2 Experiments and results
In all experiments a uniform strategy “always fulfill” was used by the system for
commitments whose bearer is not a simulation agent. The violation threshold
parameter Th was set to 0.1. Each simulation was run with 10000 agents and
1000 time steps.
Figures 8.5-8.14 present the evolution of fines and their effect on agents’ be-
havior for some possible combinations of BCTs and in-contract strategies.
In BCT (c) a LocalTD strategy (Figure 8.5) is able to grab the benefit achieved
from obligation 1 when fulfilling obligation 0. Only the violation of obligation 1 is
tempting, and thus the system adapted the corresponding fine. The concrete value
obtained for this fine is correlated with the values defined for the obligation cost
and benefit, together with the strategy used by agents when deciding on fulfilling
the obligation. Figure 8.6 shows the relative cumulative average of violations
with these settings. We can observe a decrease on the number of violations for
obligation 1 as a consequence of the fine increase, which ceases when the number
of violations is below the tolerated violations threshold (see Equation 8.3).
In BCT (d) the LocalTD strategy (Figure 8.7) impels agents to fulfill obli-
gation 0. Agents that are more socially concerned will tend to fulfill obligation
1 with lower fines than other agents, hence the difference between fines 1 and
2. Figure 8.8 shows the corresponding relative cumulative average of violations.
The effect of fines on agents’ behavior is clearly visible.
In the same scenario, BestPathMinimax (Figure 8.9) gives agents the ability
of evaluating every possible outcome with rational plays for both contractual
partners – an agent will maximize his own expected utility while assuming that
the other agent will do the same. For BCT (d) this means that each agent
playing in state 0 initially violates because he sees his partner preferring to violate
obligation 1 (and 2), therefore giving him no benefit. However, when fines 2 and
3 are high enough, fines 0 and 1 are no longer necessary. Figure 8.10 shows the
evolution of violations for this case. There are no violations for obligations 0 and
1 (their averages tend to 0 in the figure) since before time step 400 (fines applied
in these states become nil).
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Figure 8.5: Fine evolution for BCT (c) and LocalTD.
Figure 8.6: Violation cumulative average (%) for BCT (c) and LocalTD.
As for BCT (e), unlike the previous two contractual structures, this one is not
profitable (with the complete fulfillment execution 0-1-2) for the agent playing at
state 0, if we consider the values set for every obligation’s cost (10.0) and benefit
(12.0). The DoubleFulfillmentBalance strategy (Figure 8.11) is able to detect the
better path 0-4-5, causing a reaction of the normative system with a raise of fine 0.
Without this escape, violating obligation 2 is a means of taking some profit out of
the game, bringing a raise of fine 2. Figure 8.12 shows the evolution of violations
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Figure 8.7: Fine evolution for BCT (d) and LocalTD.
Figure 8.8: Violation cumulative average (%) for BCT (d) and LocalTD.
for this case. The delayed raise on the number of violations for obligation 2 is
clearly visible.
The BestPathMinimax strategy in this scenario (Figure 8.13) makes up the
most complex setting we have experimented. Starting at state 0, the best path
when playing with a similar agent is initially to violate all obligations (including
contrary-to-duties), bringing an outcome of 0. This is because the agent assumes
that his partner will maximize his own profit, therefore preferring to violate at
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Figure 8.9: Fine evolution for BCT (d) and BestPathMinimax.
Figure 8.10: Violation cum. average (%) for BCT (d) and BestPathMinimax.
states 1 and 5. Fines at obligations 0 and 1 become ineffective as soon as fines
associated with contrary-to-duties are high enough. Figure 8.14 shows the corre-
sponding evolution of violations.
The system is able to adjust deterrence sanction values to the behavior of
an agent population with any combination of BCTs and in-contract strategies,
stabilizing fines after a period of time. We should emphasize that the system
continuously tries to lower fines, which is observable by the slight fluctuations of
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Figure 8.11: Fine evolution for BCT (e) and DoubleFulfillmentBalance.
Figure 8.12: Viol. cum. average (%) for BCT (e) and DoubleFulfillmentBalance.
fines towards the end of curves in figures 8.5, 8.7, 8.9, 8.11 and 8.13. Therefore,
system imposed fine levels are the lowest that keep violations below the tolerated
violations function.
Besides affecting the number of violations (that is, agents’ in-contract behav-
ior), the adaptation of fines also affects contractual activity. Figure 8.15 shows
the relative cumulative average of contracts in each of the described settings.
While analyzing this graph, it is clear that when agents use the BestPathMin-
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Figure 8.13: Fine evolution for BCT (e) and BestPathMinimax.
Figure 8.14: Violation cum. average (%) for BCT (e) and BestPathMinimax.
imax strategy they pose further demands on the system when trying to force
agents to comply. In other words, agents use more information and therefore the
adaptive mechanism must increase the level of sanctions in order to prevent ex-
cessive violation levels. As a consequence, agents that are more risk-averse tend
to lower their level of activity, which explains why the number of contracts in
these cases is lower.
We should also note that in these scenarios, where agent populations have no
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Figure 8.15: Contract cumulative average (%) for the five settings.
bias regarding social awareness or risk tolerance, the potentially harmful effect of
fine adaptation in contractual activity is marginal for the remaining in-contract
strategies.
8.5 Addressing Different Agent Populations
In this section we analyze the adaptation of the system when handling different
agent populations, in which risk tolerance and social awareness distributions are
concerned. For that, a set of experiments were conducted using BCT (d) (see Fig-
ure 8.4). The BestPathMinimax strategy was used by all simulation agents. The
reader may want to observe Figure 8.9 again in order to recall the system’s behav-
ior when addressing a uniform distribution of agents (concerning risk-tolerance
and social-awareness).
8.5.1 Risk tolerance
With this first group of experiments we aimed at observing the behavior of the
deterrence sanction adaptation model when facing agent populations with differ-
ent risk tolerance distributions. In a population that tends to be more risk-averse,
higher fines should tend to decrease. In these experiments we used beta distribu-
tions centered at different risk tolerance values, in order to represent populations
having a predominance of agents with specific risk tolerances. For each beta dis-
tribution, we set α = 1 + (c ∗ p− c) and β = p− (c ∗ p− c), where c is the center
value and p is a peak factor that we have set to 100.
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Figure 8.16: Fine evolution for BCT (d) and BestPathMinimax : beta distribution
of risk tolerance centered at 0.4 and uniform distribution of social awareness.
Figure 8.17: Fine evolution for BCT (d) and BestPathMinimax : beta distribution
of risk tolerance centered at 0.3 and uniform distribution of social awareness.
Figures 8.16-8.19 show fine evolutions for different risk tolerance center values.
As expected, higher fines tend to decrease with lower risk tolerance values. This
is due to the fact that, when deciding whether to contract or not, agents compare
their risk tolerance with the highest applicable fine.
Another interesting observation is that while the highest fines tend to decrease,
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Figure 8.18: Fine evolution for BCT (d) and BestPathMinimax : beta distribution
of risk tolerance centered at 0.2 and uniform distribution of social awareness.
Figure 8.19: Fine evolution for BCT (d) and BestPathMinimax : beta distribution
of risk tolerance centered at 0.1 and uniform distribution of social awareness.
the system tries to compensate this potentially lower ability to ascertain the
desired level of compliance by increasing other sanctions. More specifically, since
fines 3 and 2 are lowered, they lose their effect on decisions taken at states 0 and
1, respectively. As a consequence, fines in these states are raised.
This outcome turns out to be an important emergent property of the nor-
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mative system: the ability to grasp interdependencies between fines applied to
different nodes in the BCT, without being preprogrammed to do so (the fine
update policy adapts fines in an independent way). Furthermore, such interde-
pendencies are caused by the in-contract strategy used by agents; if agents do
not take into account possible “future” fines when making a decision (as with
strategies i to vi introduced in Section 8.4.1), then the system behavior will not
pointlessly make a connection between fines.
8.5.2 Social awareness
With this second group of experiments we aimed at observing the behavior of
the deterrence sanction adaptation model when facing agent populations with
different social awareness distributions. In a population that tends to be more
socially concerned, fines should tend to decrease. Selfish agents will only fulfill if
it is in their own interest, while a higher social awareness impels agents to fulfill
even when they do not benefit directly from that option.
Figures 8.20-8.21 show fine evolutions for different social awareness center
values (using beta distributions as before). As expected, fines tend to increase
with lower social awareness values. By doing so, the system tries to discourage
commitment violations. The dependency mentioned before between fines is also
visible here: fines 3 and 2 tend to absorb the effects of fines 0 and 1 sooner for
higher social awareness values, and the system is able to find these intricacies.
8.6 Combining risk tolerance and social
awareness
By adjusting both parameters when setting up an agent population, we get a
combination of the effects identified above. Figure 8.22 shows what happens when
we set both risk tolerance and social awareness to beta distributions centered at
0.1. In this case, since highest fines are limited by a low risk tolerance, the system
raises fines 0 and 1 as much as it can, in order to try to force a population of
mostly self-interested and risk-averse agents to contract and also comply with
contractual commitments.
We should add that in these extreme and unlikely conditions the normative
system is not successful: the obtained fine levels are insufficient to force compli-
ance, and at the same time too demanding to motivate contractual activity. This
means that the few agents that do contract (which nevertheless are in essence risk-
averse) will violate their commitments (because they are also too self-interested).
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Figure 8.20: Fine evolution for BCT (d) and BestPathMinimax : uniform distri-
bution of risk tolerance and beta distrib. of social awareness centered at 0.5.
Figure 8.21: Fine evolution for BCT (d) and BestPathMinimax : uniform distri-
bution of risk tolerance and beta distrib. of social awareness centered at 0.1.
8.7 Discussion
Embedding adaptive enforcement mechanisms in normative frameworks is impor-
tant in open environments. Adapting deterrence levels to the behavior of an agent
population is important when the normative space has imperfections that make
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Figure 8.22: Fine evolution for BCT (d) and BestPathMinimax : beta distribu-
tions of risk tolerance and social awareness centered at 0.1.
contracts to which norms apply unfair, opening the possibility for self-interested
agents to exploit their potential advantage.
In this chapter we have presented a simple model for the adaptation of deter-
rence sanctions used in a normative framework. We have shown that it is feasible
to adapt deterrence levels to the behavior of an agent population: under uni-
form random distributions the system is able to adapt by appropriately raising
and stabilizing fine values. This adaptive capability can be included in the set
of the major contributions of this thesis. We have built an abstraction for con-
tractual commitments by modeling their corresponding obligations in a binary
commitment tree structure. In such a tree we are able to include both “to-duty”
complementary obligations and contrary-to-duty retribution sanctions. This ab-
stract representation allows us to consider contracts of arbitrary complexity.
This preliminary research on enforcement mechanisms to be included in an
institutional normative environment has been published in [142] and [145].
8.7.1 Characterizing agent behavior
We have studied how an adaptive deterrence sanctioning model, while trying to
“maintain order”, responds when facing different agent populations. Such pop-
ulations were characterized by a predominant level of risk tolerance and social
awareness. The use of a social awareness parameter tries to take into account het-
erogeneous social attitudes. Configuring agents with different risk attitudes was
inspired by the economic theory on deterrence sanctions [177], stating that agents
incur a risk when making contracts that are subject to deterrence sanctions.
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The parameterization of agents with different social attitudes is common in
computational models for social interactions. Boella and van der Torre [22] dis-
tinguish three types of agents, according to how they are able to deal with norms.
Norm internalizing agents shape their decision-making through the adoption of
norms: they no longer waste any time deciding on whether to fulfill a norm once
it has been internalized. Respectful agents fulfill obligations simply because obli-
gations should be fulfilled, irrelevant of there being associated sanctions in case
of violation (Castelfranchi [34] considers that the presence of external control
through sanctions is a sub-ideal situation). Finally, selfish agents are those that
fulfill obligations only if they prefer to do so, i.e., if the situation resulting from
fulfilling is preferred (taking into account applicable sanctions in case of violation)
according to their own goals and desires.
Norm internalization has been studied in social sciences, and also in the con-
text of the EMIL project [5]. Norm internalization is seen as a less costly and
more reliable enforcement mechanism than social control. By internalizing a
norm, agents detach norm fulfillment from any outside enforcement mechanisms.
Andrighetto et al. [4] present an architecture for normative agents that in-
cludes normative-BDI notions. A normative belief (created by a norm recognition
process) is a mental representation that a given action is either obligatory, for-
bidden or permitted. A normative goal (created by a norm adoption process)
is an internal goal relativized to a normative belief: the goal will be pursued
because the underlying action is believed to be prescribed by a norm. Conte et
al. [41] further extend this work to identify the mental underpinnings of norm
internalization processes. They claim that compliance is more robust if norms
are internalized: compliance becomes independent of external sanctioning enti-
ties. Furthermore, norm internalizing agents are supposed to be much better at
defending the norms because they have an incentive to punish agents who do not
comply with them. This, in turn, is seen as an indispensable tool for distributed
social control. However, some researchers (e.g. [201]) advocate that these virtues
are only long lasting if an external sanctioning system is never completely aban-
doned, basing their arguments on reinforcement learning theory.
8.7.2 Social control
Our experimental evaluations show that imposed fines tend to be lower when
agents are more risk-averse or more socially concerned. We also observed that
when a combination of sanctions is able to drive agents to comply with their com-
mitments, the adaptive mechanism is able to pursue such a combination when
constraints limit some options – such constraints are rooted in the agent popu-
lation (namely in the predominant risk tolerance), and are implicitly captured
in the fine update policy. This ability is an interesting emergent property of the
system.
Influencing agent decision making regarding social commitments is generally
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conceived as social control [34], and is usually focused on enforcement, sanctions
and reputation. A different perspective has been taken by Brafman and Ten-
nenholtz in [25], where some agents in the system are directly controlled by the
system’s designer. Making such agents play specific strategies will lower the pay-
off of joint activities when uncontrolled agents play selfishly, therefore making
them choose to fulfill. This seems unrealistic in contracting scenarios. Yet, the
authors have made a theoretical analysis in scenarios where uncontrolled agents
are expected utility maximizers and when they are reinforcement learners. Such
scenarios can be tested in our simulation model as well.
Dynamic properties of normative systems have been studied from different
perspectives. In [204], Sen and Airiau look at norms as patterns of behavior
that may emerge bottom-up from agent interactions. In our case, however, the
normative system is external to the agents, and we seek to adapt it to a specific
agent population in order to pursue an overall system goal.
Sanction-based self-adaptation of institutional normative environments is also
studied by Campos et al. in [31], with two significant differences to our approach.
First, their adaptation model is based on the definition of domain-dependent
transition functions, stating what specific change should be made in a specific
norm when some goal specification is not met. Second, their model does not
assume strict liability: agents are able to violate norms while not being detected.
In the work presented in this chapter we have not considered the influence of
reputation on agent’s contractual behavior. It has been argued [153] that in the
presence of reputation mechanisms there is a lesser need for deterrence policies.
We believe that positive reputation updates triggered by the normative environ-
ment may be an incentive for agents to fulfill their commitments. The interplay
between a normative environment and computational trust and reputation mea-
sures lies in the core of the Electronic Institution Platform project, as described
in Chapter 4.

Chapter9
Conclusions
The research work carried out in this thesis was centered around the role electronic
institutions can play in agent-based e-contracting. As the use of electronic means
for conducting business relations matures, the need for automated tools that ad-
dress e-contract handling will likely increase. At present times, the development
of such tools presents many technological, business and legal challenges [6]. Nev-
ertheless, cutting-edge research efforts are being made to address a vision of the
future Internet, where the number of business opportunities that are available
will increase exponentially. This will inevitably ask for automated tools, which
may well result from research efforts within the MAS research community.
This chapter looks back to the main research contributions of this thesis,
trying to comment on their virtues and shortcomings. We will also comment on
the potential application of our contributions in other domains, and outline some
lines of future work.
9.1 Main Achievements
In this section we will recover the research questions outlined in Section 1.3.1 and
explain how the research carried out has made its way in providing answers to
these questions.
The concept of electronic institution has been studied by several authors.
However, in our view none of the previous approaches has been directed towards
the application domain of e-contracting. This is why we have formulated the first
research question, which we here reproduce:
• How can the concept of Electronic Institution be adapted to address the
domain of agent-based e-contracting?
In respect to previous approaches, we have provided a new perspective on the
Electronic Institution (EI) concept, by giving it a more comprehensive nature.
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The EI is no longer a fully controlled environment implementing a predefined
interaction scheme (as in [68]), but instead includes a normative environment
whose normative framework, up to a certain extent, evolves through time as
agents establish contracts. Furthermore, the EI is seen as a software platform
providing a set of services that are articulated to provide assistance on agent-
mediated e-contracting activities, such as negotiation, contract drafting, contract
monitoring and enforcement.
Looking at the main subject of this work, which concerns the handling of
e-contracts (from their creation to their monitoring and enforcement), we get to
the core component of the EI, which consists of its normative environment. This
leads us to the second research question:
• What kind of e-contracting support should we embed in a normative envi-
ronment?
Two issues were addressed under this question: e-contract establishment and
monitoring. We observed that given the current state-of-the-art it is not likely to
have autonomous software agents creating e-contracts fully from scratch.
We have looked at what legal theory tells us about the use of contract clauses
applied in business, and have followed two main notions. The first is contractual
freedom: in principle, business partners are free to create contracts of arbitrary
content. The second is the notion of default rules as used in contract law: pre-
defined norms should be seen as facilitating rather than constraining contractual
activity.
Based on these assumptions, we have designed a model for norm inheritance
and defeasibility that enables the specification of a normative framework that can
address a rich set of contracting situations. We have illustrated this specification
both with one-off business cases (which were represented by contracts of sale) and
standing agreements (where parties establish cooperation agreements that span
several transactions over time). The normative framework is meant to facilitate
e-contract drafting, by providing a background normative core for specific types
of e-contracts. This alleviates the technological challenges raised by automated
e-contracting.
When considering the employment of this infrastructure in the real-world, a
major effort should be concentrated on knowledge engineering of norms applicable
to different business contexts, in order to maximize the usefulness of the normative
background. Legislative bodies or business practices in specific sectors can be
important sources for this task.
The proposed framework for contractual norms is both adaptable and ex-
tensible. By adaptable we mean that it is possible for contractual partners to
change the normative background that applies to a specific contract, following
the “default rules” principle as exposed above. Extensibility allows new types of
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e-contracts, which were not foreseen at design time, to be monitored by the nor-
mative environment, provided that such e-contracts are written in an appropriate
format (a contract schema) and include their own normative core.
We have used norm defeasibility as a design tool for our normative environ-
ment, instead of its most common use as a mechanism to solve deontic conflicts.
We believe that such conflicts are more likely to occur when the target actions
or states of affairs are defined abstractly and need to be interpreted or translated
into observable actions. In fact, legal texts usually make an intentional use of
vague concepts, allowing their interpretation and application to different situa-
tions. Although this is true, in our research we have not dealt with abstraction.
The hierarchical normative framework, combined with the constitutive nature of
counts-as conditionals, could however be exploited to define normative relations
with different degrees of abstraction. Moreover, since we are not dealing directly
with permission and prohibition (in contract law, obligation is the most important
deontic operator), deontic conflicts in a strict sense cannot occur.
Our approach leaves for the users of the normative environment the responsi-
bility of checking the correctness of the contracts they establish, from a normative
point of view. Formal verification techniques for e-contracts (such as those applied
in the CONTRACT project [132]) could be designed that check if the combination
of a normative background with contract-specific norms, as provided by our norm
defeasibility model, obtains a sound contractual relation for every participant.
Contract monitoring was also addressed by our research. We have defined
and implemented an infrastructure for run-time contract monitoring, based on
events that feed a set of monitoring rules. Norms that apply in specific situations
(following the defeasibility model already mentioned) are selected and used to
prescribe normative consequences. We have shown, through experimentation,
that the monitoring service correctly detects contract enactment anomalies, and
reacts by applying sanctioning norms as specified in the normative framework.
The examples provided show a variety of situations in which contract enactment
may go wrong, and the normative environment was able to correctly respond in
all cases.
A question that might be posed is whether it is plausible that this approach can
be applied to monitor real-world contracts. We have followed the assumption that
it is in the best interest of agents to inform the EI that they are complying with
their contractual commitments. In the future, the ubiquitous use of electronic
devices capturing and providing information about a vast amount of events should
help on relaxing this assumption.
Another criticism that might be pointed is the centralization of the norma-
tive environment and its associated contract monitoring facility. We have based
the normative environment implementation in Jess [82], a world-class rule-based
inference engine. Nevertheless, when going through the creation of e-contracts
in the order of thousands this centralization might not scale. The most natural
way to look at this is to replicate the Electronic Institution concept: we can
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have multiple EIs, for instance by having each specialized into a specific business
domain.
The third research question was:
• How should e-contracts be specified in order to enable their automatic pro-
cessing?
The search for answers to this question was interleaved with the previous one.
E-contract monitoring is dependent on a proper specification and representation
of e-contracts.
We have looked at e-contracts from the point of view of their representation
inside our structured normative environment. Here, an e-contract is translated
into a context, including: a reference to a parent context, on which the norm
inheritance and defeasibility model relies; the identification of the involved agents ;
a set of contextual information elements that specify roles, exchange values and
norm parameters; and optional contract-specific norms, which comprise specific
clauses that apply to a contract.
The e-contract schema that allows agents to use the normative environment
for monitoring purposes is in Appendix E.
When formalizing norms and their obligation prescriptions, we have also
looked at real-world practices from international trade regulations. We have
proposed a new model for contractual obligations : directed obligations with live-
lines and deadlines. Their semantics includes a flexible approach to the temporal
dimension of obligations, where counterparties are given the opportunity to par-
ticipate in the monitoring process.
Finally, the last research question has lead us to research further on the in-
stitutional nature of an EI:
• Which mechanisms may an Electronic Institution, and more specifically a
normative environment, put in practice to enforce e-contracts?
Prescribing contractual sanctions to autonomous entities is not enough as a
mechanism for contract enforcement. It is still up to the agents whether they
should fulfill sanctions. We have studied other kinds of responses an EI may
include in order to enforce compliance.
Looking at the overall EI architecture, one means to incentive norm compli-
ance is the use of trust and reputation mechanisms. While this issue is outside
the scope of this thesis, the implementation of the normative environment ac-
commodates a reporting feature that allows the environment to integrate with a
Trust and Reputation service (as explained in Section 4.1).
Inside the normative environment, we have also made an initial contribution
towards an adaptive model of deterrence sanctions. In this case, deterrence sanc-
tions are regimented: agents cannot escape them, e.g. because they were required,
upon entering the institution, to make a deposit that is under the control of the
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institution. Based on inputs from the fields of law and economics, we have de-
signed and experimentally evaluated a model for adaptive deterrence sanctions
that tries to enforce norm compliance without excessively compromising agents’
willingness to establish contracts. We have studied how the model, while trying
to force compliance, responds when facing different agent populations, which were
characterized by a predominant level of risk tolerance and social awareness. Our
experimental evaluations show that deterrence sanctions, which are materialized
through fines, tend to be lower when agents are more risk-averse or more socially
concerned. This means that social control is more needed when agents tend to
behave more selfishly, which is in accordance with real-life experience.
In Section 9.3 we identify some lines of research related with this issue that we
are currently dealing with. Before we do that, in the next section we try to take a
step back and look for other potential applications of our research contributions.
9.2 Enlarging the Application Domains
We have focused our research on the application of electronic institutions, and
more specifically institutional normative environments, in the field of electronic
contracting. Despite this biasing domain, we believe that the ingredients we have
put into our approach may be applicable in other areas.
We may characterize the class of problems that we are able to address as
follows. Some joint activity between a group of agents is to be regulated by
norms. This means that, although some kind of overarching goal is pursuit, we
have no direct control on the behavior that agents may exhibit. The activity to be
carried out may originate, at run-time, more short-termed sub-activities, which
may inherit the normative specifications of the overall activity. Since agents
are autonomous and may at times be more self-interested than team-players,
some kind of social control is needed to enforce norm compliance. We believe
that this broader perspective opens up the application domains of the research
contributions we have made.
In the field of Collaborative Networked Organizations, the governance of Vir-
tual Breeding Environments and the regulation of subsequently created Virtual
Enterprises seems to match the purpose of and the developments we have made
towards an institutional normative environment, particularly the context-based
hierarchical normative framework. Inheriting norms from a VBE into a VE meets
precisely the requirement of a fast set-up phase for VEs, by reducing the number
of issues that need to be taken into account [190]. Although there is a need to gen-
eralize the kinds of regulations that are supported by the normative environment,
this is a field where our contributions seem to be of value.
Some attempts have been made to apply organizational and normative notions
into intrinsically cooperative collective activities such as robot soccer (e.g. [108]).
In this case, using deontic notions does not hamper agent autonomy, as agents
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are still able to decide whether they comply with obligations, permissions or
prohibitions. It is less clear, however, what sanctioning mechanisms should there
be in this type of scenarios.
A research line that has been studied by many MAS researchers working with
norms and institutions is that of organizational modeling. In the literature we
can find some efforts on distinguishing institutions from organizations [167][101],
together with their electronic counterparts [226]. We have looked into electronic
institutions as computational infrastructures providing an operationalization of
institutional concepts, such as norms. Looking at organizational modeling, the
concept of a normative framework based on hierarchical contexts, such as we have
proposed, seems to match the notions of structure and hierarchy found within
organizations. Therefore, a possible extension of our work could be applied in
this field.
9.3 Research Connections and Further Work
The project behind this work covers a wide range of MAS research areas, some of
which we have already identified in Chapter 4. Each of these areas is very active
at the present, as shows the recent initiative Agreement Technologies European
Network (COST Action IC0801).
The efforts being put to develop an Electronic Institution Platform at LIACC-
NIAD&R are trying to complete the circle shown in Figure 4.1. Therefore, two
connections are made with the main subject of this thesis, which concerned the
specification and development of an institutional normative environment for e-
contracting. These can be seen as two important lines of further research, which
is taking place at present:
• Automatic negotiation of e-contracts: Instead of instantiating predefined
contract templates, the idea is to endow software agents with the ability to
automatically negotiate specific contract clauses, taking into account trust
information. Using the contract model already proposed in this thesis, we
will specify contracts that are amenable to be partially negotiated in an
automatic way, and negotiation protocols that address contract parameters
and clauses. Advanced contract negotiation strategies (e.g. based on argu-
mentation) need to be designed that allow agents to successfully negotiate
contracts.
• Trust and reputation based on past contractual behavior: As mentioned
before, the interface between the normative environment and a trust and
reputation service is already implemented. However, further research is
needed in this area in order to provide richer information to the computa-
tional trust and reputation model being developed [218].
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Another line of research that we are addressing is related to the enforcement
mechanisms that an EI may have at its disposal, continuing the initial contribu-
tion and simulation that we have included in this thesis. In particular, we are
investigating on the impact trust and reputation mechanisms may have on the
performance of contractual partners, and consequently on the need for other more
direct enforcement mechanisms.
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AppendixA
Jess Code Listing
; set conflict resolution strategy to breadth, in order to generate
; notification events in the same order as Jess facts occurrence
(set-strategy breadth)
; Java-implemented user functions
(deffunction schedule-time-alert ())
(deffunction norm-env-report ())
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;;; TEMPLATES
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;; Contexts
(deftemplate MAIN::context
"Context for norms"
(slot id)
(slot super-context (default INSTITUTIONAL-NORMS))
(slot when)
(multislot who) )
(deftemplate MAIN::contextual-info
"Contextual information"
(slot context) )
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;; Institutional reality
(deftemplate MAIN::IRE
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"Institutional reality element"
(declare (slot-specific TRUE))
(slot context (default INSTITUTIONAL-NORMS))
(slot when (default-dynamic (call System currentTimeMillis)))
(slot processing-context) ) ; used by context-handling rules
(deftemplate MAIN::start-context extends IRE
"To indicate that a context has started" )
(deftemplate MAIN::end-context extends IRE
"To indicate that a context has ended" )
(deftemplate MAIN::active-context
"To indicate that a context is active"
(slot context) )
(defrule MAIN::active-context-rule
"Active context state"
(logical (start-context (context ?ctx)))
(logical (not (end-context (context ?ctx))))
=>
(assert (active-context (context ?ctx))) )
(deftemplate MAIN::ifact extends IRE
"Institutional fact"
(multislot fact) ) ; ontology for institutional-facts goes here...
(deftemplate MAIN::time extends IRE
"Time event" )
(deftemplate MAIN::obligation extends IRE
"Obligation"
(slot bearer)
(slot counterparty)
(multislot fact) ; ontology for institutional-facts goes here...
(slot liveline (default 0)) ; 0 indicates no liveline
(slot deadline) )
(deftemplate MAIN::liveline-violation extends IRE
"Liveline violation of an obligation"
(slot obl)
(slot ifa) )
(deftemplate MAIN::deadline-violation extends IRE
"Deadline violation of an obligation"
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(slot obl) )
(deftemplate MAIN::fulfillment extends IRE
"Obligation fulfillment"
(slot obl)
(slot ifa) )
(deftemplate MAIN::violation extends IRE
"Obligation violation"
(slot obl) )
(deftemplate MAIN::denounce extends IRE
"Temporal violation denouncement"
(slot obl) )
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;; Brute facts
(deftemplate MAIN::bfact
"Brute fact"
(slot agent)
(slot context)
(multislot statement) ; ontology for brute-facts goes here...
(slot when) )
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;; Role enacting agents
(deftemplate MAIN::rea
"Role enacting agent - agent takes a role"
(slot agent)
(slot role) )
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;;; CONSTITUTIVE RULES
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
(defmodule CONSTITUTIVE-RULES
"Constitutive rules"
(declare (auto-focus TRUE)) )
(defrule CONSTITUTIVE-RULES::payments
"Constitutive rule for acknowledging payments"
(bfact (agent ?a) (context ?ctx)
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(statement currency-transfered $?data)
(when ?wh) )
(active-context (context ?ctx)) ; check that context is active
(rea (agent ?a) (role Bank))
=>
(assert (ifact (context ?ctx) (fact payment $?data) (when ?wh))) )
(defrule CONSTITUTIVE-RULES::deliveries
"Constitutive rule for acknowledging deliveries"
(bfact (agent ?a) (context ?ctx )
(statement delivered $?data)
(when ?wh) )
(active-context (context ?ctx)) ; check that context is active
(rea (agent ?a) (role DeliveryTracker))
=>
(assert (ifact (context ?ctx) (fact delivery $?data) (when ?wh))) )
(defrule CONSTITUTIVE-RULES::msg-deliveries
"Constitutive rule for acknowledging msg-deliveries"
(bfact (agent ?a) (context ?ctx)
(statement msg-delivered $?data)
(when ?wh) )
(active-context (context ?ctx)) ; check that context is active
(rea (agent ?a) (role Messenger))
=>
(assert (ifact (context ?ctx) (fact msg-delivery $?data) (when ?wh))) )
(defrule CONSTITUTIVE-RULES::denounces
"Acknowledging denounces"
(ifact (context ?ctx)
(fact msg-delivery ref ? from ?fr to ?to msg denounce $?fact)
(when ?wh) )
?obl <- (obligation (context ?ctx) (bearer ?to) (counterparty ?fr)
(fact $?fact))
=>
(assert (denounce (context ?ctx) (obl ?obl) (when ?wh))) )
(defrule CONSTITUTIVE-RULES::msg-types
"Acknowledging a message type (orders, ...)"
(ifact (context ?ctx)
(fact msg-delivery ref ?ref from ?fr to ?to
msg ?msg-type $?msg-contents)
(when ?wh))
=>
(assert (ifact (context ?ctx)
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(fact ?msg-type ref ?ref from ?fr to ?to $?msg-contents)
(when ?wh) ) ) )
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;;; INSTITUTIONAL RULES
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
(defmodule INSTITUTIONAL-RULES
"Institutional rules"
(declare (auto-focus TRUE)) )
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;; contract starting
(defrule INSTITUTIONAL-RULES::schedule-start-time-alert
"Schedule a time event for the start of a context’s life"
(context (id ?ctx) (when ?w))
=>
(schedule-time-alert ?ctx ?w) )
(defrule INSTITUTIONAL-RULES::context-start
"Signal the start of a context"
(context (id ?ctx) (when ?w))
(time (context ?ctx) (when ?w))
=>
(assert (start-context (context ?ctx) (when ?w))) )
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;; time events for directed obligations with livelines and deadlines
(defrule INSTITUTIONAL-RULES::schedule-liveline-time-alert
"Schedule a time event at an obligation’s liveline"
?obl <- (obligation {liveline > 0}) ; only if liveline is defined
=>
(schedule-time-alert ?obl.context ?obl.liveline) )
(defrule INSTITUTIONAL-RULES::schedule-deadline-time-alert
"Schedule a time event at an obligation’s deadline"
?obl <- (obligation)
=>
(schedule-time-alert ?obl.context ?obl.deadline) )
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;; semantics of directed obligations with livelines and deadlines
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(defrule INSTITUTIONAL-RULES::detect-liveline-violation
"Detect a livelive violation of an obligation"
?obl <- (obligation (context ?c) (fact $?f) (liveline ?liveline))
?ifa <- (ifact (context ?c) (fact $?f) {when < ?liveline})
=>
(assert (liveline-violation (context ?c) (when ?ifa.when)
(obl ?obl) (ifa ?ifa))) )
(defrule INSTITUTIONAL-RULES::detect-early-fulfillment
"Detect an early fulfillment of an obligation, at the liveline"
?lviol <- (liveline-violation (context ?c) (obl ?obl))
?obl <- (obligation (context ?c) (liveline ?liveline))
; livelive before denouncement
(time (context ?c) (when ?liveline))
(not (denounce (context ?c) (obl ?obl) {when <= ?liveline}))
=>
(assert (fulfillment (context ?c) (when ?liveline)
(obl ?obl) (ifa ?lviol.ifa))) )
(defrule INSTITUTIONAL-RULES::detect-violation-before-liveline
"Detect the violation of an obligation before the liveline"
?lviol <- (liveline-violation (context ?c) (obl ?obl))
?obl <- (obligation (context ?c) (liveline ?liveline))
; denouncement before liveline
?den <- (denounce (context ?c) (obl ?obl) {when < ?liveline})
=>
(assert (violation (context ?c) (when ?den.when) (obl ?obl))) )
(defrule INSTITUTIONAL-RULES::detect-fulfillment
"Detect the fulfillment of an obligation"
?obl <- (obligation (context ?c) (fact $?f)
(liveline ?liveline) (deadline ?deadline))
?ifa <- (ifact (context ?c) (fact $?f)
{when >= ?liveline && when <= ?deadline})
=>
(assert (fulfillment (context ?c) (when (max ?ifa.when ?obl.when))
(obl ?obl) (ifa ?ifa) ) ) )
(defrule INSTITUTIONAL-RULES::detect-deadline-violation
"Detect a deadline violation of an obligation"
?obl <- (obligation (context ?c) (fact $?f) (deadline ?deadline))
(time (context ?c) (when ?deadline))
(not (ifact (context ?c) (fact $?f) {when <= ?deadline}))
=>
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(assert (deadline-violation (context ?c) (when ?deadline)
(obl ?obl))) )
(defrule INSTITUTIONAL-RULES::detect-belated-fulfillment
"Detect a belated fulfillment of an obligation"
?dviol <- (deadline-violation (context ?c) (obl ?obl))
?obl <- (obligation (context ?c) (fact $?f))
; ifact before denouncement
?ifa <- (ifact (context ?c) (fact $?f) (when ?when))
(not (denounce (context ?c) (obl ?obl) {when <= ?when}))
=>
(assert (fulfillment (context ?c) (when ?when)
(obl ?obl) (ifa ?ifa))) )
(defrule INSTITUTIONAL-RULES::detect-violation-after-deadline
"Detect the violation of an obligation after the deadline"
?dviol <- (deadline-violation (context ?c) (obl ?obl))
?obl <- (obligation (context ?c) (fact $?f))
; denouncement before ifact
(denounce (context ?c) (obl ?obl) (when ?when))
(not (ifact (context ?c) (fact $?f) {when < ?when}))
=>
(assert (violation (context ?c) (when ?when) (obl ?obl))) )
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;; reports
(defrule INSTITUTIONAL-RULES::new-contract-report
"Report a new contract"
?ctxDef <- (context)
=>
(norm-env-report ?ctxDef) )
(defrule INSTITUTIONAL-RULES::ire-report
"Report an IRE"
?ire <- (IRE)
=>
(norm-env-report ?ire) )
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;;; PROCESSING-CONTEXT MANAGEMENT RULES
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
(defrule MAIN::new-ire-processing-context
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"When a new IRE is created, set its processing-context"
?ire <- (IRE (context ?ctx) (processing-context nil))
(active-context (context ?ctx)) ; check that context is active
=>
(modify ?ire (processing-context ?ctx)) )
(defrule MAIN::update-ire-processing-context
"Update IRE processing-context"
(declare (salience -100)) ; make this rule fire last (after norms)
?ire <- (IRE (processing-context ?pc))
(context (id ?pc) (super-context ?sc))
=>
(modify ?ire (processing-context ?sc)) )
(defrule MAIN::finish-ire-processing-context
"Finish IRE processing-context"
(declare (salience -100)) ; make this rule fire last (after norms)
?ire <- (IRE (processing-context INSTITUTIONAL-NORMS))
=>
(modify ?ire (processing-context VOID)) )
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;;; INSTITUTIONAL NORMS (TOP LEVEL "DEFAULT RULES")
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
(deftemplate MAIN::norm-fired-on
"To register the state fractions (IREs) on which norms fire"
(multislot ires) ; the IRE’s on which a norm fired
(slot context) ) ; the context of the firing norm
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;; INSTITUTIONAL-NORMS module definition
(defmodule INSTITUTIONAL-NORMS
"Institutional norms (default rules at top institutional context)"
(declare (auto-focus TRUE)) )
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;;; MISCELANEOUS FUNCTIONS AND QUERIES
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
; deffunction equal-sets? - used by norms
(deffunction equal-sets? (?list1 ?list2)
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"Test if two lists are sets with the same elements, in any order"
(return (= (length$ ?list1)
(length$ ?list2)
(length$ (union$ ?list1 ?list2)))) )
; template and fact for scheduling time events
; at norm’s pattern matching phase
(deftemplate time-scheduler
(declare (ordered TRUE)))
(deffacts time-scheduler-fact
(time-scheduler _) )
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;;; RESET
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
(reset)

AppendixB
Contract of Sale
(deftemplate MAIN::contract-of-sale extends contract
"A contract of sale between a seller and a buyer" )
(deftemplate MAIN::contract-of-sale-data extends contextual-info
"Data for contract of sale"
(slot seller)
(slot buyer)
(slot product)
(slot quantity (default 1))
(slot unit-price (default 0.0))
(slot delivery-rel-liveline (default 0))
(slot delivery-rel-deadline (default 5000))
(slot payment-rel-deadline (default 30000)) )
(defrule INSTITUTIONAL-NORMS::CoS_delivery
"Seller obligation to deliver the product"
(contract-of-sale (id ?ctx))
(contract-of-sale-data (context ?ctx) (seller ?s) (buyer ?b)
(product ?p) (quantity ?q)
(delivery-rel-liveline ?drl) (delivery-rel-deadline ?drd) )
(start-context (context ?ctx) (when ?w))
=>
(assert (obligation (context ?ctx) (bearer ?s) (counterparty ?b)
(liveline (+ ?w ?drl)) (deadline (+ ?w ?drd))
(fact delivery ref ?ctx from ?s to ?b
product ?p quantity ?q) ) ) )
(defrule INSTITUTIONAL-NORMS::CoS_payment
"After delivery, buyer obligation to pay"
(contract-of-sale (id ?ctx))
(contract-of-sale-data (context ?ctx) (seller ?s) (buyer ?b)
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(quantity ?q) (unit-price ?up) (payment-rel-deadline ?prd) )
(fulfillment (context ?ctx) (obl ?obl) (when ?w))
?obl <- (obligation (context ?ctx) (bearer ?s) (counterparty ?b)
(fact delivery $?) )
=>
(assert (obligation (context ?ctx) (bearer ?b) (counterparty ?s)
(deadline (+ ?w ?prd))
(fact payment ref ?ctx from ?b to ?s
amount (* ?q ?up)) ) ) )
(defrule INSTITUTIONAL-NORMS::CoS_no-delivery
"Delivery violation leads to contract end"
(contract-of-sale (id ?ctx))
(violation (context ?ctx) (obl ?obl) (when ?w))
?obl <- (obligation (context ?ctx) (fact delivery $?) )
=>
(assert (end-context (context ?ctx) (when ?w))) )
(defrule INSTITUTIONAL-NORMS::CoS_no-payment
"Payment deadline violation leads to interest"
(contract-of-sale (id ?ctx))
(contract-of-sale-data (context ?ctx) (seller ?s) (buyer ?b)
(payment-rel-deadline ?prd) )
(deadline-violation (context ?ctx) (obl ?obl) (when ?w))
?obl <- (obligation (context ?ctx) (bearer ?b) (counterparty ?s)
(fact payment ref ?ctx $? amount ?a) )
=>
(assert (obligation (context ?ctx) (bearer ?b) (counterparty ?s)
(deadline (+ ?w ?prd))
(fact payment ref interest from ?b to ?s
amount (* ?a 0.1)) ) ) )
(defrule INSTITUTIONAL-NORMS::CoS_end-of-contract
"Delivery and payments done lead to end of contract"
(contract-of-sale (id ?ctx))
(fulfillment (context ?ctx) (obl ?obl_del) (when ?w_del))
?obl_del <- (obligation (context ?ctx) (fact delivery ref ?ctx $?))
(fulfillment (context ?ctx) (obl ?obl_pay) (when ?w_pay))
?obl_pay <- (obligation (context ?ctx) (fact payment ref ?ref $?))
(not (and ?obl <- (obligation (context ?ctx) (fact payment $?))
(not (fulfillment (context ?ctx) (obl ?obl))) ) )
=>
(assert (end-context (context ?ctx) (when (max ?w_del ?w_pay)))) )
AppendixC
Contract Enactments
f-31 (start-context (context CoS-T12) (when 1279818137340))
f-33 (obligation (context CoS-T12) (when 1279818137347)
(bearer ForOffice) (counterparty LIACC)
(fact delivery ref CoS-T12 from ForOffice to LIACC
product computer-desk quantity 10)
(liveline 1279818140340) (deadline 1279818142340))
f-36 (time (context CoS-T12) (when 1279818140340))
f-38 * (ifact (context CoS-T12) (when 1279818140872)
(fact delivery ref CoS-T12 from ForOffice to LIACC
product computer-desk quantity 10))
f-39 (fulfillment (context CoS-T12) (when 1279818140872)
(obl <Fact-33>) (ifa <Fact-38>))
f-40 (obligation (context CoS-T12) (when 1279818140888)
(bearer LIACC) (counterparty ForOffice)
(fact payment ref CoS-T12 from LIACC to ForOffice
amount 200.0)
(liveline 0) (deadline 1279818170872))
f-45 * (ifact (context CoS-T12) (when 1279818158421)
(fact payment ref CoS-T12 from LIACC to ForOffice
amount 200.0))
f-46 (fulfillment (context CoS-T12) (when 1279818158421)
(obl <Fact-40>) (ifa <Fact-45>))
f-47 (end-context (context CoS-T12) (when 1279818158421))
Figure C.1: Typical contract of sale: a perfect enactment.
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f-34 (start-context (context CoS-T12) (when 1279814477907))
f-36 (obligation (context CoS-T12) (when 1279814477992)
(bearer ForOffice) (counterparty LIACC)
(fact delivery ref CoS-T12 from ForOffice to LIACC
product computer-desk quantity 10)
(liveline 1279814480907) (deadline 1279814482907))
f-39 * (ifact (context CoS-T12) (when 1279814479318)
(fact delivery ref CoS-T12 from ForOffice to LIACC
product computer-desk quantity 10))
f-40 (liveline-violation (context CoS-T12) (when 1279814479318)
(obl <Fact-36>) (ifa <Fact-39>))
f-42 (time (context CoS-T12) (when 1279814480907))
f-43 (fulfillment (context CoS-T12) (when 1279814480907)
(obl <Fact-36>) (ifa <Fact-39>))
f-44 (obligation (context CoS-T12) (when 1279814480909)
(bearer LIACC) (counterparty ForOffice)
(fact payment ref CoS-T12 from LIACC to ForOffice
amount 200.0)
(liveline 0) (deadline 1279814510907))
f-49 * (ifact (context CoS-T12) (when 1279814483701)
(fact payment ref CoS-T12 from LIACC to ForOffice
amount 200.0))
f-50 (fulfillment (context CoS-T12) (when 1279814483701)
(obl <Fact-44>) (ifa <Fact-49>))
f-51 (end-context (context CoS-T12) (when 1279814483701))
Figure C.2: Typical contract of sale: delivery liveline violation without denounce.
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f-35 (start-context (context CoS-T12) (when 1279818981791))
f-37 (obligation (context CoS-T12) (when 1279818982146)
(bearer ForOffice) (counterparty LIACC)
(fact delivery ref CoS-T12 from ForOffice to LIACC
product computer-desk quantity 10)
(liveline 1279818984791) (deadline 1279818986791))
f-40 (time (context CoS-T12) (when 1279818984791))
f-42 (time (context CoS-T12) (when 1279818986791))
f-43 (deadline-violation (context CoS-T12) (when 1279818986791)
(obl <Fact-37>))
f-45 * (ifact (context CoS-T12) (when 1279818988248)
(fact delivery ref CoS-T12 from ForOffice to LIACC
product computer-desk quantity 10))
f-46 (fulfillment (context CoS-T12) (when 1279818988248)
(obl <Fact-37>) (ifa <Fact-45>))
f-47 (obligation (context CoS-T12) (when 1279818988264)
(bearer LIACC) (counterparty ForOffice)
(fact payment ref CoS-T12 from LIACC to ForOffice
amount 200.0)
(liveline 0) (deadline 1279819018248))
f-50 * (ifact (context CoS-T12) (when 1279818995238)
(fact payment ref CoS-T12 from LIACC to ForOffice
amount 200.0))
f-51 (fulfillment (context CoS-T12) (when 1279818995238)
(obl <Fact-47>) (ifa <Fact-50>))
f-52 (end-context (context CoS-T12) (when 1279818995238))
Figure C.3: Typical contract of sale: delivery deadline violation without de-
nounce.
f-31 (start-context (context CoS-T12) (when 1279820306028))
f-33 (obligation (context CoS-T12) (when 1279820306035)
(bearer ForOffice) (counterparty LIACC)
(fact delivery ref CoS-T12 from ForOffice to LIACC
product computer-desk quantity 10)
(liveline 1279820309028) (deadline 1279820311028))
f-36 (time (context CoS-T12) (when 1279820309028))
f-38 (time (context CoS-T12) (when 1279820311028))
f-39 (deadline-violation (context CoS-T12) (when 1279820311028)
(obl <Fact-33>))
f-41 * (ifact (context CoS-T12) (when 1279820311089)
(fact msg-delivery ref CoS-T12 from LIACC to ForOffice
msg denounce delivery ref CoS-T12 from ForOffice to LIACC
product computer-desk quantity 10))
f-43 (denounce (context CoS-T12) (when 1279820311089) (obl <Fact-33>))
f-44 (violation (context CoS-T12) (when 1279820311089) (obl <Fact-33>))
f-45 (end-context (context CoS-T12) (when 1279820311089))
Figure C.4: Typical contract of sale: delivery deadline violation with denounce.
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f-38 (start-context (context CoS-T12) (when 1279969377975))
f-40 (obligation (context CoS-T12) (when 1279969377982)
(bearer ForOffice) (counterparty LIACC)
(fact delivery ref CoS-T12 from ForOffice to LIACC
product computer-desk quantity 10)
(liveline 1279969380975) (deadline 1279969382975))
f-43 (time (context CoS-T12) (when 1279969380975))
f-45 * (ifact (context CoS-T12) (when 1279969381804)
(fact delivery ref CoS-T12 from ForOffice to LIACC
product computer-desk quantity 10))
f-46 (fulfillment (context CoS-T12) (when 1279969381804)
(obl <Fact-40>) (ifa <Fact-45>))
f-47 (obligation (context CoS-T12) (when 1279969381819)
(bearer LIACC) (counterparty ForOffice)
(fact payment ref CoS-T12 from LIACC to ForOffice
amount 200.0)
(liveline 0) (deadline 1279969411804))
f-52 (time (context CoS-T12) (when 1279969411804))
f-53 (deadline-violation (context CoS-T12) (when 1279969411804)
(obl <Fact-47>))
f-54 (obligation (context CoS-T12) (when 1279969411816)
(bearer LIACC) (counterparty ForOffice)
(fact payment ref interest from LIACC to ForOffice
amount 20.0)
(liveline 0) (deadline 1279969441804))
f-57 * (ifact (context CoS-T12) (when 1279969417837)
(fact payment ref CoS-T12 from LIACC to ForOffice
amount 200.0))
f-58 (fulfillment (context CoS-T12) (when 1279969417837)
(obl <Fact-47>) (ifa <Fact-57>))
f-60 * (ifact (context CoS-T12) (when 1279969438147)
(fact payment ref interest from LIACC to ForOffice
amount 20.0))
f-61 (fulfillment (context CoS-T12) (when 1279969438147)
(obl <Fact-54>) (ifa <Fact-60>))
f-62 (end-context (context CoS-T12) (when 1279969438147))
Figure C.5: Typical contract of sale: payment deadline violation.
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f-40 (start-context (context CoS-A12) (when 1280227000680))
f-42 (obligation (context CoS-A12) (when 1280227000689)
(bearer CPUStore) (counterparty LIACC)
(fact delivery ref CoS-A12 from CPUStore to LIACC
product laptop-computer quantity 1)
(liveline 1280227000680) (deadline 1280227005680))
f-46 * (ifact (context CoS-A12) (when 1280227001453)
(fact delivery ref CoS-A12 from CPUStore to LIACC
product laptop-computer quantity 1))
f-47 (fulfillment (context CoS-A12) (when 1280227001453)
(obl <Fact-42>) (ifa <Fact-46>))
f-52 (time (context CoS-A12) (when 1280227011453))
f-61 (obligation (context CoS-A12) (when 1280227011467)
(bearer LIACC) (counterparty CPUStore)
(fact payment ref CoS-A12 from LIACC to CPUStore
amount 800.0)
(liveline 0) (deadline 1280227031453))
f-64 * (ifact (context CoS-A12) (when 1280227016007)
(fact payment ref CoS-A12 from LIACC to CPUStore
amount 800.0))
f-65 (fulfillment (context CoS-A12) (when 1280227016007)
(obl <Fact-61>) (ifa <Fact-64>))
f-66 (end-context (context CoS-A12) (when 1280227016007))
Figure C.6: Atypical contract of sale: a perfect enactment.
f-32 (start-context (context CoS-A12) (when 1280248565351))
f-34 (obligation (context CoS-A12) (when 1280248565359)
(bearer CPUStore) (counterparty LIACC)
(fact delivery ref CoS-A12 from CPUStore to LIACC
product laptop-computer quantity 1)
(liveline 1280248565351) (deadline 1280248570351))
f-38 * (ifact (context CoS-A12) (when 1280248566779)
(fact delivery ref CoS-A12 from CPUStore to LIACC
product laptop-computer quantity 1))
f-39 (fulfillment (context CoS-A12) (when 1280248566779)
(obl <Fact-34>) (ifa <Fact-38>))
f-44 * (ifact (context CoS-A12) (when 1280248571817)
(fact delivery ref return from LIACC to CPUStore
product laptop-computer quantity 1))
f-45 (end-context (context CoS-A12) (when 1280248571817))
Figure C.7: Atypical contract of sale: product is returned.
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f-84 (start-context (context Cluster-12345) (when 1280414525379))
f-85 (start-context (context CA-123) (when 1280414525382))
f-88 * (ifact (context CA-123) (when 1280414533596)
(fact order ref 1 from E3 to E1 product motherboard quantity 90))
f-89 (obligation (context CA-123) (when 1280414533596)
(bearer E1) (counterparty E3)
(fact accept ref 1 from E1 to E3 product motherboard quantity 90)
(liveline 0) (deadline 1280414538596))
f-92 * (ifact (context CA-123) (when 1280414533741)
(fact accept ref 1 from E1 to E3 product motherboard quantity 90))
f-93 (fulfillment (context CA-123) (when 1280414533741)
(obl <Fact-89>) (ifa <Fact-92>))
f-95 (contract-of-sale (id CoS-T1464) (super-context CA-123)
(when 1280414533741) (who E1 E3))
f-96 (contract-of-sale-data (context CoS-T1464) (seller E1) (buyer E3)
(product motherboard) (quantity 90) (unit-price 40.0)
(delivery-rel-liveline 0) (delivery-rel-deadline 5000)
(payment-rel-deadline 30000))
f-99 (time (context CoS-T1464) (when 1280414533741))
f-100 (start-context (context CoS-T1464) (when 1280414533741))
f-102 (obligation (context CoS-T1464) (when 1280414533832)
(bearer E1) (counterparty E3)
(fact delivery ref CoS-T1464 from E1 to E3
product motherboard quantity 90)
(liveline 1280414533741) (deadline 1280414538741))
f-108 * (ifact (context CoS-T1464) (when 1280414538030)
(fact delivery ref CoS-T1464 from E1 to E3
product motherboard quantity 90))
f-109 (fulfillment (context CoS-T1464) (when 1280414538030)
(obl <Fact-102>) (ifa <Fact-108>))
f-110 (obligation (context CoS-T1464) (when 1280414538049)
(bearer E3) (counterparty E1)
(fact payment ref CoS-T1464 from E3 to E1 amount 3600.0)
(liveline 0) (deadline 1280414568030))
f-117 * (ifact (context CoS-T1464) (when 1280414562134)
(fact payment ref CoS-T1464 from E3 to E1 amount 3600.0))
f-118 (fulfillment (context CoS-T1464) (when 1280414562134)
(obl <Fact-110>) (ifa <Fact-117>))
f-119 (end-context (context CoS-T1464) (when 1280414562134))
Figure C.8: Cooperation agreement: order leading to contract of sale.
AppendixD
Car Insurance Scenario
D.1 Car Insurance Workflow Contract
(workflow-contract
(id WfC-car-insurance)
(when ...)
(who policyholder agfil euro_assist lee_cs garage assessor) )
(action (context WfC-car-insurance) (name phoneClaim)
(sender policyholder) (receiver euro_assist) )
(action (context WfC-car-insurance) (name receiveInfo)
(sender policyholder) (receiver euro_assist) (rel-deadline 1000) )
(action (context WfC-car-insurance) (name assignGarage)
(sender euro_assist) (receiver policyholder) (rel-deadline 1000) )
(action (context WfC-car-insurance) (name sendCar)
(sender policyholder) (receiver garage) (rel-deadline 1000) )
(action (context WfC-car-insurance) (name estimateRepairCost)
(sender garage) (receiver policyholder) (rel-deadline 2000) )
(action (context WfC-car-insurance) (name notifyClaim)
(sender euro_assist) (receiver agfil) (rel-deadline 1000) )
(action (context WfC-car-insurance) (name forwardClaim)
(sender agfil) (receiver lee_cs) (rel-deadline 1000) )
(action (context WfC-car-insurance) (name contactGarage)
(sender lee_cs) (receiver garage) (rel-deadline 1000) )
(action (context WfC-car-insurance) (name sendClaimForm)
(sender agfil) (receiver policyholder) (rel-deadline 2000) )
(action (context WfC-car-insurance) (name returnClaimForm)
(sender policyholder) (receiver agfil) (rel-deadline 7000) )
(action (context WfC-car-insurance) (name sendRepairCost)
(sender garage) (receiver lee_cs) (rel-deadline 1000) )
(action (context WfC-car-insurance) (name assignAssessor)
(sender lee_cs) (receiver assessor) (rel-deadline 1000) )
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(action (context WfC-car-insurance) (name inspectCar)
(sender assessor) (receiver lee_cs) (rel-deadline 1000) )
(action (context WfC-car-insurance) (name sendNewRepairCost)
(sender assessor) (receiver lee_cs) (rel-deadline 3000) )
(action (context WfC-car-insurance) (name agreeRepair)
(sender lee_cs) (receiver garage) (rel-deadline 3000) )
(action (context WfC-car-insurance) (name repairCar)
(sender garage) (receiver policyholder) (rel-deadline 5000) )
(action (context WfC-car-insurance) (name sendInvoice)
(sender garage) (receiver lee_cs) (rel-deadline 10000) )
(action (context WfC-car-insurance) (name forwardInvoice)
(sender lee_cs) (receiver agfil) (rel-deadline 6000) )
(action (context WfC-car-insurance) (name payRepairCost)
(sender agfil) (receiver garage) (rel-deadline 30000) )
(constraint (context WfC-car-insurance)
(action1 phoneClaim) (action2 receiveInfo) )
(constraint (context WfC-car-insurance)
(action1 receiveInfo) (action2 assignGarage) )
(constraint (context WfC-car-insurance)
(action1 receiveInfo) (action2 notifyClaim) )
(constraint (context WfC-car-insurance)
(action1 assignGarage) (action2 sendCar) )
(constraint (context WfC-car-insurance)
(action1 sendCar) (action2 estimateRepairCost) )
(constraint (context WfC-car-insurance)
(action1 notifyClaim) (action2 forwardClaim) )
(constraint (context WfC-car-insurance)
(action1 notifyClaim) (action2 sendClaimForm) )
(constraint (context WfC-car-insurance)
(action1 forwardClaim) (action2 contactGarage) )
(constraint (context WfC-car-insurance)
(action1 sendClaimForm) (action2 returnClaimForm) )
(constraint (context WfC-car-insurance)
(action1 estimateRepairCost) (action2 sendRepairCost) )
(constraint (context WfC-car-insurance)
(action1 contactGarage) (action2 sendRepairCost) )
(constraint (context WfC-car-insurance)
(action1 sendRepairCost) (action2 assignAssessor) )
(constraint (context WfC-car-insurance)
(action1 assignAssessor) (action2 inspectCar) )
(constraint (context WfC-car-insurance)
(action1 inspectCar) (action2 sendNewRepairCost) )
(constraint (context WfC-car-insurance)
(action1 sendNewRepairCost) (action2 agreeRepair) )
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(constraint (context WfC-car-insurance)
(action1 agreeRepair) (action2 repairCar) )
(constraint (context WfC-car-insurance)
(action1 repairCar) (action2 sendInvoice) )
(constraint (context WfC-car-insurance)
(action1 sendInvoice) (action2 forwardInvoice) )
(constraint (context WfC-car-insurance)
(action1 forwardInvoice) (action2 payRepairCost) )
(constraint (context WfC-car-insurance)
(action1 returnClaimForm) (action2 payRepairCost) )
D.2 A Phone Claim
f-126 * (ifact (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700681109)
(fact phoneClaim ref 1 from policyholder to euro_assist))
f-127 (obligation (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700681171)
(bearer policyholder) (counterparty euro_assist)
(fact receiveInfo ref 1 from policyholder to euro_assist)
(liveline 0) (deadline 1280700691109))
f-130 * (ifact (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700684359)
(fact receiveInfo ref 1 from policyholder to euro_assist))
f-131 (fulfillment (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700684359)
(obl <Fact-127>) (ifa <Fact-130>))
f-133 (obligation (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700684406)
(bearer euro_assist) (counterparty policyholder)
(fact assignGarage ref 1 from euro_assist to policyholder)
(liveline 0) (deadline 1280700694359))
f-135 (obligation (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700684421)
(bearer euro_assist) (counterparty agfil)
(fact notifyClaim ref 1 from euro_assist to agfil)
(liveline 0) (deadline 1280700694359))
f-137 * (ifact (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700687937)
(fact assignGarage ref 1 from euro_assist to policyholder))
f-138 (fulfillment (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700687937)
(obl <Fact-133>) (ifa <Fact-137>))
f-140 (obligation (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700688000)
(bearer policyholder) (counterparty garage)
(fact sendCar ref 1 from policyholder to garage)
(liveline 0) (deadline 1280700697937))
f-143 * (ifact (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700689078)
(fact notifyClaim ref 1 from euro_assist to agfil))
f-144 (fulfillment (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700689078)
(obl <Fact-135>) (ifa <Fact-143>))
f-146 (obligation (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700689140)
(bearer agfil) (counterparty lee_cs)
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(fact forwardClaim ref 1 from agfil to lee_cs)
(liveline 0) (deadline 1280700699078))
f-148 (obligation (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700689156)
(bearer agfil) (counterparty policyholder)
(fact sendClaimForm ref 1 from agfil to policyholder)
(liveline 0) (deadline 1280700709078))
f-152 * (ifact (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700691281)
(fact forwardClaim ref 1 from agfil to lee_cs))
f-153 (fulfillment (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700691281)
(obl <Fact-146>) (ifa <Fact-152>))
f-155 (obligation (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700691328)
(bearer lee_cs) (counterparty garage)
(fact contactGarage ref 1 from lee_cs to garage)
(liveline 0) (deadline 1280700701281))
f-158 * (ifact (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700693062)
(fact sendCar ref 1 from policyholder to garage))
f-160 (fulfillment (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700693062)
(obl <Fact-140>) (ifa <Fact-158>))
f-161 (obligation (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700693109)
(bearer garage) (counterparty policyholder)
(fact estimateRepairCost ref 1 from garage to policyholder)
(liveline 0) (deadline 1280700713062))
f-167 * (ifact (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700694890)
(fact contactGarage ref 1 from lee_cs to garage))
f-169 (fulfillment (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700694890)
(obl <Fact-155>) (ifa <Fact-167>))
f-173 * (ifact (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700698250)
(fact sendClaimForm ref 1 from agfil to policyholder msg ))
f-174 (fulfillment (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700698250)
(obl <Fact-148>) (ifa <Fact-173>))
f-176 (obligation (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700698296)
(bearer policyholder) (counterparty agfil)
(fact returnClaimForm ref 1 from policyholder to agfil)
(liveline 0) (deadline 1280700768250))
f-183 * (ifact (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700701984)
(fact estimateRepairCost ref 1 from garage to policyholder))
f-185 (fulfillment (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700701984)
(obl <Fact-161>) (ifa <Fact-183>))
f-186 (obligation (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700702031)
(bearer garage) (counterparty lee_cs)
(fact sendRepairCost ref 1 from garage to lee_cs)
(liveline 0) (deadline 1280700711984))
f-189 * (ifact (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700704093)
(fact sendRepairCost ref 1 from garage to lee_cs))
f-190 (fulfillment (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700704093)
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(obl <Fact-186>) (ifa <Fact-189>))
f-192 (obligation (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700704156)
(bearer lee_cs) (counterparty assessor)
(fact assignAssessor ref 1 from lee_cs to assessor)
(liveline 0) (deadline 1280700714093))
f-195 * (ifact (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700708703)
(fact assignAssessor ref 1 from lee_cs to assessor))
f-196 (fulfillment (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700708703)
(obl <Fact-192>) (ifa <Fact-195>))
f-198 (obligation (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700708750)
(bearer assessor) (counterparty lee_cs)
(fact inspectCar ref 1 from assessor to lee_cs)
(liveline 0) (deadline 1280700709703))
f-203 * (ifact (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700709093)
(fact inspectCar ref 1 from assessor to lee_cs))
f-204 (fulfillment (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700709093)
(obl <Fact-198>) (ifa <Fact-203>))
f-206 (obligation (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700709140)
(bearer assessor) (counterparty lee_cs)
(fact sendNewRepairCost ref 1 from assessor to lee_cs)
(liveline 0) (deadline 1280700739093))
f-217 * (ifact (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700716937)
(fact sendNewRepairCost ref 1 from assessor to lee_cs))
f-218 (fulfillment (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700716937)
(obl <Fact-206>) (ifa <Fact-217>))
f-220 (obligation (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700716984)
(bearer lee_cs) (counterparty garage)
(fact agreeRepair ref 1 from lee_cs to garage)
(liveline 0) (deadline 1280700746937))
f-223 * (ifact (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700720406)
(fact agreeRepair ref 1 from lee_cs to garage))
f-224 (fulfillment (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700720406)
(obl <Fact-220>) (ifa <Fact-223>))
f-226 (obligation (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700720453)
(bearer garage) (counterparty policyholder)
(fact repairCar ref 1 from garage to policyholder)
(liveline 0) (deadline 1280700770406))
f-229 * (ifact (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700726281)
(fact repairCar ref 1 from garage to policyholder))
f-230 (fulfillment (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700726281)
(obl <Fact-226>) (ifa <Fact-229>))
f-232 (obligation (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700726312)
(bearer garage) (counterparty lee_cs)
(fact sendInvoice ref 1 from garage to lee_cs)
(liveline 0) (deadline 1280700826281))
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f-235 * (ifact (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700729390)
(fact returnClaimForm ref 1 from policyholder to agfil))
f-236 (fulfillment (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700729390)
(obl <Fact-176>) (ifa <Fact-235>))
f-241 * (ifact (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700745031)
(fact sendInvoice ref 1 from garage to lee_cs))
f-242 (fulfillment (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700745031)
(obl <Fact-232>) (ifa <Fact-241>))
f-244 (obligation (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700745093)
(bearer lee_cs) (counterparty agfil)
(fact forwardInvoice ref 1 from lee_cs to agfil)
(liveline 0) (deadline 1280700805031))
f-249 * (ifact (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700762609)
(fact forwardInvoice ref 1 from lee_cs to agfil))
f-250 (fulfillment (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700762609)
(obl <Fact-244>) (ifa <Fact-249>))
f-252 (obligation (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700762671)
(bearer agfil) (counterparty garage)
(fact payRepairCost ref 1 from agfil to garage)
(liveline 0) (deadline 1280701062609))
f-263 * (ifact (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700880718)
(fact payRepairCost ref 1 from agfil to garage))
f-265 (fulfillment (context WfC-car-insurance) (when 1280700880718)
(obl <Fact-252>) (ifa <Fact-263>))
AppendixE
Contract XML Schema
E.1 Design View Snapshots
The following snapshots were taken using Altova R© XMLSpy R© 2006, and are in-
cluded here to facilitate reading the XML schema.
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E.2 contract.xsd
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<xs:schema xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
elementFormDefault="qualified" attributeFormDefault="unqualified">
<xs:element name="contract">
<xs:annotation>
<xs:documentation>Generic contract</xs:documentation>
</xs:annotation>
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="header">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="id" type="xs:string" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="when" type="xs:dateTime"/>
<xs:element name="who">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="agent" type="xs:string" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="super" type="xs:string" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="type" type="xs:string" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="contractual-info" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="name" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="slot" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="name" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="value" type="xs:string"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="rules" minOccurs="0">
<xs:complexType>
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<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="rule" type="ruleType" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="norms" minOccurs="0">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="norm" type="normType" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:simpleType name="valueAttributeType">
<xs:annotation>
<xs:documentation>From JessML</xs:documentation>
</xs:annotation>
<xs:restriction base="xs:string">
<xs:enumeration value="SYMBOL"/>
<xs:enumeration value="STRING"/>
<xs:enumeration value="INTEGER"/>
<xs:enumeration value="VARIABLE"/>
<xs:enumeration value="FACT"/>
<xs:enumeration value="FLOAT"/>
<xs:enumeration value="FUNCALL"/>
<xs:enumeration value="LIST"/>
<xs:enumeration value="JAVA_OBJECT"/>
<xs:enumeration value="BINDING"/>
<xs:enumeration value="MULTIVARIABLE"/>
<xs:enumeration value="LONG"/>
<xs:enumeration value="LAMBDA"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:complexType name="varAllowedType" mixed="true">
<xs:annotation>
<xs:documentation>Similar to value element in JessML</xs:documentation>
</xs:annotation>
<xs:attribute name="type" type="valueAttributeType"/>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="frameType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="name" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="slot" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded">
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<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="name" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="value" type="varAllowedType"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:element name="fact" type="frameType">
<xs:annotation>
<xs:documentation>ontology for institutional-facts</xs:documentation>
</xs:annotation>
</xs:element>
<xs:complexType name="expressionType">
<xs:choice>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="num-operator">
<xs:simpleType>
<xs:restriction base="xs:string">
<xs:enumeration value="+"/>
<xs:enumeration value="-"/>
<xs:enumeration value="*"/>
<xs:enumeration value="/"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="expression" type="expressionType" minOccurs="2"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="operand" type="varAllowedType"/>
</xs:choice>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="situationElementType"/>
<xs:complexType name="andType">
<xs:complexContent>
<xs:extension base="situationElementType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="situation_element" type="situationElementType"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:extension>
</xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="orType">
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<xs:complexContent>
<xs:extension base="situationElementType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="situation_element" type="situationElementType"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:extension>
</xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="notType">
<xs:complexContent>
<xs:extension base="situationElementType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="situation_element" type="situationElementType"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:extension>
</xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="startContractType">
<xs:complexContent>
<xs:extension base="situationElementType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="when" type="varAllowedType"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:extension>
</xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="contractualInfoType">
<xs:complexContent>
<xs:extension base="situationElementType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="name" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="slot" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="name" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="value" type="varAllowedType"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:extension>
</xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="ifactType">
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<xs:complexContent>
<xs:extension base="situationElementType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element ref="fact"/>
<xs:element name="when" type="varAllowedType"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:extension>
</xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="timeType">
<xs:complexContent>
<xs:extension base="situationElementType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="when" type="varAllowedType"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:extension>
</xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="livelineViolationType">
<xs:complexContent>
<xs:extension base="situationElementType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="bearer" type="varAllowedType"/>
<xs:element name="counterparty" type="varAllowedType"/>
<xs:element ref="fact"/>
<xs:element name="when" type="varAllowedType"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:extension>
</xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="deadlineViolationType">
<xs:complexContent>
<xs:extension base="situationElementType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="bearer" type="varAllowedType"/>
<xs:element name="counterparty" type="varAllowedType"/>
<xs:element ref="fact"/>
<xs:element name="when" type="varAllowedType"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:extension>
</xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="fulfillmentType">
<xs:complexContent>
<xs:extension base="situationElementType">
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<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="bearer" type="varAllowedType"/>
<xs:element name="counterparty" type="varAllowedType"/>
<xs:element ref="fact"/>
<xs:element name="when" type="varAllowedType"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:extension>
</xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="violationType">
<xs:complexContent>
<xs:extension base="situationElementType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="bearer" type="varAllowedType"/>
<xs:element name="counterparty" type="varAllowedType"/>
<xs:element ref="fact"/>
<xs:element name="when" type="varAllowedType"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:extension>
</xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="relConditionType">
<xs:complexContent>
<xs:extension base="situationElementType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="rel-operator">
<xs:simpleType>
<xs:restriction base="xs:string">
<xs:enumeration value="eq"/>
<xs:enumeration value="gt"/>
<xs:enumeration value="ge"/>
<xs:enumeration value="lt"/>
<xs:enumeration value="le"/>
<xs:enumeration value="ne"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="expression" type="expressionType" minOccurs="2"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:extension>
</xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="ruleType">
<xs:sequence>
E.2. contract.xsd 187
<xs:element name="name" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="comment" type="xs:string" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="if">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="ifact" type="ifactType" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="then">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="ifact" type="ifactType"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="normType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="name" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="comment" type="xs:string" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="scope" minOccurs="0">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="contract-type" type="xs:string" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="id" type="varAllowedType"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="situation">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="situation-element" type="situationElementType"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="prescription">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:choice>
<xs:element name="obligation" type="obligationType" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element name="end-contract" type="endContractType"/>
</xs:choice>
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</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="obligationType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="bearer" type="varAllowedType"/>
<xs:element name="counterparty" type="varAllowedType"/>
<xs:element ref="fact"/>
<xs:element name="liveline" type="expressionType" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="deadline" type="expressionType"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="endContractType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="when" type="varAllowedType"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:schema>
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